Bid price

The prime impetus for this wide spread activity was the "energy crisis" which produced considerable uncertainty about the future availability of asphalt cement for road building purposes and as a consequence caused bid prices to soar over the past eight years. 

Service companies are always pleased to assist prospective buyers by providing specifications that are then written into a forthcoming water treatment bid request. This facility can be of genuine benefit to the buyer. However, and needless to say, where no buyer control is exercised, the temptation exists either to write the requirements tightly around the service company s products or to restrict the disclosure of certain operational and commercial information critical to competitors in their bid-price calculations. This practice can occur when the time comes to offer an existing tender for re-bid, and an existing vendor may risk losing its account. 

If the overall allocation is set such that the market requires at least some of these allowances, then this ensures the price will not drop below the agreed minimum bid price. Excessive allocation, or large inflow of cheap allowances from CDM and JI projects, could of course ultimately overwhelm a price floor set in this way, though the supplementarity criteria does also allow member states to limit the inflow into the system (Article 11a of EU Directive on emission trading, amended 27.10.2004).21... 

In addition, there may be several reasons why generators do not add on the lull C02 costs to their power bid prices 2... 

The most accurate method for determining process equipment costs is to obtain firm bids from fabricators or suppliers. Often, fabricators can supply quick estimates which will be very close to the bid price but will not involve too much time. Second best in reliability are cost values from the file of past purchase orders. When used for pricing new equipment, purchase-order prices must be corrected to the current cost index. Limited information on process-equipment costs has also been published in various engineering journals. Costs, based on January 1, 1990 prices, for a large number of different types and capacities of equipment are presented in Chaps. 14 through 16. A convenient reference to these various cost figures is given in the Table of Contents and in the subject index. 

A proper cost and economic analysis can only be made after all the invited manufacturers have fully complied with the details of the enquiry specification. The engineer must satisfy himself that this requirement has been properly met, otherwise a low bid price may indicate non-compliance or poor understanding of the enquiry specification. Apart from the important technical requirements there are often other engineering considerations that should be taken into account, e.g. vendor documentation, spare parts, delivery schedule, obsolescence, testing and inspection. Some of these aspects have a definite cost impact whereas some are somewhat intangible, e.g. history of performance, delivery schedule, obsolescence. 

A comparison between the price paid for regular beef and the bid price is only possible for those respondents who consumed regular beef Nevertheless, a large number of them could not remember the price they paid more exactly, 139 out of the 340 respondents who consumed regular roast and 132 out of the 360 respondents who consumed regular minute steak could not remember the relevant prices. This exercise is based on the remaining respondents. We consider both those who responded they would have... 

Those respondents who stated they would not purehase organie beef both at the first and at the second lower bid price were asked about the reasons for their response. Three answers were prompted (the item other reasons was never ehosen) The priee is too high 1 wouldn t trust it is really organie Organie beef is not superior to regular beef . The answers (Table 11) are of interest for assessing the impediments to consumption. 

Liquidity involves the ease with which investors can buy or sell securities quickly at close to their perceived true values. Liquidity risk is the risk that the investor (who must trade at short notice) will have to buy/ sell at security at a price above/below its true value. One widely used indicator of liquidity is the size of the spread between the bid price (i.e., the price at which the dealer is willing to buy a security) and the ask price (i.e., the price at which a dealer is willing to sell a security). Other things equal, the wider the bid-ask spread, the greater the liquidity risk. For investors who buy bonds with the intent of holding them nntil maturity, liquidity risk is of secondary importance. 

In April 1999 the SNDO launched two new linkers, a new 30-year bond (3104, 3.5% 2028) and a new 16-year bond (3105, 3.5% 2015). These two bonds were issued with an inflation floor, meaning that the new bonds had a similar structure to United States and French inflation-indexed bonds. The format of issuing inflation linked bonds was changed, this time moving back to bid price auctions, every three months. The reason being that this type of auction was common at the international level, allowing clearer signals of the volume on offer. The primary dealers were permitted to switch linkers directly with the SNDO on a daily basis, in order to enhance the liquidity of the market. 

A reserved amount of stock at each auction, available at noncompetitive bid prices (currently this is 1/2% of the issue for each GEMM, or 10% if an I-L gilt). 

Auctions are the primary means of issuance of all gilts, both conventional and index-linked. They are generally for 2- 3 billion of stock on a competitive bid price basis. Auctions of index-linked gilts are for between 0.5 and 1.25 billion. The programme of auctions is occasionally supplemented in between auctions by sales of stock on tap. This is an issue of a further tranche of stock of a current issue, usually in conditions of temporary excess demand in that stock or that part of the yield curve. That said, only one conventional stock has been tapped since 1996, a 400 milHon conventional tap in August 1999. The DMO has stated that tap issues of conventional gilts will only take place in exceptional circumstances. 

Auction bids for I-L gilts are also competitive and noncompetitive. Only IG GEMMs may make competitive bids, for a minimum of 1 million nominal and in multiples of 1 million. For I-L gilts there is a uniform price format, which means that all successful bidders receive stock at the same price. A bid above the successful price will be allotted in full. Noncompetitive bids must be for a minimum of 100,000, and will be allotted in full at the successful bid price (also known as the strike price). IG GEMMs are reserved up to 10% of the issue in the noncompetitive bid facility. Non-IG GEMMs must complete and submit an application form in the same way as for conventional gilt auctions. 

The DMO acts as a buyer of last resort for gilts that have been designated rump stocks, for which GEMMs are not required to quote two-way prices. Although the DMO only deals direct with GEMMs, institutions or private individuals can ask for a bid price via a broker, who will deal with the GEMM. 

The offer price that the dealer would quote the fixed-rate payer would be to pay 8.85% and receive EURIBOR flat. (The word flat means with no spread.) The bid price that the dealer would quote the floating-rate payer would be to pay EURIBOR flat and receive 8.75%. The bid-offer spread is 10 basis points. 

The fixed rate is some spread above the benchmark yield curve with the same term to maturity as the swap. In our illustration, suppose that the 10-year benchmark yield is 8.35%. Then the offer price that the dealer would quote to the fixed-rate payer is the 10-year benchmark rate plus 50 basis points versus receiving EURIBOR flat. For the floating-rate payer, the bid price quoted would be EURIBOR flat versus the 10-year benchmark rate plus 40 basis points. The dealer would quote such a swap as 40-50, meaning that the dealer is willing to enter into a swap to receive EURIBOR and pay a fixed rate equal to the 10-year benchmark rate plus 40 basis points and it would be willing to enter into a swap to pay EURIBOR and receive a fixed rate equal to the 10-year benchmark rate plus 50 basis points. 

In an auction, a set of tasks are offered by an auctioneer in the announcement phase. Broadcast with the auction announcement, each of the robots estimates the cost of a task separately and submits a bid to the auctioneer. Once all bids are received or a pre-specified deadline has passed, the auction is cleared. In the winner determination phase, the auctioneer decides with some selection criteria which robot wins which task [9]. This chapter adopts cost minimisation, in that an auctioned task is awarded to a robot offering the lowest bid price. 

Nevertheless, the above-mentioned approaches to improving cost estimation, like most of the current auction-based methods, are open-looped [20]. They cannot assess whether or not a bidder has kept its commitment to a task, because they do not have a mechanism to evaluate the bidder s performance after winning the task. Human bidders are self-interested in auctions, and would sometimes deliberately offer over-optimistic bid prices. Robots, on the other hand, are assumed to be honest in estimating the costs before offering the bid prices. However, there are often discrepancies between the bid prices and the actual costs in real-life applications, particularly in dynamic working environments. Discrepancies between the bid prices and the actual costs are usually caused by the uncertainties of a dynamic environment, such as unexpected task requests, changing traffic conditions. 

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