Weapons, chemical destruction

Table 8.1 Timeframe for chemical weapons destruction under CWC...

Amy E. Smithson and Maureen Lenihan, The Destruction of Weapons Under the Chemical Weapons Convention , Science and Global Security, 6 (1996), p. 93 Jonathan B. Tucker, Russia s Plan for Chemical Weapons Destruction, Arms Control Today (July-August 2001). 

The role of S A at a Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF) is different than in other types of inspections. At a CWDF, the main objective of S A is to confirm the identity of a particular chemical that has been declared, that is, the declared chemical agent that is being destroyed. Further,... 

Systematic on-site verification measures at chemical weapons destruction facilities... 

Inspectors shall have the right to tag, for sampling, munitions, devices, or containers located in the temporary holding areas at the chemical weapons destruction facilities. 

Chemical Weapons Destruction and Explosive Waste/Unexploded Ordnance Remediation, Editor Noyes, R., Noyes, Park Ridge, NJ, 1996... 

In this domain of non-proliferation and disarmament, as in many others, the majority of available information originates in the United States. Chemical weapons destruction programmes in other countries will be addressed but with less depth and fewer examples. Although much of the US controversy revolves around issues of the risk associated with incineration versus non-incineration disposal technologies, my intention in this chapter is not to make a new technical assessment of the two. I shall address how technical and scientific assessments regarding chemical weapons disposal have been communicated, viewed and utilized by the pubhc. 

A variety of methods have been utilized to communicate with the public and to solicit public input regarding chemical weapons destruction. Public information sessions have a very narrow dynamic. A few representatives from the Army, usually public affairs officers, are positioned at the front of the room and the citizens primarily serve an audience role. At some point in the hearing, the members of the public are invited to express their concerns or their support or to ask questions about a decision already made by the Army. This style of public interaction is often called Decide, Announce, Defend , and it offers very little in the way of a constructive role for the pubhc in actual decision-making. 

What role is the Chemical Weapons Convention portrayed as playing in the ongoing wrangling over chemical weapons destruction Public policy experts seem to focus on the international treaty as a motivational force driving chemical weapons disposal. " In the media, there is an underlying effort to impute culpability for the need to destroy the US chemical weapons stockpile to international treaties, often without recognizing that the weapons were declared obsolete by the US Department of Defense 10 years before the CWC was signed and 15 years before it came... 

To step back from the chemical weapons destruction issue, it may be instructive to contrast the situation with another group of public citizens... 

Russia inherited the world s largest declared stockpile of chemical weapons, over 40,000 metric tons, from the Soviet Union. The Russian government has identified chemical weapons destruction as one of its two priority areas of concern for the G-8 Global Partnership accord against the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Although issues of economics have often dominated what has been said and written about the disposal programme, lack of local community support is also cited as a major political obstacle. Many of the same concerns detailed extensively by US citizens are also asserted by Russian citizens. Foremost is concern about the detrimental effects of chemical weapons destruction on public health and the environment . ... 

The Chinese government has indicated that it recognizes the importance of local support for chemical weapons destruction. The issue s visibility in local and national newspapers is important and may join with the burgeoning Chinese environmental movement to shift discussion away from criticism of Japan to focus on the pragmatics of destruction. 

On a more cautionary note, opposition from citizens groups could embolden those who seek to limit the effectiveness of the CWC or other international agreements. If there is strong, vocal and well-established opposition at home that is already blaming the CWC, such sentiment could be co-opted as a tool to erode its effectiveness. One can imagine homeland opposition incorporated as part of the litany of motives for decreasing funding for cooperative threat reduction to aid Russia s chemical weapons destruction efforts. 

Amy E. Smithson, Michael Krepon and James Schear, The U.S. Chemical Weapons Destruction Program Views, Analysis, and Recommendations , Report No. 13 (The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, September 1994). 

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