Checklists Operation

Checklists Operators and maintenance technicians do not usually use procedures on a regular basis, particularly for routine work. However, they will use summary checklists to make sure that nothing was overlooked while carrying out a sequence of tasks. 

Process Hazards Analysis. Analysis of processes for unrecogni2ed or inadequately controUed ha2ards (see Hazard analysis and risk assessment) is required by OSHA (36). The principal methods of analysis, in an approximate ascending order of intensity, are what-if checklist failure modes and effects ha2ard and operabiHty (HAZOP) and fault-tree analysis. Other complementary methods include human error prediction and cost/benefit analysis. The HAZOP method is the most popular as of 1995 because it can be used to identify ha2ards, pinpoint their causes and consequences, and disclose the need for protective systems. Fault-tree analysis is the method to be used if a quantitative evaluation of operational safety is needed to justify the implementation of process improvements. 

Loose or mis- Preventative maintenance and operator prestart placed internal checklist hardware causes heat/sparks during plowing out. CCPS G-22... 

Running unbal- Preventive maintenance and operator checklist anced, vibration inspections due to worn bear-, effective vibration monitor/shutdown device ings or other mechanical problem such as product accumulation behind filter screen. ... 

When using the checklist, the reviewer should decide m advance which questions would not be applicable to the toller s operations. For example, the environmental and healthand safety issues associated with a toller that will be used solely to conduct packaging will greatly differ from a of a toller that will be used to perform an organic synthesis step. 

The cost of performing the hazard identification step depends on the size of the problem and the specific techniques used. Techniques such as brainstorming, what-if analyses, or checklists tend to be less expensive than other more structured methods. Hazard and operability (HAZOP) analyses and failure modes and effects analyses (FMEAs) involve many people and tend to be more expensive. But, you can have greater confidence in the exhaustiveness of HAZOP and FMEA techniques—their rigorous approach helps ensure completeness. However, no technique can guarantee that all hazards or potential accidents have been identified. Figure 8 is an example of the hazards identified in a HAZOP study. Hazard identification can require from 10% to 25% of the total effort in a QRA study. 

As with any power equipment, gas turbines require a program of planned inspections with repair or replacement of damaged components. A properly designed and conducted inspection and preventive maintenance program can do much to increase the availability of gas turbines and reduce unscheduled maintenance. Inspections and preventive maintenance can be expensive, but not as costly as forced shutdowns. Nearly all manufacturers emphasize and describe preventive maintenance procedures to ensure the reliability of their machinery, and any maintenance program should be based on manufacturer s recommendations. Inspection and preventive maintenance procedures can be tailored to individual equipment application with references such as the manufacturer s instruction book, the operator s manual, and the preventive maintenance checklist. 

More shortcut design methods and rules of thumb have been developed for fractionation than probably any other unit operation. For example the paper reprinted in Appendix 5 on development of shortcut equipment design methods contains 18 references for fractionation shortcut methods out of 37 total. Both the process and mechanical aspects of fractionation design have useful rules of thumb. Many of the mechanical design rules of thumb become included in checklists of do s and don ts. 

It is not a bad idea for the process engineer to familiarize himself with compressor surge controls. The interaction of the compressor surge controls with downstream process control valves can become a problem area later, and this study phase is not too early to put such items on a checklist. An LNG plant example comes to mind where such an operating problem existed. 

A systematic method of developing operating costs should be devised. A table or form that everyone becomes familiar with helps to make all studies uniform and complete. Reference 1 presents a good form and checklist. 

Table 12.3 Checklist for major deviations from normal operation...

Step 2.1 R ne the Initial Checklist. Table 1 is a checklist of unit operations. Apply this as an initial guide and checklist that can be used to identify each unit operation within the unit process that the audit will focus on. You may have to make additions to the list, because it is meant to be a general overview. Next to each unit operation that applies to the unit process of interest, provide a brief description of its function or purpose. This will prove useful in developing a process flow scheme in Step 3. Much of this sub-step can be accomplished by... 

Section 1. Provides a checklist for evaluating the computer hardware (equipment) and additional software (programs) required to operate the system. The flexibility and ease of use of the system and the availability of training and other types of vendor support are also addressed. 

Included in OSH As JHA Booklet, 3071, is a good description of a process hazard analysis (PHA) [1]. This is being used in the Process Safety Management (PSM) program (29 CER 1910.119) to understand how hazards exist. There are some good methods listed in the manual that can be used to conduct a JHA. As you review each method you can determine which one may be useful for your operation. The typical method chosen is the checklist. 

The what if/checklist is a broadly based hazard assessment technique that combines the creative thinking of a selected team of specialists with the methodical focus of a prepared checklist. The result is a comprehensive hazard analysis that is useful in training operating personnel on the hazards of the particular operation. 

Hazardous waste operations often include tasks and activities that are conducted on a periodic basis, are of very short duration, are transient in nature, or otherwise pose little hazard. Developing a brief HASP template (e.g., fill in the blank ), a permit, or a checklist system that includes essential HAZWOPER-type information may suffice for these types of operations. 

Small operations, although covered by the PSM rule, may use simplified methodologies and still meet the criteria. Businesses with similar processes and equipment may pool resources and prepare a generic checklist analysis used by all members to meet the PSM rule. 

After preparation, a checklist may be used by less expert engineers than the preparers for inspecting the process areas to compare the process equipment and operations with the checklist oidrcr on hardcopy or laptop computer. The analyst fills in the checklist according to observations from their inspection, process documentation, and interviews with operators and their perceptions. 

Independent checking would have avoided this accident checklists should have been in use the low flow alarm should have been operative the design was faulty for lacking redundancy in the cooling water supply and flow. 

The most common hazards control technique is a checklist. The checklist is prepared by experienced personnel who are familiar with the design, construction and operation of similar facilities. Checklists are relatively easy to use and provide a guide to the evaluator of items to be considered in evaluating hazards. API RP 14J has examples of two checklists which can be used to evaluate facilities of different complexity. Because production facilities are very similar and have been the subject of many hazard analyses, a checklist analysis to assure compliance with standard practice is recommended for most production facilities. The actual procedure by which the checklist is considered and the manner in which the evaluation is documented to assure compliance varies from case-to-case. 

As process plants become more complex, it becomes apparent that it is not possible to rely exclusively on the process worker s skills and memory required to perform the task. Job aids and procedures are devices which aim to reduce the need for human retention of procedures and references as well as the amount of decision making required. Job aids assume a variety of formats including flowcharts, checklists, decision tables, etc., while procedures refer to other systems of documentation such as standard operating instmctions and emergency procedures. 

Move set point to measured value Action Action Omitted Set point left at original value System may operate at wrong set point. Process hazard may occur (Moderate) Noticeable change of value of variable may occur at step 1.2 Introduce check in checklist... 

---