Fault quantitative

Process monitoring is applied to improve reliability and safety of process operation. The main functions of process monitoring include monitor the system operation status detect the occurrence of fault quantitative analysis of the abnormal extent determine the type, time, extent, exterior, action ways and influence extent of faults. 

Fault Tree Analysis. Fault trees represent a deductive approach to determining the causes contributing to a designated failure. The approach begins with the definition of a top or undesired event, and branches backward through intermediate events until the top event is defined in terms of basic events. A basic event is an event for which further development would not be useful for the purpose at hand. For example, for a quantitative fault tree, if a frequency or probabiUty for a failure can be deterrnined without further development of the failure logic, then there is no point to further development, and the event is regarded as basic. 

Process Hazards Analysis. Analysis of processes for unrecogni2ed or inadequately controUed ha2ards (see Hazard analysis and risk assessment) is required by OSHA (36). The principal methods of analysis, in an approximate ascending order of intensity, are what-if checklist failure modes and effects ha2ard and operabiHty (HAZOP) and fault-tree analysis. Other complementary methods include human error prediction and cost/benefit analysis. The HAZOP method is the most popular as of 1995 because it can be used to identify ha2ards, pinpoint their causes and consequences, and disclose the need for protective systems. Fault-tree analysis is the method to be used if a quantitative evaluation of operational safety is needed to justify the implementation of process improvements. 

Failure Mode and Ejfect Analysis (FMEA) This is a systematic study of the causes of failures and their effects. All causes or modes of failure are considered for each element of a system, and then all possible outcomes or effects are recorded. This method is usually used in combination with fault tree analysis, a quantitative technique. FMEA is a comphcated procedure, usually carried out by experienced risk analysts. 

Once the fault tree is constructed, quantitative failure rate and probability data must be obtained for all basic causes. A number of equipment failure rate databases are available for general use. However, specific equipment failure rate data is generally lacking and. 

In some instances, plant-specific information relating to frequencies of subevents (e.g., a release from a relief device) can be compared against results derived from the quantitative fault tree analysis, starting with basic component failure rate data. 

Identification and quantitative estimation of common-cause failures are general problems in fault tree analysis. Boolean approaches are generally better smted to mathematically handle common-cause failures. 

A logic model that graphically portrays the combinations of failures that can lead to a particular main failure (TOP event) or accident of interest. Given appropriate data, fault tree models can be quantitatively solved for an array of system performance characteristics (mean time between failures, probability of failure on demand, etc.)... 

A surface scientist working on molecular scale of catalysis may become disappointed by seeing how little quantitative use can be made in reaction engineering of the newest and theoretically most interesting instrumental techniques. It may be of some solace to them that it is not their fault. The quantitative consequences of important insights will have to evolve from much closer cooperation between physicists, chemists and engineers. This will require people reasonably well informed in all three fields. 

A failure modes and effects analysis delineates components, their interaction.s ith each other, and the effects of their failures on their system. A key element of fault tree analysis is the identification of related fault events that can contribute to the top event. For a quantitative evaluation, the failure modes must be clearly defined and related to a numerical database. Component failure modes should be realistically and consistently postulated within the context of system operational requirements and environmental factors. 

MOCUS implemented the Fussell algorithm (Fussell, 1974) for top-down solutions of the fault tree. This algorithm was used in ALLCUT and was modified to be bottom-up in WAMCE T. While cutsets are valuable for qualitative and quantitative purposes, they are not compact. They are thousands of trains (AND sequences) connected to one OR gate. 

RISKMAN is an integrated Microsoft Windows , personal computer software system for [H. i forming quantitative risk analysis. Used for PSAs for aerospace, nuclear power, and chemical [iroccsses, it has five main modules Data Analysis, Systems Analysis, External Events Analysis, Event Tree Analysis, and Important Sequences. There are also modules for software system maintenance, backup, restoration, software updates, printer font, and page control. PEG has also integrated the fault tree programs CAFTA, SETS, NRCCUT, and IRRAS into RISKMAN. 

The accident sequence frequencies are quantified by linking the system fault tree models together as indicated by the event trees for the accident sequence and quantified with plant-specific data to estimate initiator frequencies and component/human failure rates. The SETS code solves the fault trees for their minimal cutsets the TEMAC code quantitatively evaluates ihe cm sols and provides best estimates of component/event probabilities and frequencies. 

Further details about fault tree and event tree applications in quantitative risk assessment (QRA) are given in CCPS (1989b). 

EGSG Idaho s Idaho National Engineering Laboratory reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs), both qualitatively and quantitatively, to extract reliability information in support of the USNRC s effort to gather and analyze component failure data for U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. LERs describing failures or command faults (failure due to lack of needed input) for selected components have been analyzed in this program. Separate reports have been issued for batteries and battery chargers, control rods and drive mechanisms, diesel generators, ISC, Inverters, primary containment penetrations, protective relays and circuit breakers, pumps, and valves. 

Hazard Analysis Report - Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), failure mode and effect analysis, quantitative fault tree analysis or what/if check list (sec Part IV for details in theses subjects)... 

In a more quantitative sense, cause-consequence analysis may be viewed as a blend of fault tree end event tree analysis (discussed in tlie two preceding cliapters) for evaluating potential accidents. A major strengtli of cause-consequence analysis is its use as a communication tool. For example, a cause-consequence diagram displays the interrelationships between tlie accident outcomes (consequences) and Uieir basic causes. The method can be used to quantify the expected frequency of occurrence of the consequences if the appropriate chita are available. 

A large number of model-based systems use either qualitative or quantitative simulation, such as FAULTFINDER (Kelly and Lees, 1986) or EA-GOL (Roth, Woods, and Pople, 1992). These systems simulate normal behavior and compare the simulation results with observations, they simulate faults and compare simulation results with detected symptoms, or they interleave simulation with observation comparing the two to dynamically track normal and abnormal states. It is computationally very expensive to... 

The fault trees for even a simple process unit will be complex, with many branches. Fault trees are used to make a quantitive assessment of the likelihood of failure of a system, using data on the reliability of the individual components of the system. For example, if the following figures represent an estimate of the probability of the events... 

For acute releases, the fault tree analysis is a convenient tool for organizing the quantitative data needed for model selection and implementation. The fault tree represents a heirarchy of events that precede the release of concern. This heirarchy grows like the branches of a tree as we track back through one cause built upon another (hence the name, "fault tree"). Each level of the tree identifies each antecedent event, and the branches are characterized by probabilities attached to each causal link in the sequence. The model appiications are needed to describe the environmental consequences of each type of impulsive release of pollutants. Thus, combining the probability of each event with its quantitative consequences supplied by the model, one is led to the expected value of ambient concentrations in the environment. This distribution, in turn, can be used to generate a profile of exposure and risk. 

A fault tree is, itself, a Boolean equation relating basic events to the top event. The equation can be analyzed quantitatively or qualitatively by hand or by using computer code(s). If it is analyzed quantitatively, the probabilities or frequencies of the intermediate events and the top event are calculated. If it is analyzed qualitatively, a list of the failure combinations that can cause the top event is generated. These combinations are known as cut sets. A minimal cut set (MCS) is the smallest combination of basic events that, if they occur or exist simultaneously, cause the top event. These combinations are termed "minimal" because all of the basic events in a MCS must occur if the top event is to occur. Thus, a list of MCSs represents the known ways the top event can occur, stated in terms of equipment failures, human errors, and associated circumstances. 

The fault tree can be used to perform quantitative calculations to determine the probability of the top event. This is accomplished in two ways. 

Risk is the product of the probability of a release, thepjpbability of exposure, and the consequences of the exposure. Risk is usually described graphically, as shown in Figure 11-15. All companies decide their levels of acceptable risk and unacceptable risk. The actual risk of a process or plant is usually determined using quantitative risk analysis (QRA) or a layer of protection analysis (LOPA). Other methods are sometimes used however, ORA and LOPA are the methods that are most commonly used. In both methods the frequency of the release is determined using a combination of event trees, fault trees, or an appropriate adaptation. 

Probability analysis Way to evaluate the likelihood of an event occurring. By using failure rate data for equipment, piping, instruments, and fault tree techniques, the frequency (number of events per unit time) can be quantitatively estimated. 

Identification and quantitative estimation of common-cause failures are general problems in fault tree analysis. Boolean approaches are generally better suited to mathematically handle common-cause failures. The basic assumption is that failures are completely independent events, but in reality dependencies will exist and these are categorized as common cause failures (CCFs). Both qualitative and quantitative techniques can be applied to identify and assess CCFs. An excellent overview of CCF is available (AIChE-CCPS, 2000). 

Fault tree analysis (FTA) and event tree analysis (ETA) are the methods most commonly applied quantitatively. Since they only address the likelihood of undesired events, these methods are often combined with consequence severity calculations in a quantitative risk analysis, as described by CCPS (1999b). Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) uses a semiquantitative, order-of-magnitude approach. It is documented with worked examples in CCPS (2001b). 

Several qualitative approaches can be used to identify hazardous reaction scenarios, including process hazard analysis, checklists, chemical interaction matrices, and an experience-based review. CCPS (1995a p. 176) describes nine hazard evaluation procedures that can be used to identify hazardous reaction scenarios-checklists, Dow fire and explosion indices, preliminary hazard analysis, what-if analysis, failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), HAZOP study, fault tree analysis, human error analysis, and quantitative risk analysis. 

---