Spill-alarms

A local manual alarm station (spill alarm per 51.108(b)8) shall be provided... 

Today, numerous alarm and monitoring systems are required by codes. These include fire alarm, smoke detection, sprinkler system supervision, emergency (spill) alarm, and continuous toxic gas monitoring and detection systems. 

In new H-6 facilities, transporting HPMs in code-required exit corridors is prohibited. In existing facilities, the UBC and UFC will allow transportation of HPMs in the exit corridors only if spill-alarm signaling devices are provided at 150-foot intervals (among other requirements outlined in other sections). The purpose of the HPM emergency spill alarm is to initiate a local alarm and to report to the ECS the conditions of the spill, leak or other accident within the exit corridor used to transport HPMs. Although a manual pull station is acceptable by the code, we recommend utilizing a fireman s telephone mounted in an enclosure. 

Blockage of liquid Monitor pressure drop across vent system (e.g., effluent line due local indication, alarm or interlock) to closed valves,, Interlock valve in feed line to centrifuge results in flooding of basket and Equipment/line-up checks overflow from Remove unnecessary valves basket to solid col-. 5, lection system in base. Possibility of liquid spill. ... 

The plan must include a list of all emergency equipment at tlic facility (such as fire cxtinguisliing systems, spill control equipment, internal and c.xtcrnal communications and alarm systems, and decontamination equipment). In addition, the plan must include for each item on the list a physical description, a brief outline of its capabilities, and its location... 

Processes and equipment should be designed to reduce the chances of mis-operation by providing tight control systems, alarms and interlocks. Sample points, process equipment drains, and pumps should be sited so that any leaks flow into the plant effluent collection system, not directly to sewers. Hold-up systems, tanks and ponds, should be provided to retain spills for treatment. Flanged joints should be kept to the minimum needed for the assembly and maintenance of equipment. 

For instance, a level gauge in a tank with an alarm on it could warn an operator that unless something is done quickly, the tank may overflow. A spill not only wastes material, but could present a fire hazard as well as a hazard to the environment. A similar alarm system might also alert the operator that the tank is nearly empty. This may be important because a pump downstream may bum up if it continues to operate with no feed. 

Sound alarm and evacuate if warranted (for example, large drum quantity spill or hot solvent spill). 

Again, it is also important to remember that chemical emergency situations can easily reach beyond the boundaries of any industrial plant. This is to be expected, especially in this age of population explosion with its characteristic urban sprawl. It is not unusual to find, for example, a chemical industrial plant site or other industrial plant that originally was isolated from city dwellers but later became surrounded on all sides by neighbors. The point is that when a chemical spill or chemical disaster occurs in an isolated area there may be no cause for general alarm however, when such a deliberate disaster occurs in the plant site as described in the sugar plant incident, it should be clear that the purpose of PSM, RMP, the Patriot Act, Homeland Security directives, OSHA s Combustible Dust NEP, and other safety/security factors is far-reaching—and absolutely critical to the survival of a free society. 

This section includes guidelines for the central control station equipment, emergency alarm stations, supervisory devices, and visual and audible alarm services. These systems can be used for all types of in-house emergencies, such as fires, explosions, vapor releases, liquid spills, and injuries. 

Enclosures, even partial enclosures, containing equipment handling flammable, combustible, ortoxic materials may permit the accumulation of hazardous concentrations of these materials within the enclosure, potentially resulting in fire, explosion, or personnel exposure. Where the possibility of a flammable spill or release within an enclosure exists, the enclosure design should include a relevant selection from the following features noncombustible construction, adequate ventilation, drainage, appropriate electrical classification, flammable vapor detection, isolation and alarm, and internal automatic sprinkler or water spray protection. 

The sulfuric acid plant has boiler blowdown and cooling tower blowdown waste streams, which are uncontaminated. However, accidental spills of acid can and do occur, and when they do, the spills contaminate the blowdown streams. Therefore, neutralization facilities should be supplied for the blowdown waste streams (Table 15), which involves the installation of a reliable pH or conductivity continuous-monitoring unit on the plant effluent stream. The second part of the system is a retaining area through which non-contaminated effluent normally flows. The detection and alarm system, when activated, causes a plant shutdown that allows location of the failure and initiation of necessary repairs. Such a system, therefore, provides the continuous protection of natural drainage waters, as well as the means to correct a process disruption. 

Wastewater generation can be reduced by general good housekeeping procedures such as substituting dry cleanup methods for water washdowns of equipment and floors. This is especially applicable for situations where liquid or solid materials have been spilled. Flow measuring devices and pH sensors with automatic alarms to detect process upsets are two of many ways to effect reductions in water use. Prompt repair and replacement of faulty equipment can also reduce wastewater losses. 

Students and workers should know what to do when emergencies occur, including escape routes, emergency phone numbers and phone calls, and the location and use of emergency equipment (e.g, alarms, eyewashes, showers, fire extinguishers, and spill kits). 

In contrast to the physico/chemical measurement systems, BEWS are sensitive to many toxic compounds, even to those that are not included in the routine monitoring programmes. They operate continuously (24/24h, 7/7d) and provide early results. In the case of an accidental spill they should generate an alarm within minutes to one hour (van der Schalie el al., 1999). BEWS have recently been included in the WFD Common Implementation Strategy Guideline 19 on surface water chemical monitoring as complementary method (European Communities, 2009). 

The first two methods require rigid process control except in natural or slightly enriched reprocessing plants before plutonium partitioning. Other features of the layout include a calculated pitch on the process cell floors so that a major spill will not cause the solution depth to exceed criticality. A steam jet and sump pump with alarm devices are located in a geometrically safe sump at the low point in the cell area. To avoid loss of fissionable-fuel material, there should be no gravity connections between the process tanks and the waste storage area. 

There should be one or more senior operatives who are knowledgeable and well trained in precautionary and protective measures and also compliance with pesticide regulations. They should be responsible for the day-to-day supervision of plant operations, applications in the field, etc. No person should work alone while handling or likely to be exposed to anti-ChEs. There should always be an additional person nearby, designated as safety officer, who can view the operation at a distance sufficient, if necessary, to raise an alarm, to allow protective clothing and equipment CO be donned, and to undertake the initial rescue and possible first aid and resuscitation measures. Thus, ideally this person should be trained in the emergency mea.sures for an anti-ChE leak, spill, and exposure, and it is desirable for him or her to be trained in first aid measures to treat OP and CM poisoning. 

Commercial monitors and alarms are now available to detect the vapors of each of the cryogenic fluids considered here (Chapter 5). Unfortunately, many of these respond too slowly for effective use under gross spill conditions in practice, operating personnel can often detect a hazardous condition before the alarm sounds. There have been... 

An additional complication is that while there is an alarm in the tank that should sound when the liquid level reaches 7.5 feet, that alarm was not working at the time, and the operator did not know it was not working. So the operator had extra reason to believe the liquid level had not risen above 7.5 feet, given that he believed there was no flow into the tank and the 7.5-foot alarm had not sounded. The level transmitter (which provided the information to the 7.5-foot alarm) had been operating erratically for a year and a half, but a work order had not been written to repair it until the month before. It had supposedly been fixed two weeks earlier, but it clearly was not working at the time of the spill. 

Install critical power, control, instrument, and alarm wiring and pneumatic tubing outside the fire-exposed envelope. Cable trays and conduit banks should be routed underground or on the upper levels of elevated pipe racks at least 30 feet above the ground and outside the drainage path of hydrocarbon spills. Install fire proofing of critical systems and equipment if they are inside the fire-exposed envelope. 

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