Binary weapons

Among the hazardous chemical weapons scheduled class 1-3, methyl isocyanate becoming more and more important as a precursor [83]. This is just one among a number of substances which could be made via micro-reactor synthesis. Especially in the case of so-called binary weapons, where two relatively harmless substances are mixed to give a weapon, on-site mixing is demanded this can be accomplished with high performance by micro reactors. Pocket-sized miniature plants can neither be monitored nor detected. 

The U.S. has been trying to develop a "binary weapon" for years. Chemical precursors of nerve gases are housed in an explosive device ("Big Eye" bomb) and the detonation forms the gas. 

Uhe stockpile (the subject of the Amy s Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program) consists of (1) bulk containers of nerve and blister agents and (2) munitions, including rockets, mines, bombs, projectiles, and spray tanks, loaded with nerve or blister agents. Buried chemical warfare materiel, recovered chemical warfare materiel, binary weapons (in which two nonlethal components are mixed after firing to yield a lethal nerve agent), former production facilities, and miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel are not included in the stockpile. The disposition of these five classes of materials is the subject of a separate Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Pro-... 

Binary Chemical Weapons Chemical weapons formed from two non-lethal elements (called precursors) through a chemical reaction after the munitions are fired or launched. Binary weapons were manufactured, stored, and transported with only one of the chemical elements in the weapon. The second element was to be loaded into the weapon at the battlefield. As of November 1993, the precursors for the binary chemical weapons are stored at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas Tooele Army Depot, Utah and Umatilla Depot Activity, Oregon. 

The locations and quantities of binary chemical weapons are well documented and understood by the Army. Binary weapon systems principally involve an artillery projectile and components of the bigeye bomb. The projectile is composed of chemical elements, a metal casing, and explosive components. Although the bigeye bomb was never produced or stockpiled, some associated chemical elements must be destroyed. 

So-called "binary" weapons have been developed. The idea behind these is that two relatively non-toxic chemicals are placed in separate compartments in a shell. On firing these mix — perhaps by rupture of a bursting disk — and then are further mixed by the rotation of the shell in flight, so that the actual nerve agent is formed after the shell has been fired. For example, with Sarin (see above) methylphosphonic difluoride (CHgPOF ) and a mixture of isopropyl alcohol and isopropylamine (this catalyses the reaction) could be the two components. However, methylphosphonic difluoride is far from being non-toxic and the main advantage, in fact, seems to be that the separate components are easier to store and transport than Sarin itself. 

The chemistry illustrated in equation 17 was developed to meet the requirements of the binary weapons system. In the absence of base, the reaction of an alcohol with methylphosphonic difluoride (11) is slow and requires heating to drive to completion. In the presence of an amine, the reaction is extremely rapid and exothermic and proceeds in good yield. For the (US) binary munitions system for sarin, a mixture of propan-2-ol and isopropylamine are brought together with methylphosphonic difluoride when the separate canisters containing the reactants are ruptured as a result of the shock caused by firing the munition. The chemical reaction occurs within the time of flight of the munition ". ... 

Scaling to Bulk Production. The production of chemical agents is not difficult technically (relative to either biological and nuclear weapons), but obviously requires care if the operators of the processes are not to kill themselves and their immediate neighbors. Any country capable to a moderate level of industrial activity (for example, Iraq, Iran, N. Korea, Libya,. ..) can make them, and do so in bulk. Terrorist and insurgents apparently have not been able to make the more advanced agents (or the safer but more technically sophisticated binary weapons), or have not chosen to do so. 

The US proposal patently failed to inject any momentum into the disarmament negotiations in Geneva. It was not well received by many delegations and remained unacceptable to the Soviets, whose spokesmen continued to insist that they would not sign a bilateral accord until the Americans cancelled the production of binary weapons. ... 

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