Off-Site Laboratories

The concept of IAEA s safeguards analytical services (Lopez-Menchero et al. 1976) foresaw that the agency would establish and operate a fully equipped safeguards analytical laboratory (SAL). The analytical capability of SAL was to be such that samples taken from any key measurement point of the fuel cycle could be analyzed and that the results of these analyses would meet the requirements of safeguards accounting verification. 

To accommodate the 5,000 samples that were anticipated annually, SAL was to become part of a network of analytical laboratories (NWAL), along with existing laboratories nominated by member states for this purpose at the request of the IAEA. This approach was selected for reasons of economy and flexibility of services, but also because it provided the possibility of checking the accuracy of the analyses of actual inspection samples by comparing results obtained by different verification laboratories. Such an intercomparison was to become an important feature of the quality control program that the IAEA maintains to ensure the quality of measurements made by SAL and the network. Other safeguards systems operate in a similar way, which indeed strengthen the credibility of the verification measurements. After the successful completion of the PAFEX-1 and PAFEX-2 tests, IAEA NWAL became operational in 1975 (O Fig. 63.14). 

In order to preserve the confidentiality of their origin, all IAEA inspection samples are sent first to the IAEA Laboratories in Seibersdorf (Austria), from where a number of them are redispatched to NWAL, in accordance with instructions of the inspectorate. In 1975, about 480 samples, mostly uranium products but also a few of plutonium dioxide, were analyzed. A maximum was reached in 1990 with 1,600 samples, including uranium, plutonium, and spent fuel samples received and analyzed (Deron et al. 1994). 

Safeguards analytical laboratories use essentially the same sorts of techniques and equipment as research and plant laboratories for nuclear material isotopic and elemental assay and 

Nuclear material analysis Providers ol reference material 

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Sample paekaging and preparation for on-site or off-site laboratories... 

For the off-site analysis, the designated laboratories are used. These laboratories have instrumental capability, preparedness, and analytical methods to analyze the samples taken by the inspectors or by the inspected SP representatives. The samples sent (after the agreement of the inspected SP) to the off-site laboratory are coded, and therefore the laboratory receiving the samples will not know their origin. The laboratories are capable of confirming the presence or absence of CWC-related chemicals and other chemicals, but must report only data relevant to the purpose of the analysis as defined by the OPCW. The laboratory s work on the OPCW samples is confidential, which is a normal practice when regarding the work with laboratory s other collaborators and commercial business partners. The work is reported only to the OPCW. 

Sampling and on-site analysis may be undertaken to check for the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals. In case of unresolved ambiguities, samples may be analyzed in a designated off-site laboratory, subject to the inspected State Party s agreement. 

If duplicate samples cannot be taken and the analysis is performed at off-site laboratories, any remaining sample shall, if so requested, be returned to the inspected State Party after the completion of the analysis. 

Analysis Strategy for Analysis of Chemicals Related to the Chemical Weapons Convention in an Off-site Laboratory... 

Sample preparation procedures and analytical techniques for the off-site laboratories of the CWC have been developed and tested in five international interlaboratory comparison (round-robin) tests (1 5), in two trial proficiency tests, and in more than 14 official proficiency tests (see Chapter 6). The Recommended Operating Procedures (ROPs) for sampling and sample preparation (6,7) were written and updated on the basis of the results of the round-robin tests. The ROPs (see Table 1) were designed to be comprehensive enough to allow the analysis of all CWC-related chemicals. Accordingly, some of the procedures contain many sample preparation steps. It is also recommended that the ROPs should be used as first choice in the analysis, with other approaches not excluded. 

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force in April 1997, contains provisions for chemical analysis of samples in both on-site and off-site laboratories. On-site laboratories will be manned by the inspectors of the Organization for the Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and equipped with the analytical equipment... 

In analytical chemistry, combination of results of several different analytical techniques gives the most reliable results. In a well-equipped off-site laboratory, results from FTIR, MS, and NMR, with other analytical data, can be combined to produce reliable, unambiguous analytical proof to support the chemical disarmament. 

There are currently eighteen analytical laboratories that have established capability, and obtained recognized competence in, the analysis of samples for CWC-related chemicals these laboratories are the OPCW designated laboratories. The majority of the chapters in this book discuss the analytical methods used in these off-site laboratories. The methods discussed are for the identification of target chemicals from environmental and human origin samples. 

Detailed site assessments historically required extensive data collection and off-site laboratory analysis of contaminants. These studies are expensive and time consuming. Often, a suite of samples taken during site assessment shows unacceptable levels of contamination, requiring a second or even third round of sampling to determine the dimensions of contaminated areas. These multiple deployments increase both the time and costs associated with site assessment, reducing the resources available for cleanup. 

The analysis scheme implemented at the Cos Cob site used three sets of tools hand-held test kits, an on-site mobile laboratory equipped with gas chromatograph/ electron capture detector (GC/ECD) and X-ray fluorescence (XRF), and an off-site laboratory with rapid turnaround capabilities (<48 h for virtually all analyses). By implementing all of these tools at the same time, the project eliminated the need for multiple sampling events and allowed the team to perform additional real-time sampling, enabling the team to delineate the extent of potential hot spots quickly. 

At the beginning of the Triad field investigation, only the uppermost two 1 -ft intervals at each location were analyzed in the field. Ultraviolet fluorescence test kits, which require 5 min per sample for collection and analysis, were used for field detection of PAH and TPH at all sampling locations. A percentage of the PAH and TPH samples were sent to an off-site laboratory for independent collaboration of the field results. 

The plant has an off-site laboratory, two specially-adapted vehicles and a team of three chemists. These measurements are quite separate from those conducted on radioactive wastes. 

The most eommonly used explosives ean be elassified into nitroaromatics (TNT, DNT, TNB), nitramines (RDX, HMX), and nitrate esters (PETN). Of these, TNT is the most widely used explosive. Currently, the laboratory method of TNT analysis is SW-846 Method 8330, whieh is performed in a high performanee liquid chromatography system (HPLC) in an off-site laboratory [2]. This method is a highly seleetive method and sensitive to parts per billion eoncentrations (ppb) however the average turnaround times for the results of a single test are 3 days and 1 month with eosts of 1,000 and 250, respeetively [3]. 

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