Event Basics

All audio events, video events, and MIDI events are contained in tracks on the timeline. Therefore, you need to create a new track before you can create an event To create a track, browse for and preview media files (loops) in AQD Explorer and then double-click one to create a track. 

Double-click Strings 3.wav in the Explorer window to create a track that contains that event on the timeline. 

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This chapter provides a brief overview of systems currently in piace for the detection of biological events, either naturaiiy occurring disease outbreaks or deliberate bioterror events. Basic concepts related to infectious disease epidemiology and surveillance are presented. Different types of surveillance systems, including syndromic surveillance, are described. The roles of the... 

Regarding the comprehensive closed-loop model, a new methodology was developed to simulate kinetic responses of real-life carbocationic polymerizations to various events or combinations of events. Basic scenarios were set up to analyze numerically the above events and to demonstrate their effects on N and Mn vs Wp, and — ln(l — C) and C vs time diagnostic plots, respectively. 

Fire Occurrence Events Basic Events Initiating Events... 

BASIC EVENT basic initiating fault requiring no further development... 

Investigating fire-related events >- Basic fire investigation procedures >- Dealing with the aftermath. 

Table 1 illustrates the evolution mode of each situations. Our simulation allows the system to evolve the basic events (basic events Fault tree), and it describes the failure mode of the function. This failure mode helps to obtain the behavior mode related to each failure (Table 1), where each Fault tree (Delay during loading, delay of loading, bad loading and Accident) is carried by a behavior mode evaluating the level of risk related to each situation. 

One of the basic problems in molecular dynamics is how to sample infrequent events. Typically a reaction must pass over a barrier, and effort would be wasted if many trajectories are run that do not reach the reactant channel. 

Compounds are transformed into each other by chemical reactions that can be run under a variety of conditions from gas-phase reactions in refineries that produce basic chemicals on a large scale, through parallel transformations of sets of compounds on well-plates in combinatorial chemistry, all the way to the transformation of a substrate by an enzyme in a biochemical pathway. This wide range of reaction conditions underlines the complicated task of imderstanding and predicting chemical reaction events. 

Fault Tree Analysis. Fault trees represent a deductive approach to determining the causes contributing to a designated failure. The approach begins with the definition of a top or undesired event, and branches backward through intermediate events until the top event is defined in terms of basic events. A basic event is an event for which further development would not be useful for the purpose at hand. For example, for a quantitative fault tree, if a frequency or probabiUty for a failure can be deterrnined without further development of the failure logic, then there is no point to further development, and the event is regarded as basic. 

Figure 4 shows a fault tree for a flat tire on an automobile. The top event, the flat tire, is broken down into two immediate contributing events, road debris and tire failure. The contributing event, road debris, is a basic event. This event, which caimot be broken down into other events unless additional information is provided, is enclosed in a circle to denote it as a basic event. The other event, tire failure, is enclosed in a rectangle to denote it as an intermediate event. 

The next step is to define the intermediate event, tire failure. There are two events which could contribute a worn tire resulting from much usage or a tire that is defective owing to a manufacturing problem. These are both basic events because additional information is needed for any further definition. 

The resulting fault tree is shown in Figure 6, in which the top event is defined in terms of two intermediate events failure of the tank system or failure of the pumping system. Failure in either system would contribute to the overall system failure. The intermediate events are then further defined in terms of basic events. All of the basic events are related by AND gates because the overall system failure requires the failure of all of the individual components. Failures of the tanks and pumps are basic events because, without additional information, these events cannot be resolved any further. 

Fig. 6. A fault tree for the pumped storage example of Figure 5. For a real system the tank and pump failures would be more precisely defined, or set as intermediate events having further definition by subsequent basic events and more detailed failure modes.

It is not coincidental that the top event of the fault tree is the initiating event for the event tree. The fault tree shows how an event is decomposed into basic events whereas an event tree demonstrates the effect of the various safety functions. The disadvantage of event trees is that the outcomes are difficult to predict. Thus the outcome of interest might not arise from the analysis. 

ETA breaks down an accident iato its contributing equipment failures and human errors (70). The method therefore is a reverse-thinking technique, ie, the analyst begias with an accident or undesirable event that is to be avoided and identifies the immediate cause of that event. Each of the immediate causes is examined ia turn until the analyst has identified the basic causes of each event. The fault tree is a diagram that displays the logical iaterrelationships between these basic causes and the accident. 

The BHSIC event represents a basic equipment fault or failure that requires no further development iato mote basic faults or failures. 

Fault Tree Construction. Eault tree constmction begins at the TOP event and proceeds, level by level, until all fault events have been developed to their basic contributing causes (BASIC events). The analyst begins with the TOP event and, for the next level, determines the immediate. 

The immediate causes of the TOP event are shown in the fault tree with thek relationship to the TOP event. If any one of the immediate causes results dkecdy in the TOP event, the causes are connected to the TOP event with an OR logic gate. If all the immediate causes are requked for TOP event occurrence, then the causes are connected to the TOP event with an AND logic gate. Each of the immediate causes is then treated in the same manner as the TOP event, and its immediate, necessary, and sufficient causes are determined and shown on the fault tree with the appropriate logic gate. This development continues until all intermediate fault events have been developed into thek basic causes. 

The Solution. The responses of working and reference electrodes to appHed voltages are important only because this information can be indicative of what goes on in the solution, or at the solution/electrode interface. The distinction between bulk (solution) and interfacial events is basically the distinction between chemical kinetics and charge transfer. 

The expected sequence of events on an alarm is basically as follows ... 

Fault Tree Analysis Faiilt tree analysis permits the hazardous incident (called the top event) frequency to be estimated from a logic model of the failure mechanisms of a system. The top event is traced downward to more basic failures using logic gates to determine its causes and hkelihood. The model is based on the combinations of fail-... 

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