Uranium processing industry, radiation

Zirconium is used as a containment material for the uranium oxide fuel pellets in nuclear power reactors (see Nuclearreactors). Zirconium is particularly usehil for this appHcation because of its ready availabiUty, good ductiUty, resistance to radiation damage, low thermal-neutron absorption cross section 18 x 10 ° ra (0.18 bams), and excellent corrosion resistance in pressurized hot water up to 350°C. Zirconium is used as an alloy strengthening agent in aluminum and magnesium, and as the burning component in flash bulbs. It is employed as a corrosion-resistant metal in the chemical process industry, and as pressure-vessel material of constmction in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Codes. 

Constraints of Plant Design. The potential hazards encountered in the uranium feed materials processing industry include many that are common to the heavy chemicals industry. However special problems present themselves owing to direct radiation, the possibility of inhalation and ingestion of radioactive dusts and gases, nuclear safety, and more unusual chemical hazards. 

Many challenging industrial and military applications utilize polychlorotriduoroethylene [9002-83-9] (PCTFE) where, ia addition to thermal and chemical resistance, other unique properties are requited ia a thermoplastic polymer. Such has been the destiny of the polymer siace PCTFE was initially synthesized and disclosed ia 1937 (1). The synthesis and characterization of this high molecular weight thermoplastic were researched and utilized duting the Manhattan Project (2). The unique comhination of chemical iaertness, radiation resistance, low vapor permeabiUty, electrical iasulation properties, and thermal stabiUty of this polymer filled an urgent need for a thermoplastic material for use ia the gaseous UF diffusion process for the separation of uranium isotopes (see Diffusion separation methods). 

Two epidemiology studies have examined mortality among thorium workers neither found significant excess mortality. The standard mortality ratio (SMR) for all causes of death in a cohort of 3039 male workers in a thorium processing plant was 1.05 in comparison to United States white males (Polednak et al. 1983). The estimated radiation levels to the workers for inhalation intake ranged from 0.003-0.192 nCi/m (0.001-0.007 Bq/m ) for a period of 1-33 years. No evidence of overt industrial disease was found in a cohort of 84 workers at a thorium refinery exposed to <0.045-450 nCi/m (<0.002-0.02 Bq/m ) for <1-20 years (Albert et al. 1955). In both studies, the workers were exposed to other toxic compounds (uranium dust) as well as other radioactive materials (thoron, uranium daughters, thorium daughters, cerium). 

The extended radiation time for the domestic fuel increases the quantity of fission products and the higher actinides. Pure plutonium product poses nuclear weapons proliferation risk and is the primary reason reprocessing is not practiced in the United States. The modified PUREX process has been practiced on an industrial scale in Europe and supports the production of mixed uranium-plutonium fuel. Blended UO2 and PUO2 powder is compacted and sinter to form the mixed oxide (MOX) fuel pellets much like the enriched UO2 fuel. Natural and depleted uranium can be used to prepare MOX fuel and is the demonstrated option to recover fuel values from spent fuel. 

The specifications for purified uranium and plutonium to be recycled are summarized in Table 21.7. Comparing these data with those presented before sliows diat at t 1 y the fission product activity must be reduced by a factor of 10 and the uranium contrait in plutonium by a factor of 2 X 10. The large number of chemical elem its involved (FPs, actinides and corrosion products) make the separation a difficult task. Additional complications arise from radiation decomposition and criticality risks and from the necessity to conduct all processes remotely in heavily shielded enclosures under extensive health protection measures. As a result reprocessing is one of the most complicated chemical processes ever endeavored on an industrial scale. 

Chemistry used in the recovery of plutonium from irradiated fuel must provide a separation from all these elements, other fission and activation products, and the actinides (including a large amount of unburned uranium), and still provide a complete recovery of plutonium. The same issues apply to the recovery of uranium from spent thorium fuel. Most of the processes must be performed remotely due to the intense radiation field associated with the spent fuel. As in the enrichment of uranium, the batch size in the later steps of the reprocessing procedure, where the fissile product has become more concentrated, is limited by the constraints of criticality safety. There is a balance between maximizing the yield of the precious fissile product and minimizing the concentrations of contaminant species left in the final product These residual contaminants, which can be detected at very small concentrations using standard radiochemical techniques, provide a fingerprint of the industrial process used to recover the material. 

Workers who mine and process mineral sands containing tin and associated trace metals can also be exposed to uranium and thorium dusts from the sands (252). In a United Nations-sponsored study of radiological exposures in the tin by-product industry in Southeast Asia, Hewson found that many of these exposures are above occupational exposure limits, but could easily be reduced by use of standard radiation protection practices involving ventilation and respiratory protection. Implementation of such practices may be difficult, however, because most of the estimated 2000 workers employed in this indnstry work in plants that employ fewer than 20 workers, with many plants employing fewer than 5 workers. 

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