Causality multiple

Relative size Size differential Percentage Causality Multiple agents Multiple objects Unit measurement Two identical relations... 

Ken Schaffner. Well, certainly multiple causality and multiple pathways that are involved in these systems. I ve not read that particular Nature article but my sense is that we are likely to find a lot of diversity and that s apparently what they have found in these circumstances, and then the question is when you find that much diversity, how do you do classification in a useful way ... 

Environmental factors and security are tightly linked. Each affects the other. Because of multiple factors, linkages, and causalities, the relationships are complex and often difficult to understand. The use of a conceptual model, such as the one suggested in this paper, can help in managing the resolution of security issues caused by environmental stress. 

The similarity is assumed to be caused by the latent genetic factor shown in the circle (G). The causal paths are labeled with path coefficients. Again the rules of path analysis tell us that the correlation is made up of the sum of the multiplication of the terms of each path that connect the trait. Thus the equation ... 

Analysis, that can assist with the identihcation of causal factors. The concepts of incident causation encompassed in these tools are fundamental to the majority of investigation methodologies. (See Chapter 3 for information about the Domino Theory, System Theory, and HBT Theory.) The simplest approach involves reviewing each unplanned, unintended, or adverse item (negative event or undesirable condition) on the timeline and asking, Would the incident have been prevented or mitigated if the item had not existed If the answer is yes, then the item is a causal factor. Generally, process safety incidents involve multiple causal factors. 

The earliest logic trees were based on engineering fault tree analysis methods. Today, companies use a number of variations or combinations of logic trees and call them by different names, such as Why Tree,< 9) Causal Tree,(20,21) Cause and Effect Logic Diagram (CELD),<22) and Multiple-Cause, Systems-Oriented Incident Investigation (MCS011).<23,24) tools have more similarities than differences. 

Causal Trees were developed in an effort to use the principles of deductive logic found in Fault Tree but make it more user-friendly. Originally, private companies developed the Causal Tree Method (CTM) for safety, process safety, and environmental incident investigations applications. Rhone-Poulenc, for example, was an early user.<20.21) Multiple-Cause Systems Oriented Incident Investigation (MCSOfl) is another name for the CTM. At this time, most companies use simplified versions of fault trees for complex incident investigations. 

A process safety incident typically has multiple causal factors. The term direct cause is often used interchangeably with the term causal factor, but this can be confusing because it is also used to refer to just the last causal factor in an incident sequence. 

The causal factors need to be examined further to determine why those factors existed. The investigation team may use a predefined tree to examine each causal factor individually. The first causal factor is analyzed starting at the top of the tree, and then working down all of the branches as far as the facts permit. When an appropriate subcategory on one of the branches is identified, it is recorded as a root cause. The remaining branches are checked as one causal factor may have multiple root causes. The procedure is then repeated for each causal factor in turn. 

The design of most process plants relies on redundant safety features or layers of protection, such that multiple layers must fail before a serious incident occurs. Barrier analysis ) (also called Hazard-Barrier-Target Analysis, HBTA) can assist the identification of causal factors by identifying which safety feature(s) failed to function as desired and allowed the sequence of events to occur. These safety features or barriers are anything that is used to protect a system or person from a hazard including both physical and administrative layers of protection. The concepts of the hazard-barrier-target theory of incident causation are encompassed in this tool. (See Chapter 3.)... 

The tool helps the investigator to understand and focus on the failed harriers, which are normally identified as causal factors. These failed harriers may need to he strengthened, replaced, or supplemented, especially where weak administrative controls are highlighted. Even successful barriers that prevented more serious consequences may require reinforcement. Therefore, barrier analysis can give the investigator valuable insights into how the incident happened and some of the multiple causes that need corrective action to prevent recurrence. 

Once the actual incident scenario is understood and its multiple causal factors identified, this information may be used to determine the incident s root causes. One means of performing root cause analysis involves the use of ready-made, predefined trees. A predefined tree provides a systematic approach for analyzing and selecting the relevant elements of the incident scenario. It is a deductive approach, looking backward in time to examine preceding events necessary to produce the specified incident. 

First, it is necessary to identify the multiple causal factors of the incident. The procedures in Causal Factor Identification may be used to identify tbe causal factors from a timeline or sequence diagram (including a causal factor chart). 

A timeline or sequence diagram is first developed, and then causal factors identified. Care should be taken to ensure that the checklist is not used too early. Be sure to determine what happened and how it happened before determining why it happened. Otherwise, the team will think that they have identified the right root cause(s), when in reality only one or two of several multiple causes have been determined. The causal factors are then applied one at a time to each page of the checklist(s) to identify relevant root causes. Those pages that are not relevant to the particular incident of interest are discarded. Similar quality assurance checks should be applied as those described for predefined trees. 

This diversity of mental retardation, in both cause and phenotype, carries important implications for consideration of the biochemistry of consciousness. On the one hand, because this is an investigation of multiple causalities—including, for example, inborn errors of metabolism, each of which has its own unique biochemical profile (Cook Leventhal, 1996), it may not prove possible to identify specific neurotransmitter abnormalities which are common to mental retardation as such. On the other hand common themes concerning key neurotransmitters may be identified from studies of mental retardation. Altered neurotransmitter functioning associated with the severity of mental retardation is open to different interpretations, either reflecting fundamentally impaired development of cerebral structure or a more general impairment of central transmitter activity and functioning. 

Retrospective case-control Can study multiple exposures Gives the strength of the relationship Least costly Useful for rare events Control of only one variable Recall and other biases and confounding Less certain causality... 

E. J. Sonuga-Barke, Causal models of attention-deficit/hjrperactivity disorder from common simple deficits to multiple developmental pathways. Biol. Psychiatry, 2005, 57,1231-1238. 

Since, in this causal model, the extended wave 0 represents a real physical finite wave with well-defined energy, it seems natural to represent it by a suitable mathematical form. At the time when de Broglie put forth his causal interpretation of quantum mechanics, it was necessary for him to construct a finite wave using the Fourier analysis, namely, the multiplicity of harmonic plane waves, infinite in space and time, summing up and giving origin to a wavepacket. 

The methodological complexities inherent in epidemiological studies of human population exposed to multiple contaminants at low concentrations in drinking water make it virtually impossible to establish a causal link between THMs and an increased in cancer of the bladder or any other site. Small differences in cigarette consumption between two population groups could account for the observed associations. 

Hypothetical or potenhal causalities include postulated causalities which have not yet been proven to be related to IAQ. An example is multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS). Often effects or exposures cannot be quantified, not even by indicators. Toxicological evaluations can only deal with effects and exposures which are quantifiable. Therefore, these undocumented causalities must be defined as hypothetical or potential causalities. Even if some of these effects may be considered adverse or have high prevalence, the present level of knowledge prohibits an official rational preventive action and no official guidelines or recommendations can be established. It should be noted that all new types of IAQ problems start as hypothetical. This group includes many health effects which are potentially important to human health and thus defines the research forefront in IAQ sciences. Table 14.2 shows some examples. Several potential or hypothetical causalities are discussed in the scientific literature. Their relevance to health indoors is unknown and no official recommendations or guidance can be established. Mitigation of indoor climate problems becomes a matter of ad hoc solutions and a major... 

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