Facility-Specific Approach

A facility-specific implementation strategy relies on local expertise and calls for a num r of local PSM teams to work in parallel. One benefit of this approach is that it can provide for very rapid implementation of PSM. In addition, facility-specific programs can be adapted to local requirements, such 

Facility-specific approaches to implementing PSM make sense if you have determined significant variations among Icxations in one or more of the following areas  

As previously noted, cility-specific approaches tend not to succeed where the overall current status of PSM is poor. Local staff will not have the necessary knowledge or experience of safety management to develop and implement a program without considerable outside assistance. Even if you have identified significant variations, if your team decides that overail PSM performance is low you should consider a companywide strategy rather than a facility-specific approach. 

Facility-specific implementation requires formation of a local team at each of your company s facilities. As a general rule, these teams comprise resident staff and report to the facility manager. A typical local teeim would include the facility scifety manager and representatives from operations and engineering. 

More often than not, teams such as these benefit from outside assistance, either from other company experts or from consultants or engineers who can supplement their expertise. In any case, these teams, either directly or through facility managers, should report to a company PSM manager or champion to monitor progress, assure consistency, and facilitate cross-fertilization of efforts through exchange of experience. 

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Where individual facilities have strong programs in specific aspects of PSM, a facility-specific approach may involve identifying "best practice" programs and facilitating cross-communication among locations. 

Facility or division-specific approach. A facility or division-specific approach can provide very rapid integration and allow the systems, programs and elements to be adapted to meet local needs. However, the differences between locations will limit the value of sharing experience and knowledge. You are most likely to adopt a facility-specific approach if there are significant differences in ... 

Whether you have chosen a facility-specific, a companywide, or a h) rid approach, it may be helpful to consider your priorities in terms of both facilities and PSM elements. The goal here is to help determine what needs doing, in what order, and with what level of effort. 

As part of developing the PSM implementation plan (Chapter 5), you and the team identified benefits unique to the approach you selected, using them to help win management s approval. For example, your plan may focus on priority elements because the assessment you conducted suggests that this method will yield the greatest overall improvement in safety performance. And, as part of the pilot test described in this chapter, you focused on facility-specific benefits to enlist the support of local management and staff. 

The objective of a Source Investigation (SI) is to identify the upstream source of the toxicant, followed by implementation of controls (z. e., treatment technologies or alteration of upstream management systems) that will translate into elimination of final effluent toxicity. A key advantage is that treatment of smaller, more concentrated streams can often be performed more efficiently and economically than treatment of larger, more dilute streams (i.e., the final effluent) (U.S. EPA, 1989 1999). Source investigations can also be viable alternatives to eliminate final effluent toxicity in cases where a specific toxicant(s) cannot be identified, or if toxicity is transient or non-persistent. The selection of a SI or TTE approach will be facility-specific. However, an SI conducted prior to a TTE can be more beneficial and more cost-effective, since the source of toxicity can be identified and then treated separately from the final effluent (Novak et ah, 2002). 

Deliberate ignition of a release in which the material is both toxic and flammable is a means of mitigation. But this approach may only be appropriate in a few select material-specific and facility-specific cases. Certain materials may well represent a toxicity hazard greater than the flammability hazard. Moreover, the combustion of the vapor cloud may be incomplete or generate toxic products (Husa and Bulkey, 1965). The facility itself, the layout of the processes, other hazardous materials, property lines, and prevailing weather conditions all are of critical importance when a vapor cloud is ignited. 

The January 2004 Consultation NAP invited stakeholders to comment on the proposed approach to installation-level allocations. Most individual respondents were unhappy with their allocations, for example because they thought the baseline period was unrepresentative, or that a grandfathering methodology was unfair in their case, or because they felt that special circumstances had not been taken into account. Many sites also argued that they had been classified within the wrong sector, or that a separate sector should be created for one or more sites.7 These and subsequent consultations led to various modifications to the facility-specific allocations as well as to the development of procedures for allocating allowances to new facilities. 

The administrative costs of subsequent NAPs are likely to be substantially smaller than those for the Phase 1 NAP. The development of a facility-specific database, creation of the information needed to forecast sector-specific emissions, the consultation process, as well as the efforts developed by stakeholders to participate and influence the process all contributed to the considerable administrative costs of the UK Phase 1 NAP. Due to the experience gained both by UK government officials and by stakeholders, administrative costs of subsequent NAPs are likely to be substantially lower. However, the multiple-period approach may increase the administrative burden of the scheme relative to a case in which the allocations are decided only once, since some elements will undoubtedly be revisited and since greater understanding by stakeholders could well mean that some issues become more contentious. Overall, however, the considerable effort to develop the Phase 1 NAP and the framework and data underlying it provide a very solid foundation for future periods. 

With respect to technological risks, communication and participation are key to improved risk and crisis management as well as public acceptance of facilities and operations (Chakraborty 2011). Jacob Kringen (Chapter 11 in this volume) points out that the style of communication and inclusion defines much of what is known as regulatory style in the literature. This may vary between educational, accommodative, conciliatory, persuasive, insistent, and legalistic enforcement practices. Yet each of these styles demands a specific approach to internal and external communication and stakeholder involvement. 

Collaboration on an international level is essential in big science. These trends began with work centered at large facilities such as big accelerators but have also penetrated into areas of small science. Research on the chemistry of the heaviest elements concentrated at the few suitable heavy-ion accelerators is an obvious and successful example. Small groups take over at their home institutions a considerable part of the development of fast single-atom chemistry each element and each class of compounds requires a specific approach they test it in model experiments at smaller facilities. Eventually, the external groups and the in-house experimentalists join up at the heavy-ion accelerator to perform the major experiment. 

Alarm philosophy encompasses basic definitions, key work practices, and various processes as well as the alarm system performance goals and details about the, roles, and responsibilities. This facility specific document provides guidance for a consistent approach to alarm management and defined activities of the alarm management life cycle. Major positive issues (see Fig. IX/4.4.2-1 and Table IX/4.4 1), addressed by alarm philosophy shall include but are not limited to the following ... 

Qiu, H., Mallik, A.K., Takafuji, M., and Ihara, H. (2011) A facile and specific approach to new liquid chromatography adsorbents obtained by ionic self-... 

The modified FMEA approach evaluates each piece of equipment (not each device) as an independent unit, assuming worst case conditions of input and output. Separators, flowlines, heaters, compressors, etc., function in the same manner no matter the specific design of the facility. That... 

In addition to specific deadlines for each task and subtask, you should also consider program milestones, key pcrints in the plan at which you will want to review progress to date and make any necessary adjustments. For example, if you have adopted an element-by-element approach, you could consider completion of each PSM element as a milestone similarly, each facility s program would constitute a milestone, if that is the approach you ve chosen. 

Quantitative XRF analysis has developed from specific to universal methods. At the time of poor computational facilities, methods were limited to the determination of few elements in well-defined concentration ranges by statistical treatment of experimental data from reference material (linear or second order curves), or by compensation methods (dilution, internal standards, etc.). Later, semi-empirical influence coefficient methods were introduced. Universality came about by the development of fundamental parameter approaches for the correction of total matrix effects... 

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