Safety output

The safety outputs are carried through the diy contacts series of two relays (implanted on the card) and controlled respectively by each master/slave channel (see wiring diagrams in single and double cut. Figures 5.10 and 5.11). 

The execntion of the safety program is done cyclically (time configurable by the user). The cycle time is controlled by the safety application program as well as by the receiver of the safety telegram (e.g. safety output card). 

An alternative for customers of small railroads is information on safety inputs. Examples might be the average experience of the staff, the age and condition of equipment, and the level of safety-related expenditures. Information of this type will be especially useful in ameliorating the market failure due to myopia. Myopic railroads will tend to be inexperienced firms who do not have a long safety output track record to report on, or unscrupulous railroads who are cheating by deviating from their past safety performance. 

Currently, this type of information is not collected and disseminated. The traditional objection has been that it is unclear which, if any, measures of safety inputs provide readily-interpretable information to customers. This is in contrast to information on safety outputs where it is quite straightforward to specify the data that should be collected, and customers can readily interpret their meaning a higher accident rate is worse than a lower accident rate. 

Meaningftil provision of safety-input data does require that users of the information have the skill and knowledge to relate input measures to the expected effect on safety outputs. This is a task which is difficult even for professionals in the safety field. Are older locomotives more of a safety risk than newer locomotives At what point does age become critical ... 

There is an additional benefit from defining minimum acceptable accident-performance measures. Responsible firms will be deterred from myopic behavior if there are clearly stated minimum performance standards that they can meet that would obviate scrutiny by the FRA. From a societal point of view it is much more beneficial to state these minimal objectives in terms of safety outputs rather than by the existing system where acceptable performance is stated in terms of the minimum quality and quantity of safety inputs. The benefit comes from the ability of railroads to use their managerial ability to achieve at least the minimum level of safety by using the most efficient combination of safety inputs. 

A fatal accident and some other disasters, which were caused by small cracks, lead to a more strict consideration of the security of these steam drums. Parallel to these the economical pressure, due to the globalisation of the today s industry, lead to the increase of the pressure and the rotation speed of the paper production machines for a higher output of the production, which means, that all safety aspects from the design and the material will be exploited totally. On the other hand cast iron is also not a ductile and comfortable material, like the most steels for the pressure equipment. 

Beside all these safety reasons, we are able to test 2 or 3 drums at the same time and by some improvements of the application we are able to reduce the test-period down to 4 hours, which results in an also for the production sufficient number of tested drums during the short shut down periods. These increase the availability and the production output of a plant and result therefore in a gain of safety an economical competitiveness of the European industry. 

A small (25-kg), portable apheresis system, available in 1993, is designed to meet a wide variety of blood cell separation needs. The role of the apheresis system is to control the behavior, separation, and collection of blood components from the bowl while maintaining maximum donor safety. The system controls the flow rates of blood and components through variable pump speeds. It directs the flow of components out of the bowl, by fully automatic opening and closing of valves based on the output of the system sensors. The system monitors the separation of blood components in the bowl by an optics system that aims at the shoulder of the bowl. A sensor on the effluent line monitors the flow of components out of the bowl. 

Detection of Bromine Vapor. Bromine vapor in air can be monitored by using an oxidant monitor instmment that sounds an alarm when a certain level is reached. An oxidant monitor operates on an amperometric principle. The bromine oxidizes potassium iodide in solution, producing an electrical output by depolarizing one sensor electrode. Detector tubes, usefiil for determining the level of respiratory protection required, contain (9-toluidine that produces a yellow-orange stain when reacted with bromine. These tubes and sample pumps are available through safety supply companies (54). The usefiil concentration range is 0.2—30 ppm. 

The logic for the safety interlock, including inputs from measurement devices and outputs to ac tuators. 

Improved sensors allow computer monitoring of the system for safety and protection of the equipment from damage. Sensors include lubrication-flow monitors and alarms, bearing-temperature sensors, belt scales, rotation sensors, and proximity sensors to detect ore level under the crusher. The latter prevent jamming of the output with too high an ore level, and protect the conveyor from impact of lumps with too low an ore level. Motion detectors assure that the conveyor is moving. Control applied to crusher systems including conveyors can facilitate use of mobile crushers in quarries and mines, since these can be controlled remotely by computer with reduced labor. 

Inherently Safer Design Rather than add on equipment to control hazards or to protect people from their consequences, it is better to design user-friendly plants which can withstand human error and equipment failure without serious effects on safety, the environment, output, and efficiency. This part is concerned with this matter. 

For many years the usual procedure in plant design was to identify the hazards, by one of the systematic techniques described later or by waiting until an accident occurred, and then add on protec tive equipment to control future accidents or protect people from their consequences. This protective equipment is often complex and expensive and requires regular testing and maintenance. It often interferes with the smooth operation of the plant and is sometimes bypassed. Gradually the industry came to resize that, whenever possible, one should design user-friendly plants which can withstand human error and equipment failure without serious effects on safety (and output and emciency). When we handle flammable, explosive, toxic, or corrosive materials we can tolerate only very low failure rates, of people and equipment—rates which it may be impossible or impracticable to achieve consistently for long periods of time. 

Chemical analyses should be provided for all anodes used in the offshore and harbor area, together with results for current content in A h kg and current output in amperes [2,3]. The geometric shape and the number of anodes required is determined by these parameters. Expensive calculations for design based on grounding resistances are made only in exceptional cases because in practice there are too many uncertainties and the number and mass of the anodes have to be quoted with a corresponding safety factor. 

The topology is going to be an isolated, multiple output flyback converter that must meet the safety requirements of UT, CSA, and VDE. These considerations affect the design of the final packaging, transformer, and voltage feedback designs. 

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