Chemical weapons production

Certainly, some states in unstable regions of the world remain interested in chemical weapons. While they are probably not the most effective battlefield weapons, chemical weapons can instil terror in entire populations and compel governments to strike pre-emptively against chemical weapons production and storage sites. The presumption of a chemical warfare capability in an adversary state can magnify an existing condition of crisis instability. The CWC offered the prospect that in the not too distant future an entire class of unconventional weaponry would be eliminated. 

India Declared in June 1997 that it possessed a chemical weapons stockpile. Has begun to destroy its stockpile under the CWC. Its industry retains the ability to produce agent precursors - chemicals that can be used in chemical weapons production. Delivery systems include short-range anti-ship cruise missiles, air-launched tactical missiles, fighter aircraft, artillery and rockets. 

Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this... 

PART V Destruction of Chemical Weapons Production Facilities and its Verification Pursuant to Article V... 

Systematic verification of chemical weapon production facilities and cessation of their activities... 

The detailed facility agreement for each chemical weapons production facility shall specify ... 

Alkyl/cycloalkyl alkylphosphonofluoridates are generally obtained from an organophosphorus precursor, typically an alkylphosphonic difluoride, and an alcohol. In 1992, over 300 aliphatic and cyclic alcohols were found to be commercially available as fine chemicals, of which inexpensive primary and secondary alcohols are considered suitable for chemical weapons production. By these criteria, approximately 70 alcohols remain of prime interest for the preparation of Schedule l.A.l chemicals. Only pinacolyl alcohol, the precursor of soman, is contained in the CWC Schedule... 

The six countries to have declared chemical weapons are required to destroy some 8.5 million items, including munitions and containers. As of April 2005,167 countries had joined the OPCW. ° All declared chemical weapons production capacity had been inactivated, with two-thirds of the declared facilities either verifiably destroyed or converted for peaceful purposes. With respect to chemical weapons, the inventory of all declared stockpiles had been completed and verified, but less than one-quarter of the declared 8.5 million chemical weapon munitions had been verifiably destroyed. Of the 70,000 tonnes of declared chemical weapons agents, only about 15 per cent had been verifiably destroyed just a tiny drop of nerve agent the size of a pin head can kill an adult within minutes of exposure. Almost 5,000 industrial facilities around the world are liable for inspection the OPCW had conducted almost 2,000 inspections at 170 military and 600 industrial sites in 68 countries. 

The Review Document simply stated The First Review Conference considered the impact of developments in science and technology on the Convention s prohibitions. The definitions contained in Article II, in particular of the terms chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facihty , were found to adequately cover these developments and to provide for the apphcation of the Convention s prohibitions to any toxic chemical, except where such a chemical is intended for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, and as long as the types and quantities involved are consistent with such purposes (Review Document, para. 23). 

It is rather difficult to state with confidence whether five days is long or not but, as one arms control expert has said, [wjhile the delay between the challenge and the team s entry into the site - a total of some 120 hours - may seem long, chemical weapons production is very difficult to clean up. Modern chemical detection equipment would be able to detect traces of chemical agents in reaction vessels where they had been produced, for example, even after extensive cleaning. If this is the case -and the view has been shared by other experts the point would then be whether the inspection team could reach the reaction vessels in question. In other words, it would become important how intrusive the access could be. 

Law no. 98-467 of 17 June 1998 concerning the implementation of the Convention of 13 January 1993 on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (French CWC Act), Article 2. The full French text of the legislation can be found via . An English translation has been used for the purposes of this paper and is on file with the author. The French legislation also contains provisions relating particularly to chemical weapons production facilities, as well as to destruction facilities. See French CWC Act, Articles 3-6. 

Radilov, A.S., Nagomyy, S.V., Rembovskiy, V.R., Ermolaeva, E.E., Savelieva, E.I., Goncharov, N.V., Koryagina, N.L., Tsybulskaya, E.A., Khlebnikova, N.S., Tsymhal, F.A. (2007). Toxicological and sanitary assessment of waste products of the former chemical weapon production facilities. Rossiyskii Khi-micheskii Zhurnal [Russian Chemical Journal] LI(2) 77-82. (In Russian)... 

Article I of the CWC obliges states parties to destroy any chemical weapon stockpiles in its possession or which it has abandoned on the territory of another state party. As well, a state party must destroy its chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) or convert them for peaceful purposes not prohibited under the Convention. A state party is required within 30 days of ratifying or acceding to the Convention to declare to the Technical Secretariat whether or not it possesses any chemical weapons or has possessed or produced them in the past. Likewise, old chemical weapons (OCW), both those produced before 1925, and those produced between 1925 and 1946, have to be declared. A state party must also notify the OPCW if it has... 

There are certain chemical munitions, materiel, and facilities that are not specifically included in the U.S. stockpile of unitary chemical weapons (those containing a single lethal chemical agent). These items are referred to as nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel and consist of binary chemical weapons, miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel, recovered chemical weapons, former chemical weapon production facilities, and buried chemical warfare materiel. 

In 1993, the United States signed the U.N.-sponsored Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and the Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, commonly referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention. The United States agreed to dispose of (1) binary chemical weapons, recovered chemical weapons, and former chemical weapon production facilities within 10 years and (2) miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel within five years of the date the convention becomes effective. If ratified by the U.S. Senate, the convention becomes effective 180 days after the 65th nation ratifies the treaty, but not sooner than January 13, 1995. Under the terms of the convention, chemical weapons buried prior to 1977 are exempt from disposal as long as they remain buried. In the United States, burial was... 

Former chemical weapon production facilities The facilities that are to be destroyed have been identified. However, the levels of contamination and deterioration are unknown. 4 0.42 10... 

Former Chemical Weapon Production Facilities Government-owned or contracted facilities used to (1) produce chemical agents, precursors for chemical agents, or other components for chemical weapons or (2) load or fill chemical weapons. These facilities are located at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Indiana Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas and Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado. 

The Army has identified former chemical weapon production facilities that need to be cleaned up. They consist of buildings and equipment for producing, loading, storing and assembling chemical munitions and agents. These facilities are located in four states and are in various degrees of contamination and deterioration. 

The subject of chemical weapon production was a very sensitive one. In 1984, congress created the Chemical Warfare Review Commission to look at several issues related to the military s chemical warfare preparedness. This committee visited numerous sites, interviewed experts, reviewed policy, and examined intelligence reports. Among their findings, the commission concluded... 

Despite such uncertainties, a chemical weapons reduction agreement17 was reached in 1990 between the United States and the Soviet Union that will (1) effectively stop chemical weapon production and (2) reduce each nation s chemical agent stocks to a value of 5,000 metric tons by the year 1999 (by the end of the year 2002, this number will fall to 500 tons). Destruction of the remainder is contingent on a commitment for similar, total chemical warfare stock elimination by other chemical warfare-capable nations.18,19... 

Another unique problem area in Chesapeake Bay is the Edgewood arsenal (Aberdeen Proving Ground). This was the largest chemical weapons production facility in the world. For years, this facility dumped chemical weapons in the Chesapeake tributaries and, in one case, nuclear material near Delaware Bay. 

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