Chemical Weapons Convention CWC

Highly toxic perfluoroisobutylene (PFIB) poses a serious health hazard to the human respiratory tract. PFIB is a thermal decomposition of polytetrafluo-roethylene (PTFE), e.g., Teflon. PFIB is approximately lOx as toxic as phosgene. Inhalation of this gas can cause pulmonary edema, which can lead to death. PFIB is included in Schedule 2 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the aim of the inclusion of chemicals such as PFIB was to cover those chemicals, which would pose a high risk to the CWC. 

The earliest information on Russia s novichok chemical weapons program which was codenamed "Foliant," carne just prior to Moscow s signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) from two Russian chemists. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Russia produced several new agents that were reportedly made from chemicals not controlled by the CWC. 

The majority of G-series agents are listed in Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as long as they are within the following limitations ... 

Abstract The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is shortly characterised stressing... 

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) opened for signature in Paris, on January 13, 1993 and entered into force on April 29, 1997. Its complexity is reflected in almost 200 pages of text, containing Preamble and 24 Articles and three Annexes On Chemicals (6 p), On Implementation Verification (105 p), and On Protection of Confidential Information (5 p) [2], To the main pillars of the CWC belong ... 

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) opened for signature 13th January 1993. Entry into Force was after the ratification of 65 signatory states on 29th April 1997. To date there are 167 ratified States Parties and 20 Signatory States which are yet to ratify. There are 16 Non signatory States which have yet to accede to the convention. 

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is an international treaty that bans the use of chemical weapons and aims to eliminate chemical weapons, everywhere in the world, forever. 

A very special and sensitive issue is the production and usage of the warfare chemical agents. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) which now has 168 member states aims to rid the world of all chemical weapons by 2007. Now three years before the Convention s end date, the promise is seen optimistic. 

The U.S. Army is in the process of destroying the country s stockpile of aging chemical weapons, stored at eight locations in the continental United States and on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. The deadline for completing the destruction of these weapons, as specified by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) international treaty, is April 29, 2007. Originally, the Army selected incineration as the preferred baseline destruction technology, and it currently operates two incineration facilities—one on Johnston Atoll and one at the Deseret Chemical Depot near Tooele, Utah. The Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) completed destruction of the stockpile on Johnston Island in late 2000, and closure of the... 

The Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and of their destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC) was signed on January 13, 1993, and entered into force on April 29, 1997. The CWC includes 24 Articles, the Annex on Chemicals, the Annex on Implementation and Verification (so-called Verification Annex), and the Confidentiality Annex. The Verification Annex, which by the length occupies the majority of the CWC, is written in 11 parts. Article I lists the general obligations of the CWC as shown in Figure 1. 

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) provides sampling and analysis as a tool for verification. General procedures to use sampling and analysis are outlined under the general rules of verification in the Verification Annex (VA) Part II paragraph 52-58, special provisions concerning different types of inspections are given in various parts of the VA. 

Sampling and analysis (S A) during inspections is one of the verification tools provided for by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (1). Chemical analysis of a sample is the only direct and scientific (and not only circumstantial) tool to confirm the presence of a chemical substance. The presence of a declared chemical in a declared place at a declared time and in declared quantities confirms the declaration provided by a State Party to the OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons). The actual or past presence of a chemical, which should not be at the inspected site according to the declarations, or, which has... 

The OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD) is compiled and maintained by the OPCW Laboratory and contains analytical data of the chemicals that fall under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (1). States Parties (SPs) of the CWC and the OPCW (Organization for Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons) Laboratory submit analytical data for inclusion to the OCAD. These analytical data are peer reviewed by experts. Before the analytical data are included into the OCAD, they undergo a technical and political approval process. 

Seventeen States Parties (SP) have volunteered to provide services of their high-level chemical analytical laboratories to the Organization for prohibition of the Chemical Weapons (OPCW). From these SPs, 18 laboratories (2004) have been designated by the Director-General (DG) of the OPCW to perform analyses as part of the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (1). For the purpose of effective implementation, for example, analysis of samples taken during inspections or... 

The reliable verification of chemicals related to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC-related chemicals) depends essentially on the collection of good samples and well-planned, effective, and reasonably simple sample preparations suitable to the method of analysis. The collection of good samples is arguably the most critical part of a successful analysis and this is discussed in a separate article (see Chapter 3). For its part, proper preparation of samples requires a thorough understanding of the behavior of the various types of chemicals in different sample matrices, both before and during... 

Over the past decade, liquid chromatography combined with mass spectrometry (LC/MS) has evolved from being primarily a research tool, available in a limited number of analytical laboratories, to a robust and widely available analytical and investigative technique (1 3). It is now in widespread use in pharmaceutical, food, environmental, and forensic laboratories and is an indispensable tool in biomedical research. At the time of our previous review of this subject (4), few laboratories were using LC/MS in the analysis of chemicals relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This was due to a number of factors, two of which were the cost of instrumentation and a perception that the technique was difficult to implement in an analytical laboratory. In the intervening years, the costs of basic LC/MS have been reduced, and the instrumentation has become robust and easier to operate. LC/MS is now a mature technique that should be considered by all laboratories that are required to analyze chemicals related to the CWC. 

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force in April 1997, contains provisions for chemical analysis of samples in both on-site and off-site laboratories. On-site laboratories will be manned by the inspectors of the Organization for the Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and equipped with the analytical equipment... 

The States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) have established the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in order to achieve the object and purpose of the Convention. It aims to ensure the implementation of the CWC s provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties. The aim of this book is to give a comprehensive view of how to internationally verify compliance with the CWC, in principle, using analytical chemistry and related strategies and methods. 

At the conclusion of the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1992, this treaty was heralded as a major breakthrough in multilateral arms control. It was the first comprehensively verifiable multilateral treaty that completely banned an entire class of weapons, and went further than any previous treaty in the depth, extent and intrusiveness of its verification. Verification under the CWC includes compulsory national declarations about relevant industrial and military activities, destruction of chemical weapons within a time frame with intrusive verification, and a regime of routine inspections of declared industrial and military facilities. Additional features are the possibility of a challenge inspection, whereby a State Party can request an inspection of any site in another State Party at short notice, and provisions for the investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons. 

In this chapter, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the object of examination. The CWC was the first disarmament treaty that totally prohibited and completely eliminated one whole category of weapons of mass destruction with an extremely extensive and intrusive verification system. The Convention has also become a model for subsequent disarmament treaties. It was no surprise that, when the CWC was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, the international community enthusiastically welcomed it as a truly epoch-making treaty. 

The national implementation of international chemical disarmament and non-proliferation obligations has been a key focus of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). During the 2003 Review Conference for the CWC, a number of States Parties presented papers emphasizing the need for comprehensive national laws to control prohibited activities. The need for national implementation was also a central tenet of the Political Declaration of the CWC Review Conference, and was further elaborated in its Report. ... 

Is the CWC a success With 170 States Parties by mid 2005, membership of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force in 1997, has seen remarkable growth in a relatively short span of time. This is not a treaty that states join lightly, without careful consideration of the costs and benefits of doing so. It includes a detailed and intrusive declaration and inspection regime. It is also a treaty with economic incentives, with obligations and, potentially (if implemented meaningfully), with teeth. 

More recently, microemulsions have been developed for the oxidative/hydrolytic destruction of sulfanes sulfoxides) and phosphoric acid derivatives using sodium hypochlorite and cetyl-trimethylammonium chloride (CTAC). The compounds studied serve as model compounds for chemical warfare agents such as mustard gas [bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfane] and sarin (GB i-propyl-methylphosphonofluoridate). Big stocks of these must now be destroyed after implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which came into force in April 1997 [865],... 

Sanches, M.L., C.R. Russell, and C.L. Randolf. 1993. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Signature Analysis. DNA-TR-92-73, AD B171788, Defense Technical Information Center. 

For the development of new chemical weapons (CWs), a number of criteria are necessary a research base including scientists and equipment, access to information, chemical and arms industries, and of course financial support. It is noteworthy that the development of CWs is possible not only for states but also for terrorists. It is necessary to stress that the intention of this chapter is not to describe new CWs or chemical warfare agents (CWAs) but to comment on a number of trends in toxicology with the aim that these chemicals may be proposed for inclusion in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) verification mechanisms. However, the text of the CWC is comprehensive and covers practically all chemicals that may be misused as CWs. 

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