Water shut-down

During normal operation, the heat generated in the core is transferred to the SGU via the water circulated by the Primary Pumps, which are located at the top of the Inner Vessel. In case of unavailability of this heat transfer route, the water of the Intermediate Plenum (approximately 300 cubic meters per reactor module) always enters the Primary Circuit, mixes up with the primary water, shuts down the reactor and cools the core in natural circulation. The same water mbdng process heats up the intermediate plenum water and the Pressure Vessel and activates the natural heat transfer route towards the Reactor Pool, which contains approximately 6.000 cubic meters of cold water. The water inventory in the Reactor Pool is large enough to allow this water to remain below the atmospheric boiling point after removal of the decay heat for about a week. 

Most aquaculture faciUties release water constandy or periodically into the environment without passing it through a municipal sewage treatment plant. The effects of those efduents on natural systems have become a subject of intense scmtiny in recent years and have, in some instances, resulted in opposition to further development of aquaculture faciUties in some locales. There have even been demands that some existing operations should be shut down. 

The process operates at 1 kPa (10 mbars) and 450 kW of power. When the condenser temperature reaches 580°C, the power is reduced to 350 kW. Cooling water is appHed to the condenser, throughout distillation, by means of sprays. Normally distillation takes 10—12 hours and the end point is signified by an increase in furnace temperature and a decrease in vapor temperature to 500—520°C. At this point the power is turned off and the vacuum pump is shut down. Nitrogen is then bled into the system to prevent oxidation of 2inc. 

The Hanford N Reactor. The Hanford N reactor was built in 1964 for purposes of plutonium production during the Cold War. It used graphite as moderator, pierced by over 1000 Zircaloy 2 tubes. These pressure tubes contained slightly enriched uranium fuel cooled by high temperature light water. The reactor also provided 800 MWe to the Washington PubHc Power Supply System. This reactor was shut down in 1992 because of age and concern for safety. The similarity to the Chemobyl-type reactors played a role in the decision. 

Heavy water [11105-15-0] 1 2 produced by a combination of electrolysis and catalytic exchange reactions. Some nuclear reactors (qv) require heavy water as a moderator of neutrons. Plants for the production of heavy water were built by the U.S. government during World War II. These plants, located at Trad, British Columbia, Morgantown, West Virginia, and Savaimah River, South Carolina, have been shut down except for a portion of the Savaimah River plant, which produces heavy water by a three-stage process (see Deuterium and tritium) an H2S/H2O exchange process produces 15% D2O a vacuum distillation increases the concentration to 90% D2O an electrolysis system produces 99.75% D2O (58). 

Liquid Coolers and Condensers Dirty water can be used as the cooling medium. The top of the cooler is open to the atmosphere for access to tubes. These can be cleaned without shutting down the cooler by removing the distributors one at a time and scrubbing the tubes. 

The well supplies cooling water to the plant. During operation of the system, a reduction in flow rate was noticed. The well was shut down and the pump inspected. 

Direct expansion is also possible wherein the refrigerant is used to chill the incoming air directly without the chilled water circuit. Ammonia, which is an excellent refrigerant, is used in this sort of application. Special alarm systems would have to be utilized to detect the loss of the refrigerant into the combustion air and to shut down and evacuate the refrigeration system. 

Another serious problem in heat exchangers is corrosion. Severe corrosion can and does occur in tubing and very often with common fluids such as water. Proper material selection based on a full analysis of the operating fluids, velocities and temperatures is mandatory. Very often, heavier gauge tubing is specified to offset the effects of corrosion, but this is only a partial solution. This should be followed by proper start-up, operating and shut-down procedures. 

Routing of Flare Header through Process Areas - Flare headers in process areas should be routed to avoid locations of particularly high fire risk, such as over pumps, near furnaces, etc. The headers and subheaders should also be laid out and provided with isolating CSO valves and spectacle blinds, unless prohibited by local codes, such that it is not necessary for flare lines to remain in service in units which are shut down separately. Blowdown and water disengaging drums should be spaced from process areas. 

While great public protection is provided by these barriers, accidents can happen. Regardless of the cause of an accident, the core cannot overheat while in contact with liquid water. Furthermore it cannot be critical in the absence of water (because of the low enrichment of the fuel) thus, any accident involves a subcritical core that is heal by decaying radionuclides with inadequate cooling. Figure 8.1-1 shows the rate of heat evolution as a function of time after shutting down a 3,0(K3-MW reactor (Cohen, 1982). Even after an hour, th leat production is about 40 MW. 

The results were not serious. The pumps supplied water to cool the hot gases leaving an incinerator when the water flow stopped, a high-temperature trip shut down the burner. The incinerator was nev/, was still undergoing tests, and the job had not been done before. The water was recycled, and ash in it probably caused the choke [40]. 

The smaller of the two boilers became short of water first, and the low w ater level trip shut it dowm. The operator was so busy trying to get it back on line that he ignored the low water level and other alarms that were sounding on the other boiler. Unfortunately the trips on this boiler did not work, as it had been rewired (incorrectly) since it was last checked. Fifteen to 20 minutes later, someone saw flames corning out of the boiler stack. The boiler was then shut down manually. By this time most of the tubes had melted. 

The drain (blowdown) line on a boiler appeared to be choked. It could not be cleared by rodding (the choke was probably due to scale settling in the base of the boiler), so the maintenance foreman pushed a water hose through the drain valve and turned on the water. The choke cleared immediately, and the head of water left in the boiler pushed the hose out of the drain line and showered the foreman with hot water. Although the boiler had been shut down for 15 hours, the water was still at 80°-90°C and scalded the foreman. 

The immediate cause of the disaster was the contamination of an MIC storage tank by several tons of water and chloroform. A runaway reaction occurred, and the temperature and pressure rose. The relief valve lifted, and MIC vapor was discharged to atmosphere. The protective equipment, which should have prevented or minimized the release, was out of order or not in full working order the refrigeration system that should have cooled the storage tank was shut down, the scrubbing system that should have absorbed the vapor was not immediately available, and the flare system that should have burned any vapor that got past the scrubbing system was out of use. 

Low water level had shut down a boiler. Flameout occurred on two attempts to refire the boiler. On the third attempt, a violent explosion occurred. The worker had not purged the firebox between each attempt to fire the boiler and this resulted in the accumulation of fuel-air mixture which exploded on the third attempt to ignite the pilot... 

System integration involves numerous miscellaneous development activities, such as control software to address system start-up, shut-down and transient operation, and thermal sub-systems to accomplish heat recovei y, heat rejection and water recoveiy within the constraints of weight, size, capital and operating costs, reliability, and so on. Depending on the application, there will be additional key issues automotive applications, for example, demand robustness to vibrations, impact, and cold temperatures, since if the water freezes it will halt fuel cell operation. 

In subsequent years, Savery made important improvements that benefited future steam inventions. In June 1699 he demonstrated to the Royal Society a pump with two receivers, each with a separate, hand-controlled steam supply. This ensured improved continuity of operation, allowing one receiver tn operate in its vacuum stage and the other under steam pressure. In 1701, he added two more critical steps a second boiler, avoiding the need to shut down the fire and pump, between stages and he replaced the two interconnected steam cocks with a single valve, run with a manually operated long lever. This may have been the inspiration for the modern slide valve and his inventiveness created, in effect, the world s first feed-water heater. 

When a boiler may not be shut down for maintenance of the level control chambers isolating valves can be fitted between the water-level control and the steam space. In this instance, the valves must be capable of being locked in the open position and the key retained by a responsible person. When these valves are closed during maintenance periods the boiler must be under manual attendance. Fitting of these valves should only be with the agreement of the insurance company responsible for the boiler. Drains from the water-level controls and level gauges should be collected at a manifold or sealed tundish before running to the blowdown vessel. 

Sometimes it is not practical to blowdown the level controls and shut down the incinerator. In this case, the situation should be discussed with the insurance company and the boiler supplier. It is possible to include for an extra high working water level giving a safety margin above the heating surfaces. The controls may then be blown down and checked for satisfactory operation with a predetermined time delay before it shuts down the incinerator or operates a bypass in the event of a fault. 

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