Formal Safety Assessments hazards analysis

A job safety assessment or analysis should be performed at the start of any task or operation. The designated competent or authorized person should evaluate the task or operation to identify potential hazards and determine the necessary controls. This assessment should focus on actual worksite conditions or procedures that differ from or were not anticipated in the related project or phase hazard analysis. In addition, the authorized person should ensure that each employee involved in the task or operation is aware of the hazards related to the task or operation and of the measures or procedures that workers and visitors must use to protect themselves. Note The job safety assessment is not intended to be a formal, documented analysis, but instead is more of a quick check of actual site conditions and a review of planned procedures and precautions. A more detailed explanation of job safety analysis is provided in Chapter 12. 

Hazard identification and control are important aspects of safety in a laboratory. Most hazards in a laboratory environment involve either unsafe conditions or behavior. Conditions can be controlled through proper analysis and inspection of the work environment, and implementation of controls to reduce or eliminate the exposure to these hazards. A formal job hazard analysis, where individual tasks are observed, broken down into their individual components, and analyzed for existing and potential hazards is necessary for hazard identification and corrective action. This activity must be followed by periodic formal inspections and hazard assessments. 

Hazard Analysis. Recognizing that no plant can be perfectly safe, modem safety engineering has turned to techniques for the formal or quantitative assessment of risk [58]. Many techniques for formal analysis now exist [59,60]. They differ widely in scope and intention, and the Center for Chemical Process Safety [59] tabulates for each of them ... 

Safety of construction and operation. This is assessed at the design stage by formalized hazard analysis for the process and by hazard... 

Recent developments take the risk assessment subject to a higher level within the practice of safety. By formalizing the hazard analysis and risk assessment process, a better appreciation of the significance of individual risks is achieved. As risks levels are categorized and prioritized, more intelligent decisions can be made with respect to their elimination or reduction. For the hazard analysis and risk assessment process, it is necessary to arrive at definitions of hazards, hazards analyses, risks, and risk assessments. 

Model Based Safety Assessment aims at supporting the Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) [8]. Before the PSSA is performed, the Functional Hazard Analysis identifies the Failure Conditions (e.g. safety critical situations of the system) and assesses their severity on a scale going from No Safety Effect (NSE) to Catastrophic (CAT). Then, during the Preliminary System Safety Assessment, safety models (or alternatively fault-trees) axe built and analysed. A safety model describes formally in which node a fault occurs and how this fault propagates inside the system architecture in order to cause a Failure Condition. 

The Acceptable Risk Process was the basis for all technical decision making at NASA, from daily decision making to the formalized, final decision process immediately prior to a launch known as the FRR. The Acceptable Risk Process was first set forth in the Space Shuttle Safety Assessment Report, issued prior to the first shuttle launch in 1981. Similar to the hazard analysis and tracking process introduced in Chapter 3, a hazard was classified by NASA as an acceptable risk only after... 

Identification can be as simple as asking what-iP questions at design reviews. It can also involve the use of a checklist outlining the normal process hazards associated with a specific piece of equipment. The major weakness of the latter approach is that items not on the checklist can easily be overlooked. The more formalized hazard-assessment techniques include, but are not limited to, hazard and operability study (HAZOP), fault-tree analysis (FTA), failure mode-and-effect analysis (FMEA), safety indexes, and safety audits. 

The FSA approach is a standardized holistic approach, and consists of five steps (IMO 2002) 1) Hazard Identification, 2) Risk Assessment, 3) Estabhsh Safety Measures, 4) Cost-Benefit Assessment, and 5) Recommendation for decision making. It is mandated that in order to be consistently appUed by different parties, the process must be clearly documented and formally recorded in a uniform and systematic manner (IMO 2002). In general, the availability of suitable data for all steps in the analysis is vital. If not readily available, these may be estimated through models, expert judgment and simulations. 

In addition to the hazardous conditions that develop during daily operations and are incorporated in the closed-loop hazard tracking system, the customer may require the contractor to perform a formal periodic risk assessment (usually annually, but it can be more frequent if the customer so desires or if operational activities dictate) of all facilities in which operations will occur. The risk assessment will also take into consideration the hazards associated with the permanent equipment and hardware assigned for use in the facility. The accident risk assessment then becomes a detailed safety analysis of a facility, including its systems and functions. 

The Change Safety Analysis (CSA) aims to integrate a formal approach to system safety hazard management, quantification of system safety requirements, and system safety assurance. The Change Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Process encapsulate the following ... 

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