Nuclear material production

By contrast, a nascent nuclear power, such as North Korea or Iran, that is seeking to establish a credible nuclear deterrent either needs or could benefit immeasurably from assistance at all points of the process, from specialized equipment to design information to production technologies and skills. A nascent nuclear power must invest in the relevant infrastructure that a credible deterrent requires. Recent activities in both countries to establish nuclear materials production capabilities indicate that they believe it is important to build these capabilities. These activities also suggest that these two countries are less likely to aggressively pursue weapons-usable materials from Russia than what was feared in the early 1990s. These activities may, however, have increased their demand for certain types of knowledge and skills. 

The technology used to produce chemical weapons is much harder to identify unambiguously as weapons-related than is that for nuclear materials production technology, and relevant know-how is much more widely available. Although production techniques for major chemical weapon agents involve some specialized process steps, detailed examples can be found in the open literature and follow from standard chemical engineering principles. 

Agreement State programs were developed to bring a modicum of control to the state level, but they do not cover all handling of nuclear materials. For instance, all import and export of nuclear materials is controlled by the NRC, as is the constmction of any nuclear material production or utilization facility. Many waste disposal issues also fall under the aegis of the NRC. The NRC has the ultimate authority to control all nuclear materials deemed pertinent to the defense and security of the United States. More information on NRC and Agreement State regulations is online at http //www.hsrd.ornl.gov/nrc/index.html (Dec. 2005). 

Forty years of nuclear materials production at the Savannah River Site (SRS) has generated over 300 million liters of aqueous radioactive waste to date. This waste has been primarily generated from the two fuel reprocessing facilities as fission products from reactor irradiations. The current volume of waste is less than half the above due to processing through evaporators to remove excess non-radioactive water. The total activity stored in the tanks is over 600 million Ci (2.2E19 Bq). 

Radionuclides released from the production of nuclear weapon materials and from fabrication plants are not widely published. The exposures from nuclear materials production/ processing centers (Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Tomsk) in the Russian Federation were published, and the annual effective doses were 0.0054-0.11 mSv. 

The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Material Production. S.K. also acknowledges the support of die USAF Phillips Laboratory, the National Research Council (Office of Eastern European Affairs), the Academy of Arts and Sciences, Slovenia, and the Stefan Institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia. The support of colleagues at the Los Alamos National Laboratory— Drs. Lamed Asprey, P. Gaxy EUer, Jon Nielsen, and Kent Abney— and at the Jozef Stefan Institute— Prof. Boris Zemva, and Drs. Karel Lutar and Adolf Jesih— also gratefully appreciated. 

Fission Product Nuclide and Special Nuclear Material Production and Decay... 

As specified in both the draft DOE Nuclear Safety Policy and Policy and Expectations for Formal Conduct of Operations in DOE Owned Nuclear Material Production Program Facilities, facilities shall be operated and supported by personnel designated by management as qualified to perform their assigned function. Minimum qualification criteria shall be established and documented consistent with the requirements in DOE Order 5480.6 ANSI/ANS 3.1 draft DOE Order 5480.XX, "Personnel Section, Qualification, and Training Requirements" (Reference 3) and the NRC Policy Statement on Education for Senior Operators and Shift Supervisors at Nuclear Power Plants. Deviations from these requirements will require the approval of the Department of Energy Savannah River Site. Selected positions and their associated requirements are highlighted due to the restart issues that surround them. 

Proceedings of the Second Cnited Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Cses of Atomic Energy, Geneva, Sept. 1—3,1958, United Nations pubUcation, Geneva, 1958, particulady Vol. 4 Production of Nuclear Materials andlsotopes. 

The licensing process consists of two steps construction and operating license that must be completed before fuel loading. Licensing covers radiological safety, environmental protection, and antitru,st considerations. Activities not defined as production or utilization of special nuclear material (SNM), use simple one-step. Materials Licenses, for the possession of radioactive materials. Examples are uranium mills, solution recovery plants, UO fabrication plants, interim spent fuel storage, and isotopic separation plants. 

Nuclear power production involves bringing fissionable material together to react nuclearly, removing the heat, converting the heat to steam to drive a turbogenerator. and managing the wastes. 

The DOE N-Reactor is one of the plutonium production reactors located on the Hanford Reservation near Richland, Washington. It is graphite moderated, pressurized water reactors that in addition to production of special nuclear materials also provided steam to turbine generators owned by the Washington Public Power Supply System for electric power production. It began op ition in 1 is put into standby status in 1988 and closed because of similarities to Chernobyl. 

THE NEW VISION INCLUDES A SAFE, EFFICIENT AND RELIABLE PRODUCTION COMPLEX FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS FOR IMPORTANT NATIONAL PROGRAMS SUCH AS DEFENSE, SPACE EXPLORATION, MEDICINE, INDUSTRIALNEEDS AND RESEARCH,INCLUDINGPRODUCTION AND STUDY OF TRANS-SEABORGIUM ELEMENTS. 

A safe, efficient and reliable production complex for nuclear materials for national programs such as defense, space exploration, medicine, industrial applications and research - including the production and study of trans-Scaborgium elements... 

In 1978, the U.S. Department of Defense began manufacturing military ammunition using depleted U-238, since it had more than 700,000 tons of this byproduct material left from nuclear weapon and nuclear power production. The material was attractive for ammunition production since it had no other use, cost nothing to produce, and is pyrophoric (bursts into flames on contact with a target). 

For the purpose of this discussion, radiological materials that could be used in a terrorist attack are divided into three categories (1) bomb-grade nuclear material, (2) nuclear reactor fuel and associated waste products, and (3) industrial sources. Bomb-grade nuclear material includes concentrated plutonium and/or highly enriched uranium (>20% U-235) that may be used to build a nuclear weapon, assuming a terrorist group cannot or has not already secured an assembled weapon. 

Childs, B. G. 1963. Fission product effects in uranium dioxide. Journal of Nuclear Materials, 9, 217 -244. 

Kleykamp, H. 1985. The chemical state of fission products in oxide fuels. Journal of Nuclear Materials, 131, 221-246. 

Sunder, S., Shoesmith, D. W. Miller, N. H. 1997. Oxidation and dissolution of nuclear fuel (UO2) by the products of the alpha radiolysis of water. Journal of Nuclear Materials, 244, 66-74. 

Murakami, T. 1985. Crystalline product on surface of synroc after long leaching. Journal of Nuclear Materials, 135, 288-291. 

Jensen, K. A., Janeczek, J., Ewing, R. C., Stille, P., Gauthier-Lafaye, F. Salah, S. 2000. Cran-dallites and coffinite retardation of nuclear fission products at the Bangombe nuclear fission reactor. Material Research Society Symposium Proceedings, 608, 525-532. 

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