Fault tree analysis and event trees

Methods for performing hazard analysis and risk assessment include safety review, checkhsts, Dow Fire and Explosion Index, what-if analysis, hazard and operabihty analysis (HAZOP), failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis, and event tree analysis. Other methods are also available, but those given are used most often. 

Tliis cliapter is concerned willi special probability distributions and tecliniques used in calculations of reliability and risk. Tlieorems and basic concepts of probability presented in Cliapter 19 are applied to llie determination of llie reliability of complex systems in terms of tlie reliabilities of their components. Tlie relationship between reliability and failure rate is explored in detail. Special probability distributions for failure time are discussed. Tlie chapter concludes with a consideration of fault tree analysis and event tree analysis, two special teclmiques lliat figure prominently in hazard analysis and llie evaluation of risk. 

Fault Tree Analysis and Event Tree Analysis... 

In this paper we explore quantitative risk assessment using a bow-tie model to analyze intangible risk -combining fault tree analysis and event tree analysis in order to estabUsh the cause/effect relations describing a specific imdesired event, see e.g. (Vatn et al. 1996). 

FIAZOPS is a technique applied in the assessment of potential hazards from new installations and processes. It is a technique used extensively in the chemical industry and in chemical engineering applications, along with other techniques, such as Failure Modes and Effect Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis and Event Tree Analysis. 

Bow tie analysis is a qualitative, iterative technique often conducted by a team. It unifies fault tree analysis and event tree analysis. This technique visualizes all effects leading to a top event and all consequences which result from the top event (Badreddine and Ben Amor, 2010). 

Representation Having defined what the operator should do (via task analysis) and what can go wrong, the next step is to represent this information in a form which allows the quantitative evaluation of the human-error impact on the system to take place. It is usual for the human error impact to be seen in the context of other potential contributions to system risk. Human errors and recoveries are usually embedded within logical frameworks such as fault tree analysis and event tree analysis. 

Fault Tree Analysis. Fault trees represent a deductive approach to determining the causes contributing to a designated failure. The approach begins with the definition of a top or undesired event, and branches backward through intermediate events until the top event is defined in terms of basic events. A basic event is an event for which further development would not be useful for the purpose at hand. For example, for a quantitative fault tree, if a frequency or probabiUty for a failure can be deterrnined without further development of the failure logic, then there is no point to further development, and the event is regarded as basic. 

Fault Tree Analysis Faiilt tree analysis permits the hazardous incident (called the top event) frequency to be estimated from a logic model of the failure mechanisms of a system. The top event is traced downward to more basic failures using logic gates to determine its causes and hkelihood. The model is based on the combinations of fail-... 

Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) is a simplified form of event tree analysis. Instead of analyzing all accident scenarios, LOPA selects a few specific scenarios as representative, or boundary, cases. LOPA uses order-of-magnitLide estimates, rather than specific data, for the frequency of initiating events and for the probability the various layers of protection will fail on demand. In many cases, the simplified results of a LOPA provide sufficient input for deciding whether additional protection is necessary to reduce the likelihood of a given accident type. LOPAs typically require only a small fraction of the effort required for detailed event tree or fault tree analysis. 

Frequency Phase 3 Use Branch Point Estimates to Develop a Ere-quency Estimate for the Accident Scenarios. The analysis team may choose to assign frequency values for initiating events and probability values for the branch points of the event trees without drawing fault tree models. These estimates are based on discussions with operating personnel, review of industrial equipment failure databases, and review of human reliability studies. This allows the team to provide initial estimates of scenario frequency and avoids the effort of the detailed analysis (Frequency Phase 4). In many cases, characterizing a few dominant accident scenarios in a layer of protection analysis will provide adequate frequency information. 

Eault tree analysis is used to assess the frequeney of an ineident. A fault tree is a diagram that shows how primary eauses produee events, whieh ean eontribute to a partieular hazard. There are several pathways in whieh a single primary eause ean eombine with other primary eauses or events. Therefore, a single eause may be found in more than one hazard and may oeeur at different loeations in the fault tree. 

A significant development of the study was the use of event trees to link the system fault trees to (lie accident initiators and the core damage states as described in Chapter 3. This was a response to the ditficulties encountered in performing the in-plant analysis by fault trees alone. Nathan Villalva and Winston Little proposed the application of decision trees, which was recognized by Saul Levine a.s providing the structure needed to link accident sequences to equipment failure. 

A simple example of fault tree analysis applied to an internal combustion engine (Figure 3.4.4-2) is the Figure 3.4.4-3 fault tree diagram of how the undesired event "Low Cylinder Compression" may occur. The Boolean equation of this fault tree is in the caption of Figure 3.4.4-3. Let the occurrence of these events be represented by a 7, non-occurrence by 0, and consider that there may he a long history of occurrences with this engine. Several sets of occunrence.s (trials) are... 

A failure modes and effects analysis delineates components, their interaction.s ith each other, and the effects of their failures on their system. A key element of fault tree analysis is the identification of related fault events that can contribute to the top event. For a quantitative evaluation, the failure modes must be clearly defined and related to a numerical database. Component failure modes should be realistically and consistently postulated within the context of system operational requirements and environmental factors. 

Gates look alike the are only distinguished by the gate label. Each event box is labeled to fully describe the postulated fault according to the what and when about the event, The precise statement enhances the analysis by focusing on the event, and aiding the fault tree revic. . ... 

AS r.dift lad iL v iifrtion or i iiiun.J c wk-di. failure and T., i. -did- riri d independent unavailability, d<)>.-cftid number of failures, and Cdi. dijcy of top event No Phased-mission analysis possible if fault tree is input, minini j1 cutsets will be calcuijidd rnc 7r/--r. Asail.iblc Ik -ii mvuuu-(. -nicT... 

RISKMAN is an integrated Microsoft Windows , personal computer software system for [H. i forming quantitative risk analysis. Used for PSAs for aerospace, nuclear power, and chemical [iroccsses, it has five main modules Data Analysis, Systems Analysis, External Events Analysis, Event Tree Analysis, and Important Sequences. There are also modules for software system maintenance, backup, restoration, software updates, printer font, and page control. PEG has also integrated the fault tree programs CAFTA, SETS, NRCCUT, and IRRAS into RISKMAN. 

The frequencies of plant damage and public consequence are calculated using plant logic combined with component fragilities. Event and fault trees are constructed to identify tiic accident sequences and the damage that may result from an earthquake. In performing a plant system and accident-sequence analysis, the major differences between seismic and internal events analysis are given in Table 5.1-4... 

The assembly process (Figure 10-1) brings together all of the assessment tasks to provide the risk, its significance, how it was found, its sensitivity to uncertainties, confidence limits, and how it may be reduced by system improvements. Not all PSAs use fault trees and event trees. This is especially true of chemical PSAs that may rely on HAZOP or FMEA/FMECAs. Nevertheless the objectives are the same accident identification, analysis and evaluation. Figure 10-1 assumes fault tree and event tree techniques which should be replaced by the equivalent methods that are used. 

The QRA was conducted by risk sts and design innel to determine the probability of explosive releases of the chemical. Fault tree analysis identified several combinations of equipment failures and operator errors that could cause the top event (reactor explosion), Failure data were obtained from plant ex ice and industry da%.ui,/uoes to quantify the fault trees to estimate the frequency of reactor explosions. The fault trees suggested several safety improv-... 

---