Checklist analysis purpose

The purpose of a what-if/checklist analysis is to identify hazards, consider the types of accidents that can occur in a process or activity, evaluate in a qualitative manner the consequences of these accidents, and determine whether the safety levels against these potential accident scenarios appear adequate. The what-if/checklist analysis is described in detail in Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures (CCPS, 1992). 

Checklists are primarily used when published standards, codes, and commonly accepted industry practices exist. There are many such checklists. They consist of lists of questions pertaining to the applicable standards and practices—usually with a yes or no or not applicable response. Their purpose is to identify deviations from the expected, and thereby possible hazards. A checklist analysis requires a walk-through of the area to be surveyed. 

All team members should be familiar with PrHA objectives, the PrHA method to be used, and their roles in performing the PrHA. A 1- or 2-hour overview at the beginning of the first team review session is generally sufficient for this purpose. However, the more demanding PrHA methods, such as fault tree analysis (FTA), require more training and/or a greater depth of experience than less-rigorous methods, such as what-if and checklist analyses. 

Checklists are easy to use and provide a cost-effective way to identify customarily recognized hazards. Nevertheless, the quality of checklists is dependent on the experience of the people who develop them. Furthermore, they must be crafted to suit particular needs. If a checklist is not complete, the analysis may not identify some hazardous situations. An example of a checklist for machinery design is provided in Addendum B at the end of this chapter. A checklist for general design purposes appears in Chapter 13, Safety Design Reviews. Both serve as resources for those who choose to build their own checklists. 

The purpose of the what if analysis technique is to identify hazards/hazardous situations, major incidents, and/or specific accidents pertinent to specific areas, which could develop into undesirable consequences. As stated earlier, this technique is very helpful when various other checklists are unavailable. This is made very clear when a small example is taken. As an example, suppose there is a heating element heating water in a heater. Now, what if the water flow stopped The heater coil may burn out as heat will not be taken away. A precautionary measure will be to cut the power supply to the heater when there is no water flowing. Here, the situation is questioned in the form of what if and the answer is listed. After review a necessary precautionary measure is suggested. This is a very simple situation. However, in complex situations it is better to divide the entire scenario into smaller parts, then carry out the analysis. 

Once all the data have been evaluated and the PHA worksheet is completed, a formal report should be written documenting the results of the analysis. The narrative report typically includes a summary of all significant findings associated with operational risk. Recommendations for hazard elimination/control are also included in the report as well as suggestions for follow-on analyses. Although not entirely necessary, depending on the nature of the operation, process, or system, it is also useful to include a brief description of the project itself, its purpose and/or function as it relates to overall operations. The PHA/PHL worksheets are usually provided in the report as backup data to verify the report contents. Finally, the PHA report should also include a brief discussion of the methods used to develop the analysis (ETBA, FMEA, checklists, matrices, etc.), so that the reader can validate the report data, if required (Stephenson 1991). 

The purpose was to validate the methodology process and to test the specific results related to the checklists and scenarios. Thus, the project covers the first three of the following steps (0) Preparation, (1) General analysis, (2) Scenario analysis, (3) Action and (4) Implementation and follow up. 

The proposed method allows the continuous monitoring of OHS conditions in workplaces associated to workers safety performance. The combination of a checklist of dendritics and a control chart seems to be an adequate and sustainable approach for this purpose. On the one hand, the checklist, developed by mean of a Preliminary Hazard Analysis, includes all the hazardous conditions of the company and in particular all the at-risk behaviours. On the other hand, the control chart allows identifying all the hazardous conditions that are critical for the employees. 

The ILCI model has been applied in the design of accident investigation checklists according to the second principle. Such checklists are relatively easy to apply in accident investigations and in the subsequent analysis and coding of the results for statistical purposes. They suffer from a poor reliability (different investigators will come up with different results) and from an inadequate coverage of the detailed circumstances of the accidents and near accidents. 

Various analytical tools can be used in conjunction with the JHA process. These are used for specific purposes or conditions depending on the industry and range widely complexity. Examples would include — Process Hazard Analysis," What-If Analysis and Checklists for scenario development. Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Failure Mode and Efiect Analysis (FMEA), Fault-tree Analysis, Activity Hazard Analysis (Appendix H). 

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