Buried Chemical Weapons

Emphasis in this review is on those potential degradation products resulting from agent contact with soil, water or the atmosphere after unintended release from historically buried chemical weapons and wastes, or potential spills during munition demilitarization and disposal activities. The principal degradation processes include photolysis, hydrolysis, oxidation and microbial degradation. Volatilization is an important mechanism for the transfer of some CWAs from soil and water to air. Decontamination procedures, considered in Chapter 7, may incorporate some or all of these processes. 

Issues Bearing on Sites Containing Large Amounts of Buried Chemical Weapons Materiel... 

Non-stockpile chemical materiel includes buried chemical weapons, recovered chemical materiel, binary chemical weapons, former production facilities, and miscellaneous chemical materiel. 

At the end of World War I, there were four million shells in the United States inventory. World War I ordnance such as the Livens projectile and Stokes mortar were outmoded by World War II, resulting in burials and dumping. Leaking ordnance was a continual problem. Add to that the 1,343,728 World War II chemical bombs, and the 13,550,613 World War II chemical mortar rounds not used in World War II, and the probability of substantial buried chemical weapons becomes a certainty, in addition to the tremendous numbers of currently stockpiled ordnance. Also, even current inventory ordnance would have an occasional leaking or damaged munition. In addition, experimental ordnance, grenades, rockets, candles, spray tanks, smoke pots, and cylinders are also burial candidates. Where is the question state and local regulators need to repeatedly ask. 

Because the remediation efforts at Spring Valley did not address all of the areas of concern reflected in the Historical Report, serious questions remain over the adequacy of the search for unexploded ordnance as well as the survey for residual contamination from the toxic substances used in the research. There are five areas of research findings that bear on the issue of whether or not a potential for more buried chemical weapons munitions exists ... 

First, past experience at other sites indicates a tendency to bury excess munitions. And, as noted, buried chemical weapons munitions have already been found at the Spring Valley site. Second, as the District of Columbia has seen above, the production of chemical warfare agents was very large. The operation had 1200 chemists and engineers and 700 support personnel. If each chemist used only one small bottle of dangerous chemicals a week, that is a lot of material. 

If a State Party buried chemical weapons on its territory after 1976, that State Party is obliged to include this fact in its declaration. A State Party is also obliged to declare the sea dumping... 

First, past experience at other sites indicates a tendency to bury excess munitions. And, as noted, buried chemical weapons munitions have already been found at the... 

Subsequently, a newspaper reporter located an Ian McFee who worked for Porton Downs, the British equivalent of AUES, and also that this individual buried chemical weapons there after World War II. Could this person have been the son of our Ian Macfee His birth date rules him out as being the same person. The District of Columbia checked that spelling of McFee and found 109 in the British telephone directory. 

Uhe stockpile (the subject of the Amy s Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program) consists of (1) bulk containers of nerve and blister agents and (2) munitions, including rockets, mines, bombs, projectiles, and spray tanks, loaded with nerve or blister agents. Buried chemical warfare materiel, recovered chemical warfare materiel, binary weapons (in which two nonlethal components are mixed after firing to yield a lethal nerve agent), former production facilities, and miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel are not included in the stockpile. The disposition of these five classes of materials is the subject of a separate Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Pro-... 

Minute quantities of sulfur mustard are used by various military and contract laboratories for defense research purposes, and for verification of Chemical Weapons Convention comphance. Bulk quantities of sulfur mustard are no longer manufactured in the USA. Military stockpiles of sulfur mustard are awaiting destruction or are in the process of being destroyed. Some sulfur mustard may also be found buried or abandoned at former defense sites. Sulfur mustard was frequently loaded into artillery shells and aerial bombs (often with lewisite). Various quantities of sulfur mustard also exist in other countries. Large amounts of sulfur mustard have been disposed of at sea. 

For over 70 years the U.S. has produced and stored chemical weapons. In addition to the military arsenal, there are also "non-stockpile" materials. Non-stockpile material includes buried chemical warfare material, binary chemical weapons, recovered chemical weapons, and former production facilities. Some of these materials date back to World War I development and production efforts. Not all of these sites are still under military control. For example, in 1993, a large number of World War I chemical shells were removed from a residential neighborhood in Washington, D.C. The burial site was discovered by construction crews while excavating the basement of a new home. In addition to non-stockpile materials, there have also been several situations where individuals have claimed to possess chemical munitions and threatened to release their contents. For these reasons, it would be beneficial to be able to rapidly identify suspect munitions. 

There are certain chemical munitions, materiel, and facilities that are not specifically included in the U.S. stockpile of unitary chemical weapons (those containing a single lethal chemical agent). These items are referred to as nonstockpile chemical warfare materiel and consist of binary chemical weapons, miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel, recovered chemical weapons, former chemical weapon production facilities, and buried chemical warfare materiel. 

In 1993, the United States signed the U.N.-sponsored Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and the Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, commonly referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention. The United States agreed to dispose of (1) binary chemical weapons, recovered chemical weapons, and former chemical weapon production facilities within 10 years and (2) miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel within five years of the date the convention becomes effective. If ratified by the U.S. Senate, the convention becomes effective 180 days after the 65th nation ratifies the treaty, but not sooner than January 13, 1995. Under the terms of the convention, chemical weapons buried prior to 1977 are exempt from disposal as long as they remain buried. In the United States, burial was... 

Chemical Sureties/Weapons As with conventional ordnance, burial of chemical weapons was an accepted disposal practice. The lack of accurate disposal records and the acute threat represent significant challenges to the restoration of lands that may contain buried chemical agents. Leaking stockpiles of chemical weapons also represent a threat to human health... 

Military Firing Ranges/Proving grounds can be the location of buried or unexploded munitions or chemical weapons rounds. These munitions can be undocumented and are potentially very dangerous. 

CWM that remains buried is not subject to the treaty. Once the CWM has been recovered and characterized, it must be declared under the CWC and must then be destroyed as soon as possible. Non-stockpile CWM items in storage at the time of treaty ratification must be destroyed within 2, 5, or 10 years of the ratification date, depending on the type of chemical weapon or on the type of chemical with which an item is filled (U.S. Army, 2001c). 

In addition, the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) mandates requirements for chemical demilitarization. Congress began that effort in earnest with the EY 1993 Defense Authorization Act (PL 102-484), directing the Army to identify the locations, types, and quantities of all non-stockpile chemical materiel, explain disposal methods, estimate costs, establish a schedule for their destruction, and discuss transportation alternatives. Nonstockpile CWM includes buried CWM, binary chemical weapons, recovered chemical weapons, former production facilities, and miscellaneous CWM. 

Table 3.1 details some suspected CWM burial sites. This does not include all sites where work was conducted on chemical weapons and residual contamination or burial of CWM probably occurred. For example, leaking chemical containers or ordnance items were required to be buried immediately, thus a convoy shipping chemical weapons, merely passing through a facility and stopping for the night, might lead to a burial. 

The document also states, In most cases, these sites served more than one purpose. Ranges were often used to dispose of leaking or defective munitions. Many historical references, primarily during and immediately after World War II, cite instances where chemical weapons were buried because of leaks discovered during transportation or in storage. In some cases, munitions and other containers were drained into holes, covered with lime or open-pit burned and finally covered with earth. ... 

In choosing the correct detectors, other particular facts should also be considered. Whereas most ordnance is ferrous, fuses may be nonferrous and are usually buried separately from the projectile bodies and may be in large and dangerous quantities. Some explosives such as dynamite or C-3 and C-4 may not be in metallic containers, thus the nonferrous detonators may be the only clue to their location. Also, some chemical agent containers are nonferrous. Chemical weapon test sites may have the unique problem of arsenic, magnesium, and other metals in the soil. Ranges may have copper and beryllium in the soil. The effects of such contamination or natural soil conditions on the detection equipment should be carefully considered. 

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