Special nuclear material

Transportation and onsite transfer of nuclear explosives, nuclear components, Navel nuclear fuel elements, Category I and Category 11 special nuclear materials, special assemblies, and other materials of national security. 

The hulls are the first material removed from the process to merit concern in respect to safeguards. These represent a possible route for special nuclear material (SNM) to be clandestinely removed from the system. Special instmmentation is used to assay the hulls containers for residual SNM. This step not only monitors the dissolver for proper functioning, but also serves an accountancy function as a material access area portal and enables the satisfaction of contractual requirements regarding process losses (40). 

The licensing process consists of two steps construction and operating license that must be completed before fuel loading. Licensing covers radiological safety, environmental protection, and antitru,st considerations. Activities not defined as production or utilization of special nuclear material (SNM), use simple one-step. Materials Licenses, for the possession of radioactive materials. Examples are uranium mills, solution recovery plants, UO fabrication plants, interim spent fuel storage, and isotopic separation plants. 

The DOE N-Reactor is one of the plutonium production reactors located on the Hanford Reservation near Richland, Washington. It is graphite moderated, pressurized water reactors that in addition to production of special nuclear materials also provided steam to turbine generators owned by the Washington Public Power Supply System for electric power production. It began op ition in 1 is put into standby status in 1988 and closed because of similarities to Chernobyl. 

A particular focus of ourjoint efforts in the DOE work with Minatom has been to reduce the amounts of special nuclear material and to increase the security and accountability of the material that remains. Commercial nuclear power plants are key to the program, since that is where the weapons material is ultimately burned. ... 

Low-Level Waste. Low-level wastes are further divided into categories of special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material, depending on the isotopes contained. Special nuclear material refers to uranium 233, plutonium 239, and uranium containing more than the natural abundance of uranium 235. Source material refers to materials containing 0.05 percent or more of thorium or uranium in any physical or chemical form except that covered under special nuclear material. By-product materials consist of all other radioactive materials including fission and activation products. 

Holcomb (2) reports that through 1976, commercial burial grounds had disposed of 951,468 kilograms (kg) of source material, approximately 4 million curies of by-product material, and 1,667 kg of special nuclear material as well as 113 kg of TRU waste ( 3). The DOE sites, according to Duguid ( 1), contain 7,292,124 kg of source material and 11 million curies of byproduct as well as more than 700 kg of TRU waste. An additional 6 million liters of a waste-cement grout slurry has been injected into hydrofractured shale at the Oak Ridge disposal site in Tennessee. 

The mission of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is to regulate the nation s civilian use of by-product, source, and special nuclear materials to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, to promote the common defense and security, and to protect the environment. 

Dissolution of a Primary Metal. This method is not likely to be used by many radioanalytical laboratories because of special facility requirements. Dedicated hoods and glove box facilities are used to handle the usual types and quantities of special nuclear materials. Samples of metallic plutonium, uranium, or neptunium can be purchased with certification of both purity and mass for use of the metal as the primary standard material. The metal is dissolved in acid and then diluted to prepare the solution of desired concentration. 

A Plan for Elimination of Potential Emergency Situations during Shipment of Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Substances is in force at PA Mayak . Both regular and reserve ERU teams have been trained and certified in compliance with the "Program of Training Rescuers and Members of Special Emergency Groups". 

Special units of PA Mayak and special gnards of the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs ensure physical protection of nuclear materials. 

In addition, prior to SIT departure a special committee performs complex check-up of SIT for purposes of physical protection of nuclear materials (control over technical condition, equipment and fire safety observance of security rules and anti-terrorist preparedness). 

By contrast, a nascent nuclear power, such as North Korea or Iran, that is seeking to establish a credible nuclear deterrent either needs or could benefit immeasurably from assistance at all points of the process, from specialized equipment to design information to production technologies and skills. A nascent nuclear power must invest in the relevant infrastructure that a credible deterrent requires. Recent activities in both countries to establish nuclear materials production capabilities indicate that they believe it is important to build these capabilities. These activities also suggest that these two countries are less likely to aggressively pursue weapons-usable materials from Russia than what was feared in the early 1990s. These activities may, however, have increased their demand for certain types of knowledge and skills. 

There seem to be several reasons for this phenomenon. First, verifying arms control agreements and arrangements involving chemicals is far more difficult than for those involving nuclear materials, for example, as was exemplified by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections in Iraq. It is, therefore, possible that even the most advanced challenge inspection system under the CWC would not reveal evidence of the suspected non-compliance, particularly if the relevant site is unknown. 

The analytical schemes applied to the non-nuclear material samples were specially developed to allow the inspectors to make rapid and selective measurements without demanding optimum performance in terms of precision. Another important objective was to obtain as much information as possible from a sample before it was destroyed by further chemical processing. 

Blomeke, J. O., Kee, C. W., Salmon, R., Projected Shipments of Special Nuclear Material and Wastes by the U.S. Nuclear Power Industry, USAEC Report ORNL-TM-3965, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, August 1974. 

Is the material in the shipment to be imported a pesticide a source or special nuclear material or by-product a firearm or ammunition or a food, food additive, drug, cosmetic, or device If yes, the material is not subject to TSCA, but a negative TSCA import certification is required unless the shipment is clearly identified as being a pesticide or other chemical not subject to TSCA (e.g., the shipment is accompanied by FDA Form FD701 or EPA (FIFRA) Form 3540-1). If no, continue to the next question. 

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