Explosives transportation safety

FIGURE 12.12 Case study explosives transport safety problem and proposed solution. 

National Transportation Safety Board. 1971. Highway Accident Report Liquefied Oxygen tank truck explosion followed by fires in Brooklyn, New York, May 30, 1970. NTSB-HAR-71-6. 

National Transportation Safety Board. 1972. Pipeline Accident Report, Phillips Pipe Line Company propane gas explosion, Franklin County, MO, December 9, 1970. National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC, Report No. NTSB-PAR-72-1. 

It is common for crash investigators to undertake reconstruction of the aircraft wreckage, and this can be exceptionaUy useful in estabhshing the seat of an explosion, if that is what in fact took place. The National Transportation Safety Board in the United States and the United Kingdom Air Accident Investigation Branch have both done some exceptionaUy fine work of this type. 

FIGURE 4.4 Looking west at a portion of the crater created by the pipeline explosion near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The missing section of pipe between the arrows was ejected from the crater. (From the National Transportation Safety Board, Natural gas pipeline rupture and fire near Carlsbad, New Mexico, August 19, 2000. Pipeline Accident Report NTSB/PAR-03/01. National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC, 2003.)... 

The Transportation Safety Act defines several classes of hazardous materials. Classes include explosives, radioactive material, flammable liquids or solids, combustible liquids or solids, oxidizing or corrosive materials, compressed gases, poisons, etiologic agents (hazardous biological materials), irritating materials, and other regulated materials (ORM). The act excludes firearms and ammunition. Other chapters in this book discuss hazards associated with some of these materials. 

FIGURE 12.14 Case study explosives transport risk/cost diagram for alternative safety measures. 

The table refers transportation carriers and shippers to Emergency Response Guide (ERG) number 154, governing toxic and/or corrosive (non-combustible) substances. The ERG covers potential hazards to health and fire/explosion pubhc safety in regards to first steps when a spill occurs, protective clothing and evacuation procedure and emergency responses to fire, spills, leaks, and first aid. 

National Transportation Safety Board. 1995. Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation Natural Gas Pipeline Explosion and Eire Edison, New Jersey March 23, 1994. Pipeline Accident Report NTSB/PAR-95/01. Washington, DC. 104 p. 

National Transportation Safety Board. 1996. UGl Utilities, Inc., Natural Gas Distribution Pipeline Explosion and Eire Allentown, Pennsylvania June 9, 1994. 

National Transportation Safety Board. 1986. Northeast Utilities Service Co. Explosion and Fire Derby, Connecticut December 6, 1995. Pipeline Accident Report NTSB/PAR-86/02. Washington, DC. As a result of the Northeast Utility Service Company s positive response to Safety Recommendation P-86-19, the reconunenda-tion was classified Closed— Acceptable Action on May 14, 1987. 

National Transportation Safety Board Pipeline Accident Report—San Juan Gas Company, JncVEnron Corp., Propane Gas Explosion in San Juan, Puerto Rico, on November 21, 1996 (NTSB/PAR-97/01). 

National Transportation Safety Board Pipeline Accident Report—Arizona Public Service Company Natural Gas Explosion and Fire, Phoenix, Arizona, September 25, 1984 (NTSB/PAR-85/01). 

The potential for using these laminates to repair steel pipes where man entry is not possible is tremendous. The September 9,2010, explosion of the 30-in (750-mm)-diametCT gas pipe in San Bmno, California, that resulted in eight dead and many more casualties and loss of property is a recent reminder of the devastating results of such failures. A detailed investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board noted brittle... 

Certain types of equipment are specifically excluded from the scope of the directive. It is self-evident that equipment which is already regulated at Union level with respect to the pressure risk by other directives had to be excluded. That is the case with simple pressure vessels, transportable pressure equipment, aerosols and motor vehicles. Other equipment, such as carbonated drink containers or radiators and piping for hot water systems are excluded from the scope because of the limited risk involved. Also excluded are products which are subject to a minor pressure risk which are covered by the directives on machinery, lifts, low voltage, medical devices, gas appliances and on explosive atmospheres. A further and last group of exclusions refers to equipment which presents a significant pressure risk, but for which neither the free circulation aspect nor the safety aspect necessitated their inclusion. 

Many compounds explode when triggered by a suitable stimulus however, most are either too sensitive or fail to meet cost and production-scale standards, requirements for safety in transportation, and storage stability. Propellants and explosives in large-scale use are based mosdy on a relatively small number of well-proven iagredients. Propellants and explosives for military systems are manufactured ia the United States primarily ia government owned plants where they are also loaded iato munitions. Composite propellants for large rockets are produced mainly by private iadustry, as are small arms propellants for sporting weapons. 

The lower volatihty of JP-8 is a significant factor in the U.S. Air Force conversion from JP-4, since fires and explosions under both combat and ordinary handling conditions have been attributed to the use of JP-4. In examining the safety aspects of fuel usage in aircraft, a definitive study (15) of the accident record of commercial and military jet transports concluded that kerosene-type fuel is safer than wide-cut fuel with respect to survival in crashes, in-flight fires, and ground fueling accidents. However, the difference in the overall accident record is small because most accidents are not fuel-related. 

Distribution costs depend on plant location, physical state of the material (whether liquid, gas, or sohd), nature of the material (whether corrosive, explosive, flammable, perishable, or toxic), freight rates, and labor costs. Distribution costs may be affected by any of the following new methods of materials handling, safety regulations, productivity agreements, wage rates, transportation systems, storage systems, quality, losses, and seasonal effects. 

Safety issues are not covered here. These are dealt with in Systems and Equipment book, and some fundamental issues will be taken up in the second edition of the Fundamentals book. The following aspects should be taken into account in system design fan safety AHU fire protection issues safety measures in mines, tunnels, underground car parks, etc. transportation of chemical and explosives. 

The worst hazard scenarios (excessive temperature and pressure rise accompanied by emission of toxic substances) must be worked out based upon calorimetric measurements (e.g. means to reduce hazards by using the inherent safety concept or Differential Scanning Calorimetry, DSC) and protection measures must be considered. If handling hazardous materials is considered too risky, procedures for generation of the hazardous reactants in situ in the reactor might be developed. Micro-reactor technology could also be an option. Completeness of the data on flammability, explosivity, (auto)ignition, static electricity, safe levels of exposure, environmental protection, transportation, etc. must be checked. Incompatibility of materials to be treated in a plant must be determined. 

For vapor to move in the unsaturated zone, the soil formations must be sufficiently dry to permit the interconnection of air passages among the soil pores. Vapor concentration and vapor flow govern its movement. Vapor can move by diffusion from areas of higher concentration to areas of lower concentration and ultimately to the atmosphere. Therefore, the transportation of the vapor phase of gasoline components in the unsaturated zone can pose a significant health and safety threat because of inhalation and explosion potential. 

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