Safety critical equipment

Examples of these re-occurring Tow consequences deviations are minor damage of non-critical safety equipment, operator complaints, maintenance problems, quality problems, etc. Examples of high consequences deviations (that are covered by the current pro-active Sis) are small leakages of hazardous substance, damages to or the malfunctioning of safety critical equipment, violation of safety guidelines and procedures, etc. 

Safety Critical Equipment—Engineering controls that provide layers of protection to lower the risk category of a specific scenario or scenarios from unacceptahle to acceptable as defined by organizational risk tolerance criteria. Engineering controls that further reduce the risk below acceptable might not be designated as safety critical equipment. 

Percentage of ITPM tasks for safety-critical equipment that were completed on time X... 

Process safety management is the primary requirement that drives process plants and refineries to establish quality control programs for incoming materials and spare parts. OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119 has defined regulations for process safety critical equipment and systems that include such requirements. Other reasons for quality control programs may be equally important, for example when failure has a significant impact on capability to make product or leads to excessive maintenance costs. 

Maintenance programs both prevent failures and prolong the useful life of equipment. In the case of safety—critical equipment and components, failure prevention is of primary concern, however prolonging useful life will also reduce failure frequency and thus contribute to overall reliability. 

Where maintenance or repair of certain safety - critical equipment may require that it be taken out of service, extra precautions may be needed, for example ... 

Require that all changes affecting safety equipment be approved by the plant manager or by his or her designated representative for safety. Any outage of safety-critical equipment must be reported immediately. 

Detecting migration toward riskier behavior starts with identifying baseline requirements. The requirements follow from the hazard analysis. These requirements may be general ( Equipment will not be operated above the identified safety-critical limits or Safety-critical equipment must be operational when the system is operating ) or specifically tied to the hazard analysis ( AWACS operators must always hand off aircraft when they enter and leave the no-fly zone or Pilots must always follow the TCAS alerts and continue to do so until they are canceled ). 

Create and enforce policies about disabling safety-critical equipment and making changes to the physical system. 

Define and communicate safe operating limits for all safety-critical equipment and alarm procedures. Ensure that operators are aware of these limits. Assure that operators are rewarded for following the limits and emergency procedures, even when it turns out no emergency existed. Provide for tuning the operating limits and alarm procedures over time as required. 

Examples of typical safety critical equipment/systems could be... 

Some organizations classify unplanned maintenance jobs as near misses because such events will generally put the system in a less safe condition and they indicate deficiencies in the management systems, i.e., the problem should have been anticipated and included in the preventive maintenance program. Some organizations choose to classify unplanned maintenance as a near miss only when it affects safety critical equipment (Vancauwenberghe, 2011). 

How does this redesign affect safety-critical equipment safety systems, shutdown systems, pressure safety valves (PSV s), etc. ... 

Will this redesign affect the PM schedule to ensure the reliability of safety-critical equipment and instrumentation, shutdowns, fire and gas, etc. ... 

Add special protective features (e.g. waterproofing) to protect safety critical equipment, or equipment that can fail hazardously. 

Suggested Evaluation of indicators related to backlog ofpreventive and corrective maintenance - especially related to safety critical equipment should be established. These indicators should be supported by a risk assessment from the local workforce, to get their human assessment of the criticality of maintenance. 

The maximum allowed length of the functional test interval is 36 months. A 36 months interval corresponds to the longest interval between revision stops for oil and gas installations on the Norwegian continental shelf, and we assume that the functional status of aU safety critical equipment should be verified with no longer intervals than this. 

It should also be noted that backlog of maintenance work for safety critical equipment has often been used as a leading indicator for major hazards. This is an indirect and implicit indicator. The barrier indicators are exphcitly focused on the hkely performance of barriers, and therefore to be preferred. 

Safety-Critical Equipment Equipment that can present safety hazards to users (e.g.. X-ray and laser equipment) as well as equipment used to control exposures to recognized hazards, and whose improper use could subject users to harm (e.g., fiime hoods, biological safety cabinets, respirators, automated him processors). 

Procedures should be robust, followed in practice and audited otherwise, input values in risk assessments (eg human reliability input data to LOPA studies for safety critical equipment) may be invalidated. 

Oil and gas industries use many risk assessment tools beside the HAZOP. For example, failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is particularly common for evaluating how safety critical equipment can fail, such as a subsea blowout preventer used on drilling rigs. The bow tie model is another popular tool. 

Keeping equipment properly maintained is critical to safety. This section addresses the safety implications, how systems are maintained, and the periodicity of that maintenance, especially for safety-critical equipment. 

Non-safety-critical I C systems, if they fail, may challenge safety-critical equipment. 

It identifies safety-critical equipment where a single failure would be critical for the system. 

Safety-critical equipment failure as a result of loss of power. 

Presence of basic, safety critical equipment and procedures. These usually include sensors, transmitters, controller, control valves, pressure reducers, etc. The equipment should have current specification sheets, procedures and maintenance requirements. Employee s knowledge and awareness of safety procedures, duties, rules and emergency response assignments. These documents should be readily available for reference. 

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