Former chemical weapon production facilities

Former Chemical Weapon Production Facilities Government-owned or contracted facilities used to (1) produce chemical agents, precursors for chemical agents, or other components for chemical weapons or (2) load or fill chemical weapons. These facilities are located at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Indiana Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas and Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado. 

The Army has identified former chemical weapon production facilities that need to be cleaned up. They consist of buildings and equipment for producing, loading, storing and assembling chemical munitions and agents. These facilities are located in four states and are in various degrees of contamination and deterioration. 

The Army estimates that it will take ten years and 420 million to 

Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel Chemical warfare materiel, which are buried on both private lands and military installations, consisting of various munitions, bombs, rockets, and containers that may have been contaminated with nerve, blister, blood, or choking agents. At some sites, chemical munitions and agents were drained into holes in the ground, covered with lime or burned in an open pit, and finally covered with earth. Based on preliminary analyses, the Army has identified potential chemical warfare materiel at 215 burial sites in 33 states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Washington, DC. The Army has determined that thirty of the 215 potential burial sites warrant no further remediation activity. This determination is based on the Army s assessment of the potential burial site, prior remedial work, or accessibility to the site. 

The Army has limited and often imprecise information about the nature and extent of buried chemical materiel. However, it has begun to develop site characterization, excavation, removal, and treatment procedures for the burial sites. Since burial was considered to be the final disposal act, little record-keeping was done for burial activities and additional sites are likely to be identified. Available records indicate that some burial sites may contain active chemical agents and explosives therefore, they pose a threat to human health and the environment. 

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Radilov, A.S., Nagomyy, S.V., Rembovskiy, V.R., Ermolaeva, E.E., Savelieva, E.I., Goncharov, N.V., Koryagina, N.L., Tsybulskaya, E.A., Khlebnikova, N.S., Tsymhal, F.A. (2007). Toxicological and sanitary assessment of waste products of the former chemical weapon production facilities. Rossiyskii Khi-micheskii Zhurnal [Russian Chemical Journal] LI(2) 77-82. (In Russian)... 

There are certain chemical munitions, materiel, and facilities that are not specifically included in the U.S. stockpile of unitary chemical weapons (those containing a single lethal chemical agent). These items are referred to as nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel and consist of binary chemical weapons, miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel, recovered chemical weapons, former chemical weapon production facilities, and buried chemical warfare materiel. 

In 1993, the United States signed the U.N.-sponsored Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and the Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, commonly referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention. The United States agreed to dispose of (1) binary chemical weapons, recovered chemical weapons, and former chemical weapon production facilities within 10 years and (2) miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel within five years of the date the convention becomes effective. If ratified by the U.S. Senate, the convention becomes effective 180 days after the 65th nation ratifies the treaty, but not sooner than January 13, 1995. Under the terms of the convention, chemical weapons buried prior to 1977 are exempt from disposal as long as they remain buried. In the United States, burial was... 

Former chemical weapon production facilities The facilities that are to be destroyed have been identified. However, the levels of contamination and deterioration are unknown. 4 0.42 10... 

The First Review Conference reviewed progress in relation to the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities, and noted with satisfaction that the elimination of CW production capabihties has progressed as required by Part V of the Verification Annex. The conversion of former chemical weapons production facihties for purposes not prohibited is permitted by the Convention, in exceptional cases of compelling need. 

The First Review Conference reviewed the progress made in the field of conversion of former CW production facilities for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. The First Review Conference confirmed the States Parties commitment to complete conversion as early as possible and to keep the Secretariat and the Council informed about the progress being made. The First Review Conference noted the intention of the Secretariat to inspect, soon after 29 April 2003, all chemical weapons production facihties that are subject to conversion for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, but that have not yet been certified as completely converted, and to report to the Coimcil about the conversion status of each of these facilities. 

In 2004 Libya declared to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 3,563 empty chemical weapons (CW) airborne bombs and 23.62 metric tons of sulfur mustard and other chemicals that could be used in the production of CW. Libya stated that it had never transferred CW. In March 2004 Libya completed the destruction of the bombs. That December, the OPCW approved Libya s request to convert a former sulfur mustard production facility at Rabta into a pharmaceutical production facility to produce drugs to treat acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), malaria, and tuberculosis. While it is evident that Libya stockpiled air-droppable CW and sulfur mustard, the exact nature of its work with other agents is less clear. For example, Libya reportedly carried out some experimental work with sarin and soman. 

Uhe stockpile (the subject of the Amy s Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program) consists of (1) bulk containers of nerve and blister agents and (2) munitions, including rockets, mines, bombs, projectiles, and spray tanks, loaded with nerve or blister agents. Buried chemical warfare materiel, recovered chemical warfare materiel, binary weapons (in which two nonlethal components are mixed after firing to yield a lethal nerve agent), former production facilities, and miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel are not included in the stockpile. The disposition of these five classes of materials is the subject of a separate Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Pro-... 

The destruction of these declared stockpiles has made considerable progress. There have been difficulties and delays, but there is no doubting the full commitment of all possessor States Parties to complete the destruction of all their chemical weapons within the time frames established by the Convention. Furthermore, facilities that were used in the past to produce chemical weapons are being destroyed or converted for legitimate purposes. Destruction as well as conversion operations are subject to systematic verification by the OPCW, which has conducted more than 1,800 inspections, in 65 States Parties, since the beginning of inspections in 1997. More than 1,000 of these inspections were conducted at CW facilities (CW storage facilities, former CW production facilities, destruction operations, and locations where old and/or abandoned chemical weapons are being recovered and destroyed). Some... 

For over 70 years the U.S. has produced and stored chemical weapons. In addition to the military arsenal, there are also "non-stockpile" materials. Non-stockpile material includes buried chemical warfare material, binary chemical weapons, recovered chemical weapons, and former production facilities. Some of these materials date back to World War I development and production efforts. Not all of these sites are still under military control. For example, in 1993, a large number of World War I chemical shells were removed from a residential neighborhood in Washington, D.C. The burial site was discovered by construction crews while excavating the basement of a new home. In addition to non-stockpile materials, there have also been several situations where individuals have claimed to possess chemical munitions and threatened to release their contents. For these reasons, it would be beneficial to be able to rapidly identify suspect munitions. 

Destroying binary chemical weapons, miscellaneous chemical warfare material, recovered chemical weapons, and former production facilities in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, in compliance with public safety and environmental requirements and regulations, and in coordination with the potentially affected public and... 

Non-stockpile chemical materiel includes buried chemical weapons, recovered chemical materiel, binary chemical weapons, former production facilities, and miscellaneous chemical materiel. 

In addition, the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) mandates requirements for chemical demilitarization. Congress began that effort in earnest with the EY 1993 Defense Authorization Act (PL 102-484), directing the Army to identify the locations, types, and quantities of all non-stockpile chemical materiel, explain disposal methods, estimate costs, establish a schedule for their destruction, and discuss transportation alternatives. Nonstockpile CWM includes buried CWM, binary chemical weapons, recovered chemical weapons, former production facilities, and miscellaneous CWM. 

Chemical warfare materiel (CWM) encompasses diverse items that were used during 60 years of efforts by the United States to develop a capability for condncting chemical warfare. Non-Stockpile CWM (NSCWM) is materiel not included in the current U.S. inventory of chemical munitions and includes buried materiel, recovered materiel, components of binary chemical weapons, former production facilities, and miscellaneous materiel. NSCWM that had been buried on former military sites is increasingly being dug up as the land is developed for other purposes. Other NSCWM may be found on or near the surface at former research facilities or test and firing ranges. 

Major steps have been taken towards eliminating CWPFs. The last remaining former CWPFs are currently undergoing conversion, one is temporarily used for chemical weapons destruction and will be destroyed thereafter. The verification measures applied by the OPCW are tailored to ensure that these production capacities are either rendered for peaceful purposes or destroyed in accordance with the Convention s requirements. All converted facilities remain under systematic verification. An issue that needs to be addressed is the scope of the verification measures to be applied past the 10-year period after former CWPFs have been certified by the OPCW as converted. 

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