Hazard reviews and analysis

Hazard reviews and analysis provide the foundational information and data used to further enhance the effectiveness of the safety system (Oregon OSHA Workshop Materials, Hazard Identification and Control, n.d.). Refer to Figure 6.1 (Risk Management, ATP 5-19,2014). 

The starting point in hazard review and analysis is to consider the workplace as a system of cause and effects or emerging properties with inherent hazards and associated risk built into the work environment. The review and analysis has features that are critical and should ... 

What is the starting point for a hazard review and analysis... 

A number of hazard identification and analysis techniques (e.g., HAZOP), can be applied to identify, analyze, and reduce and/or mitigate the process hazards, which includes handling of reactive chemicals and energetic reactions. Chapter 4 provides an overview of these kinds of techniques as related to reactive chemicals mote detailed reviews of hazards analysis techniques are included in [2,3]. 

Bryan, J.L. 1986. Defining Damageability - The Examination, Review, and Analysis of the Variables and Limits of Damageability for Buildings, Contents, and Personnel from Exposure in Eire Incidents. Symposium on Quantitative Fire Hazards Analysis. Society of Fire Protection Engineers, Boston, MA. 

Using a single sensor for both the BPCS and SIS requires further review and analysis. The additional review and analysis is necessary because a failure of this single sensor could result In a hazardous situation. For example, a single level sensor used for both the BPCS and a SIS high level trip could create a demand if the sensor fails low (i.e., below the set point of the level controller). As a result of the sensor failing low, the controller would drive the valve open. Since the same sensor is used for the SIS, then it will not detect the resultant high level condition. 

For locations qualifying for program levels 1 and 2, those with lesser exposure, ERA will accept hazard reviews done by qualifled personnel using suitable checklists. Hazard reviews must be documented and show that problems have been addressed. In its literature, ERA comments on the desirability of using the What-If hazard identification and analysis process. ERA also proposes the use of more involved analytical techniques if findings suggest that may be desirable. 

Conduct preliminary hazard review and code analysis ergonomics, safety, electrical, clearance zones, materials of construction, etc. 

Worksite hazard identification and analysis identifies existing hazards and conditions, operations and situations that create or contribute to hazards, and areas where hazards may develop. This includes close scrutiny and tracking of injury or illness and incident records to identify patterns that may indicate causes of aggressive behavior and assaults. The objectives of worksite hazard identification and analyses are to recognize, identify, and plan to correct security hazards. Analysis uses existing records and worksite evaluations should include record review and identification of security hazards. 

Congressional Research Service. (1979). Hazardous Materials Transportation A Review and Analysis of the Department of Transportation s Regulatory Program. Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office. 

Process Safety Analysis This part treats the analysis of a process or project from the standpoint of hazards, risks, procedures for making potential damage estimates, and project reviews and audits. It can be helpful to management in assessing risks in a project. It consists of the following ... 

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) An organized effort to identify and evaluate hazards associated with chemical processes and operations to enable their control. This review normally involves the use of qualitative techniques to identify and assess the significance of hazards. Conclusions and appropriate rec-... 

JHAs can do much toward reducing incidents in the workplace. The JHA is only effective if you review and update it periodically. Even if there are no changes in a job, you may detect another hazard that was missed in an earlier analysis. 

In this study detailed fault trees with probability and failure rate calculations were generated for the events (1) Fatality due to Explosion, Fire, Toxic Release or Asphyxiation at the Process Development Unit (PDU) Coal Gasification Process and (2) Loss of Availability of the PDU. The fault trees for the PDU were synthesized by Design Sciences, Inc., and then subjected to multiple reviews by Combustion Engineering. The steps involved in hazard identification and evaluation, fault tree generation, probability assessment, and design alteration are presented in the main body of this report. The fault trees, cut sets, failure rate data and unavailability calculations are included as attachments to this report. Although both safety and reliability trees have been constructed for the PDU, the verification and analysis of these trees were not completed as a result of the curtailment of the demonstration plant project. Certain items not completed for the PDU risk and reliability assessment are listed. 

The comprehensive and detailed assessment of the risks required for a safety-case can only be satisfactorily carried out for major installations with the aid of computer software. Suites of programmes for quantitative risk analysis have been developed over the past decade by consulting firms specializing in safety and environmental protection. Typical of the software available is the SAFETI (Suite for Assessment of Flammability Explosion and Toxic Impact) suite of programs developed by DNV Technica Ltd. These programs were initially developed for the authorities in the Netherlands, as a response to the Seveso Directives of the EU (which requires the development of safety cases and hazard reviews). The programs have subsequently been developed further and extended, and are widely used in the preparation of safety cases see Pitblado el al. (1990). 

One of the most important elements of the PSM Rule is the process hazard analysis (PrHA). It requires the systematic identification of hazards and related accident scenarios. The PSM Rule allows the use of different analysis methods, but the selected method must be based on the process being analyzed. The PSM Rule specifies that PrHAs must be completed as soon as possible within a 5-year period. However, one-fourth of the PrHAs must have been completed by May 26, 1994, with an additional one-fourth completed each succeeding year. The highest risk processes were to be done first. A schedule for PrHAs must be established at the outset of a process safety management (PSM) program to give priority to the highest risk processes. PrHAs must be reviewed and updated at least every 5 years. 

The update team must develop a new PrHA report to document the scope and approach of its analysis as well as any new hazards, scenarios, and action items. Justification must be provided for removing any scenarios from the original PrHA. The report should receive close scrutiny, both for compliance with the PSM Rule and for explanations of new action items. Guidance for reporting the PrHA results is given in Section 5.1. The updated report is submitted to management for review and approval, following the same procedure as an initial PrHA. 

This checklist may be used to stimulate the thinking of inherent safety review and process hazard analysis teams, and any other individuals or groups working on process improvements. It is intended to promote "blue-sky" or "out-of the-box" thinking, and to generate ideas that might be usable in an existing facility or a "plant of the future" concept. 

Design reviews are conducted to refine requirements. Hazards are introduced to plant operators following laboratory work, EHS review, capital requirements review, and process hazard analysis. Reactivity is addressed during process hazard analysis and the initial review. 

Since risk analysis plays an important role in public policy decision making, efforts have been made to devise a means by which to identify, control, and communicate the risks imposed by agricultural biotechnology. A paradigm of environmental risk assessment was first introduced in the United States by Peterson and Arntzen in 2004. In this risk assessment, a number of assumptions and uncertainties were considered and presented. These include (1) problem formulation, (2) hazard identihcation, (3) dose-response relationships, (4) exposure assessment, and (5) risk characterization. Risk assessment of plant-made pharmaceuticals must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis because the plants used to produce proteins each have different risks associated with them. Many plant-derived biopharmaceuticals will challenge our ability to define an environmental hazard (Howard and Donnelly, 2004). For example, the expression of a bovine-specihc antigen produced in a potato plant and used orally in veterinary medicine would have a dramatically different set of criteria for assessment of risk than, as another example, the expression of a neutralizing nonspecihc oral antibody developed in maize to suppress Campylobacter jejuni in chickens (Peterson and Arntzen, 2004 Kirk et al., 2005). 

Professional literature should be reviewed. Manuals of analytical methods ( 1,2) describe various sampling scenarios and considerations. Overview references (3) discussing processes similar to the one proposed for study may also be available. Professional publications e.g., The Journal of the American Industrial Hygiene Association, Journal of Occupational Medicine, may outline specific aspects of the process to be studied. Toxicological texts (4,.5,.6 7) provide information about potentially hazardous agents. These sources can provide information about the character of exposure, and their relative expected concentration or intensity, and methods previously used for detection, sampling and analysis. 

Air Sampling Refers to the collection and analysis by instrument of samples of air to detennine the presence of hazardous materials. The reader should review Chapter 2 for the objectives and types of air sampling techniques. 

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