Accident analysis report

The accident analysis report determines and documents the root causes of accidents associated with the end product and includes new hazards, hazards inadequately controlled or analyzed, and new baseline information identified by the accident analysis in the system safety effort. 

Accident analysis reports are prepared in response to all significant accidents, including near misses, associated with the end product at any time during the life cycle. 

An accident analysis report may be prepared by the system safety working group and/or an independent accident investigation board. The recommended method for serious accidents is for the SSWG to prepare an accident analysis report based on its own investigation and upon the findings of the traditional accident report prepared by the accident investigation board. 

Detailed project description and detailed accident information are required to conduct an in-depth accident analysis. Historical data, existing hazard analyses, and the hazard tracking log are also important. 

Techniques recommended for conducting accident analysis include change analysis, event and causal factors charts, PET analysis (or MORT or mini- 

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Coal Mine Safety Supervision Bureau of the State 2012. The National Coal Mine Accident Analysis Report (2011). 

The accident analysis report is a narrative. It includes a description of the project and the accident, a summary of findings and recommendations, an outline of methodology, and a detailed discussion of facts, findings, and recommendations. Photographs, drawings, and an event and causal factors chart are included as illustrations. 

TEPCO, 2012. Fukushima Nuclear Accident Analysis Report. Tokyo Electric Power Company Inc. 

FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report (Chapter 15 is the accident analysis section in the FSAR standard format). 

These topics are the subject of DOE Standard DOE-STD-1027-92, "Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23 Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports," which provides guidance for facility managers and Cognizant Secretarial Offices (CSOs). They are also discussed in the DOE Standard DOE-STD-3009-94,... 

At first sight many more soft deviations were expected to be found compared to hard deviations, because from accident analysis it is known that in many cases, events triggering the accident are very often human errors, Reason (Reason, 1997). However, considering that soft deviations are often not explicitly reported or known, it makes sense that more hard deviations are present. Retrieving soft deviation information is... 

William R. Rhyne received a B.S. in nuclear engineering from the University of Tennessee and M.S. and D.Sc. degrees in nuclear engineering from the University of Virginia. Dr. Rhyne is currently an independent consultant and earlier cofounded H R Technical Associates, Inc., where he remains a member of the board of directors. He has extensive experience in risk and safety analyses associated with nuclear and chemical processes and with the transport of hazardous nuclear materials and chemicals. From 1984 to 1987, he was the project manager and principal investigator for a probabilistic accident analysis of transporting obsolete chemical munitions. Dr. Rhyne has authored or coauthored numerous publications and reports in nuclear and chemical safety and risk analysis areas and is author of the book Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Analysis Quantitative Approaches for Truck and Train. He is a former member of the NRC Transportation Research Board Hazardous Materials Committee, the Society for Risk Assessment, the American Nuclear... 

Dr. Wilse Webb performed a different analysis from Leger s using the data of fatal and total motor-vehicle accidents as reported by the National Safety Council in 1988 (6). He proposed a conservative estimate of 1225 fatalities, 45,000 disabling injuries, and 1.75 billion in total cost from these accidents. 

As an initial step, the reports of l80 in-process accidents were viewed. A sianmary of the type of information obtained is shown in Fig 22. The process operation and the probable causative stimuli which led to the accident are given in terms of the number of accidents and the percentage of the total number. Thus the most probable causes of an accident were identified in an accident analysis. The causes varied by process operation and material type. However friction, impact, electrostatic discharge (ESD), and heating were the most commonly identified causative stimuli. 

Hazard Analysis—The determination of material, system, process, and plant characteristics that can produce undesirable consequences, followed by the assessment of hazardous situations associated with a process or activity. Largely qualitative techniques are used to pinpoint weaknesses in design or operation of the facility that could lead to accidents. The Safety Analysis Report (SAR) hazard analysis examines the complete spectrum of potential accidents that could expose members of the public, on-site woikers, facility workers, and the environment to hazardous materials. 

DOE-STD-1027-92, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE 0 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports . 

Probst, T. M., Estrada, A. X. (2009). Aeeident under-reporting among employees Testing the moderating inlluenee of psyehologieal safety climate and supervisor enfOTcement of safely praetiees. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 42(5), 1438—1444. 

Webb, G. R., Redman, S., Wilkinson, C., Sanson-Fisher, R. W. (1989). Filtering effects in reporting work injuries. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 21(2), 115-123. 

The data in this paper show the total number of coal mine accidents happening in China from January 2006 to December 2010. (The data are from The report of national coal mine accidents analysis in 2010 published by the Department of Accident Investigation at State Administration of Coal Mine Safety). The data processed to model are from January 2006 to December 2009, and the data of 2010 aim to be compared with the forecasted data, see table 1. 

This article finds some common indicator elements in those accidents written reports in China Coal Mine Accidents and Expert Comments Collection with a statistical analysis. Through analysis and summary, ten component elements which have impacts on the selection of coal mine... 

Huang, Y. H. et al. (2006). Safety climate and self-reported injury Assessing the mediating role of employee safety control. Accident Analysis and Prevention. 38(3), 425-433. 

CEFR is pool-type reactor and the main vessel is divided into two parts. The upper part is called hot pool because it contains hot sodium whose temperature is 516 centigrade degree. The lower part is called cool pool because it contains cool sodium whose temperature is 360 centigrade degree. This accident is a BDBA (Beyond Design Basis Accident) in the Primary Safe Analysis Report of CEFR. Here are initial conditions,... 

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