Safety culture observations

This study goes beyond much of the earlier research and— following the approach of Hunt and Habeck (1993) and Hunt et al. (1993)—seeks to estimate the role of HRM practices in the determination of workers compensation costs in a multivariate framework. It uses a workplace safety model that incorporates a wider variety of HRM practices than has been previously employed. In particular, it analyzes the impact of the three important dimensions of HRM practices on safety employee participation in decision making, employee participation in financial returns, and the firm s management safety culture. In addition, this is the first study to consider file effect of each of these factors on claim frequency and claim severity, and to ask whether any observed change is file result of changes in technical efficiency or moral hazard (principal-agent) incentives. 

We are striving to produce a culture where safety is a core value. If safety is a core value, then the members of the culture wiU work safely all of the time, whether anyone is there to observe them or not. This is truly a safety culture [p. 45]. 

The construction of safety culture of the enterprise is a long process,in the process of how to find and correct the employees of unsafe behavior, to gradually regulate the employees of safety behavior is particularly important. In this respect the effective method is to implement behavior safety management tools. This paper introduced at present in SINOPEC widely applied behavior safety management tool - HSE observation card. 

If we will enhance safety culture and standardize employee safety behavior, it cannot leave the application of behavior-based safety management tools. The behavior-based safety management tools are an important means that is to effectively promote the safety culture of enterprise. At present, in SINOPEC comprehensive apvplication of HSE observation tools, its core is to conduct field observation and analysis and communication, to interfere with the way or intervention, make people know the dangers of unsafe behavior, prevent and eliminate imsafe behavior. 

As for the reporting rate of Level 0 and 1 cases, significant correlations were also observed with several safety culture factors. However, contrary to the safety measure hypothesis of this index, there was the same trend shown in the reporting rate of Level 2+ cases a positive score for each factor contributes to lower frequency... 

In IRT, on the other hand, a latent trait, such as patient safety culture , is an unobserved construct measured by a set of observed items. The unobserved construct, in this case patient safety culture , has a causal relationship to the observed scores . Thus, CTT tends to focus more on total test scores, whereas IRT focuses on the items and their characteristics (Borsboom 2005). CTT is useful when the test score is of central interest, while IRT is most useful in examining the individual building blocks (items) of the total test scores. Both have their strengths and both are needed to form a complete picture of the properties of a set of items. 

Item Characteristic Curve (ICC) IRT is a group of measurement models that describe the mathematical relationship between underlying latent construct of safety culture and the uKhviduaPs performance (observed item responses) as a logistic function called an item characteristic curve (ICC). Each single item in a 5-point Likert-type response format is characterised by an ICC defined by the estimated slope parameter and 4 item location parameters representing the movement from the lower options to the higher options of the Likert scale. 

Several instruments have been developed to assess hospital staff s perceptions of aspects of workplace safety culture and a number of studies have reported associations between hospital safety culture and safety outcome measures (Jackson et al. 2010). Profiling the hospital safety culture scores is relatively straightforward but finding safety outcome measures for patients or workers is more challenging (Flin 2007). Different types of safety outcome data can be collected, e.g. (i) hospital incident records for staff or patients or clinical data for patients, (ii) self-reports of incidents and injuries by workers or patients and (iii) workers safety behaviours (self-reported or observed). 

A sample of 475 staff from 10 hospitals in Costa Rica, Gimeno et al. (2005) found that safety culture was related to self-reported work-related injuries. Another study of 789 hospital-based healthcare workers in the USA, found that experienced blood and body fluid exposure incidents for workers were lower when senior management support, safety feedback and training were perceived favourably (Gershon et al. 2000). In Japan, reduced needle-stick and sharp injuries to hospital workers were associated with safety culture factors, such as being involved in health and safety matters (Smith et al. 2010). In our Scottish hospital sample, we collected information on self-reports of worker injuries, as well as observed errors affecting patients. 

Summarising the various concepts and definitions proposed, safety culture appears to be the broader, manifest concept behind the fiamewoik of safety climate. Safety cultme is the source for patterns of behaviour which can be observed, described and changed (Goodmaim 2004), whereas safely climate is the sum of behaviours and attitudes based on common assumptions and beliefs toward patient safety. Cox and Flin (1998) describe culture as an organisation s personality while climate is seen as the organisation s mood . 

There is scarce evidence on the effectiveness of interventions aimed at improving safety culture. This lack of evidence is due to the fact that the effectiveness of safety culture interventions is hard to prove because, often, a combination of strategies is observed as having an impact without there being a clear and known relationship between each single intervention and a safety culture improvement... 

Hazards of all types can exist in healthcare facilities and organizations must take steps to identify and control these hazards. Conducting periodic tours, inspections, and surveys can help identify and control hazards. Organizations with established safety cultures can rely on staff vigilance to help identify hazards and help prevent accidents. Healthcare supervisors must also focus on correcting unsafe acts and behaviors. Facility personnel at all levels should learn to observe hazards and behaviors that could contribute to accidents. Senior leads should stress the importance of job safety education and training. Supervisors should communicate the need for personal involvement in safety and hazard control efforts. 

McSween observes that an organization may initiate a series of programs under the umbrella of an ongoing safety process (1995, p. 34). Krause emphasizes that continuous improvement is a factor that distinguishes a genuine process from a program (1997, p. 73). Ultimately, the purpose of behavioral safety is not simply to improve individual behaviors, but to positively impact the overall safety culture and related safety systems. As these goals are accomplished, safety performance will continually improve. 

There is no one best way to perform observations— techniques and methods depend on the organization and the existing safety culture. It is recommended each site tailor the observation process to its particular needs. If a site benchmarks to another site, the suggested strategy is to use the benchmark sites approach as a guide but develop specific procedures to accommodate the process locally. 

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