The AWACS Operators

This level of the control structure contains more examples of inconsistent mental models and asynchronous evolution. In addition, this control level provides interesting examples of the adaptation over time of specified procedures to accepted practice and of coordination problems. There were multiple controllers with confused and overlapping responsibilities for enforcing different aspects of the safety requirements and constraints (figure 5.8). The overlaps and boundary areas in the controlled processes led to serious coordination problems among those responsible for controlling aircraft in the TAOR. 

Context in Which Decisions and Actions Took Place 

Safety Requirements and Constraints The general safety constraint involved in the accident at this level was to prevent misidentification of aircraft by the pilots and any friendly fire that might result. More specific requirements and constraints are shown in figure 5.8. 

Controls Controls included procedures for identifying and tracking aircraft, training (including simulator missions), briefings, staff controllers, and communication channels. The senior director and surveillance officer (ASO) provided real-time oversight of the crew s activities, while the mission crew commander (MCC) coordinated all the activities aboard the AWACS aircraft. 

The Delta Point system, used since the inception of OPC, provided standard code names for real locations. These code names were used to prevent the enemy, who might be listening to radio transmissions, from knowing the helicopters flight plans. 

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According to Snook, there were also no explicit or written procedures regarding the control of helicopters. He states that radio contact with helicopters was lost frequently, but there were no procedures to follow when this occurred. In contrast. Piper claims the AWACS operations manual says ... 

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