Plant Safety Framework

As the proposed plant safety model is aiming to cover all activities in the plant lifecycle to ensure safe plant activities, it is difficult to achieve that without having a systematic approach to abstract plant lifecycle 

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As a part of the plant safety framework, common data component is proposed to manage all common data for the plant safety framework and to accumulate the safety-related common data across plant activities. This component is a part of the data warehousing for the plant-wide activities across the plant lifecycle. The object-oriented modeling approach is used to abstract these common elements within the plantwide conceptual model while the physical data are within the data warehouse frame. The safety common data (SCD) component includes (but not limited to) the possible source of data errors, documentation standards (vocabulary), generic cause-consequence for each component type, checklists for operation-type jobs, and standard safety interlock levels. The common data are essential to be organized and formatted in a... 

Modarres M., Mosleh A., Wreathall J., 1994. A framework for assessing influence of organization on plant safety, Reliability Engineering System Safety 45, pp. 157-171. 

Long before a test plant is built, that is, already during the constmction of the laboratory apparatus and at the beginning of the planning phase, the first consideration of the safety concept must be made. The first step is to gather the relevant substance data (Section 3.2). Then the necessary auxiliary substances are considered (must an AI liquid be used, or is a B classified solvent adequate ). For the transition from alabora-tory to a pilot plant, a detailed safety concept must be provided and discussed with the relevant departments (head of pilot plant, safety department, etc.). At the end of process development all safety-relevant aspects must be documented. This document is the basis of the safety studies (Section 5.2.2) in the framework of the feasibility study (Section 5.1). 

The development of probabilistic techniques, especially Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) for nuclear power plants, has greatly improved the possibilities to view plant safety within a uniform framework. PSAs have greatly improved the possibilities to ... 

In Japan, probabilistic safety assessment of individual plants have been performed on internal events, and it has been done within the framework of examination of measures against severe accidents. The results of assessment were reported to the regulatory body in "Report on the Examination of Accident Management. The results of PSA have been arranged by reactor type and by containment vessel type, taking into consideration plant safety design, and proper measures against severe accidents have been identified for each type of the plant. 

The combination of deterministic and probabilistic procedures in the evaluation of plant safety has been realized in the "approach oriented to safety objectives". This method verifies plant safety via the achievement of so-called "safety objectives". The standard to be issued by the German Nuclear Technology Committee, "KTA 2000", intends to establish the framework conditions for such an approach oriented to safety objectives. In Bavaria, this approach has already been applied to all nuclear power stations during periodical safety inspections (PSI). 

The use of defence in depth in nuclear power plant design and operation involves three fundamental principles. Defence in depth provides the basic framework for most nuclear power plant safety. The concept has been refined and strengthened through years of application. All safety analysis for nuclear power plants, both deterministic and probabilistic, revolves around evaluating the performance of the plant subject to different modes of defence in depth, and the reliability of these modes [1]. 

Part I presents an overview of the book where scope, problem definition and solution significance are explained. It presents the background and similar research work done in this area. Also it describes the approach followed along with the theoretical and methodological framework developed to achieve the stated research objective. In this section, the plant safety model is presented as the base of designing CAPE-SAFE within PEEE. 

Propose conceptual framework to represent safety aspects in plant safety model where we could manage to abstract plant lifecycle safety aspects and propose opportunities to represent within plant enterprise engineering environment. 

The SPEAR framework to be described in subsequent sections is designed to be used either as a stand-alone methodology, to provide an evaluation of the human sources of risk in a plant, or in conjunction with hardware orientated analyses to provide an overall system safety assessment. The overall structure of the framework is set out in Figure 5.4. 

A regulatory framework and approval process was set up to avoid inadvertent release of material, to ensure environmental safety, and to protect the integrity of the plant product intended for food or animal feed. Much overlap exists between the agencies responsible for addressing these issues. 

A final point that also needs to be presented is related to quality assurance, i.e. the requirement to satisfy regulatory frameworks concerned with safety and environmental issues. Traditionally, only national regulatory bodies had to be satisfied. Now, however, international regulatory bodies have to be satisfied while national regulatory bodies must, in many cases, accept the regulations of other nations. In this context, quality assurance of a plant or a process may often require a demonstrable pedigree for each number in the calculation of some aspect of the plant. 

Detailed lists of the data required to be evaluated to satisfy inclusion in Annex I of the Directive, or the authorization of a plant protection product are set out in the Directive (Annexes II and III). Annex II data relate to the active substance and Annex III to the plant protection product. These data are submitted to one or more Member States for evaluation. A report of the evaluation is submitted to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). Following peer review of the report the EFSA makes a recommendation to the European Commission on whether Annex I inclusion is acceptable. This recommendation is then discussed by all Member States in the framework of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health (SCFA), previously the Standing Committee on Plant Health (SCPH). Where necessary, the Scientific Panel is consulted before the SCFA can deliver an opinion on whether an active substance should be included in Annex I of 91/414/EEC. 

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