Water supply systems operational monitoring

Operational monitoring involves planned observations or measurements to assess whether the critical components of a safe water supply are operating properly. If the components are operating properly collectively, the system should be able to meet water quality targets. 

Water quality is a major issue addressed by water supply systems. Raw water sources vary in their quality over time, and operators of water-treatment plants must constantly monitor the biochemical changes that can occur in their plant s water sources. Heavy precipitation can easily increase the suspended material in the stream, thereby requiring aluminum to make floes (clot-like masses) that can form and settle these materials to the bottom of a holding basin. State and federal laws govern the quality of potable water for systems of all sizes and purposes. Water-quality standards for industrial uses and irrigation, however, may differ from those for CWSs. 

Yet a further problem concerning excessive water loss is the increased risk of carbonate scale deposition. It is the usual case to propose that, because heating systems are closed loops with minimal losses, many operators believe that they do not require sophisticated chemical treatment programs, injection-feed methods, or monitoring and control processes. To further this view comes the added philosophy that, irrespective of hardness content, the MU water supply to these systems does not require any pretreatment such as ion-exchange softening. 

Specified technology National authority specifies processes to adequately address constituents with potential health effects (e.g. generic water safety plans for an unprotected catchment) Constituents with potential health effect in small municipalities and community supplies Compliance assessed through system assessment and operation monitoring (see GDWQ Chapter 4)... 

The Joint Service Agent Water Monitor (JSAWM) is a funded Department of Defense program that is intended to identify, mature and develop the technology needed for specific and sensitive detection of chemical warfare agents (CWA) in source, treated, stored and distributed water supplies. According to the JSAWM criteria, a successful detection system will function in heterogeneous liquid environments, have less than a 10 minute response time with low false alarms, work in both continuous (on-line monitoring) and batch modes, be portable, small, easy to operate, and have very low power requirements. ... 

Fearful that they may lose their reputation in the community, WAA requested a government audit of their operations to see if the problem could be internal. Indeed, the auditor concluded that the problem was likely due to a contaminated distilled water supply. It turns out that WAA had previously been using a conductivity meter to continuously monitor the quality of the water as it elutes from the distiller and had taken it offline some time earlier because it was apparently malfunctioning. Besides always indicating that the water was highly conductive despite the use of an expensive distillation and deionizing system, it also seemed to be the source of unusual colorations and odors found in the water. As soon as it was taken offline, the colorations and odors ceased. 

Thermocyclic cracks were revealed in pipes connecting a reactor with pressurizers, in internal headers for water supply from purification system to reactor coolant pumps, in internal shells of pumps flow chambers, etc. The indicated defects became the reason for in-depth analytical and experimental studies of equipment operating conditions in the propulsion and test reactor plants, particularly thermal and strain parameters monitoring. 

Fault and failure For FTA, a few other issues are also important, such as defining what is a fault and what is failure. It is better to explain the issue with the help of an example. A pump is delivering water to the system from a sump whose level is monitored by a level switch. Case 1 If the pump fails to operate due to damage in bearing or impeller, the result is that there will be no water supply. Case 2 If the pump stops, or trips, from a level switch signal, this will also result in no supply of water. The two cases are not same. In the first case, the pump could not deliver water on account of the failure of the pump. In the second case, the pump really does not have a failure. There may be for some reason, a low sump level, and the level switch operated and stopped the pump. In the second case, it is a system fault for which undesired event took place. So, it could be stated that all failures are faults, but all faults are not failures. 

A Water Safety Plan is a comprehensive risk assessment and risk management approach that encompasses aU steps in water supply from catchment to consumer. It comprises as a minimum the three essential actions that are the responsibihty of the drinking-water supplier in order to ensure that drinking-water is safe. These are a system assessment, effective operational monitoring, and management. 

Step 6 is the water supply sufficient in terms of quantity, pressure and flow rate (El 19 / nnex D6.) The pressure required is back-calculated starting at the monitor. Most monitors require 7 to 9 bar, then add in the frictionai losses from the monitor to the pumps. Operators need to remember that the system demands will not just be at the monitors water drawn from any fixed system applications and cooling streams will also need to be considered. It is important to determine the required volumes and pressures used. Dynamic system demand testing will provide the evidence that the system can deliver the required resources. 

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