Big Chemical Encyclopedia

Chemical substances, components, reactions, process design ...

Articles Figures Tables About

Vaccines price

McGuire (2003) showed that setting the vaccine price equal to mean benefit will elicit the socially efficient level of R D on vaccines. Although this is an efficient solution, it may be subject to criticism on equity grounds. The entire net benefit accrues to manufacturers as profit, and no consumer surplus accrues to the public. McGuire assumed a fully effective vaccine. Benefit should be scaled to reflect the extent to which a vaccine is partially effective. [Pg.116]

The second way for policy makers to eliminate excess demand for vaccines is to allow vaccine prices to adjust to market-clearing levels. According to this approach, the government would reduce disincentives for R D, and... [Pg.129]

We also estimated a variant of equation (7.1), in which the continuous variable fwas replacedby a set ofbinary variables for year (a variable for 1993, 1994, etc.). The coefficients on these year variables, which show changes in the vaccine price index, crude and adjusted for the Consumer Price Index,... [Pg.131]

Between 1993 and 1999, the FSS declined 11%, while the Consumer Price Index increased 15%. Hence, the real or relative price of vaccines decreased about 26% in this period. In contrast, from 1999 to 2002, the vaccine price index increased 19%, while the Consumer Price Index increased by 8% the real or relative price of vaccines increased about 11% in this period. [Pg.132]

I estimated a version of equation (7.1) in which i denotes vaccine i (i = 1, 2,..., 13), and the continuous variable f was replaced by a set of year dummies. The model was estimated via weighted least squares, where the weight was equal to the market value (price times quantity) of that vaccine in thatyear. The coefficients on these year variables maybe considered values of a Center for Disease Control vaccine price index. Nominal FSS and Centers for Disease Control vaccine price indexes are compared in Figure 7.2... [Pg.132]

A combination of escalating demand and shrinking supply clearly poses a risk of substantial excess demand for vaccines. In principle, there are two ways in which policy makers can help eliminate this excess demand and promote a more efficient allocation of resources to the vaccine industry. First, the government can become a developer and producer of vaccines, as contemplated in the National Vaccine Authority Act. The second way is to allow vaccine prices to adjust to market-clearing levels. [Pg.149]

Federal Supply Schedule Vaccine Price Index 133... [Pg.340]

Vaccine development involves a substantial investment in time, effort, and resources. Any public or private research and producing facility should allocate huge financial and human rescues when development of vaccine is decided. The cost from research to licensure, the risks inherent in vaccine development (e.g. technological constraints, regulatory approval) and short- or long-term evaluations of scientific and financial results may constrain this activity. In the developing world, the price has been a major impediment to the introduction of new vaccines. [Pg.138]

In Chapter 4 Aidan Hollis examines three proposals in considerable detail. The first is an Advanced Purchase Commitment by sponsors, who offer an explicit subsidy in advance for innovative products. The subsidy offer includes a fixed-dollar amount per unit as well as a commitment to purchase a specific number of units at that price. The second proposal is that sponsors pay annual rewards based on the therapeutic effectiveness of innovative drugs. The third approach is to offer a patent extension on patented products to pharmaceutical companies if they successfully developed a vaccine for a disease such as HIV/AIDS that is highly prevalent, particularly in some low-income countries. Hollis concludes that the third approach is an extremely inefficient way to reward innovation. By contrast, the second approach could correct the market failure directly by rewarding innovative drugs according to their therapeutic effectiveness, which is measurable by cost-effectiveness analysis, a topic discussed later in greater detail in Chapters 10 and 11. [Pg.17]

In this chapter 1 examine and compare three proposals recently made to stimulate private involvement in developing pharmaceuticals for neglected diseases (1) Kremer and Glennerster (2004) and the Center for Global Development (2005) have described in detail a plan for Advanced Purchase Commitments for vaccines, which would commit a global body to pay a fixed subsidy per vaccine delivered for certain diseases, if the vaccine meets prespecified technical requirements and is priced below some level. This would help to solve both access and incentive problems, but is necessarily... [Pg.75]

Advanced purchase commitments require a technical committee to identify the desired, feasible technical characteristics of a vaccine. The donor institution or sponsor would offer a minimum price to firms that developed a vaccine meeting the technical characteristics. The minimum price would be higher than the market can currently sustain, and it would be achieved by the donor offering copayments to the manufacturer to make up the difference between the market price and the minimum price. For example, the sponsor might make a payment of 13.50 per dose, while the transaction price of the vaccine for the ultimate buyer might be only 1.50. The manufacturer would thus obtain a total price of 15. [Pg.80]

The Advanced Purchase Commitment system sets rewards in an anticipatory fashion, presumably based in part on the expected therapeutic impact. Indeed, Kremer and Glennerster (2004, p. 90) observed that the sponsor s commitment should be large enough to motivate research on vaccines, but that it should not be so expensive that alternative health interventions could save more lives with the same resources. They then examined the price per DALY of the Advanced Purchase Commitment proposal, based on some assumptions about the probability of its being successful in speeding up vaccine development. [Pg.86]

The hxed-dollar public subsidy would apply to existing and to future vaccines. For existing vaccines, a higher price would encourage more entry into the vaccine business, more investment in developing improved versions of existing vaccines, and greater investments in production capacity to reduce the probability of supply disruptions. For future vaccines, injection of public funds coupled with the mandate would increase market sizes and prospective returns to R D on new vaccines. [Pg.111]

The mandate/subsidy plan would apply only to populations/vaccines recommended for coverage by an independent body. The committee s second recommendation proposed changes to the composition and decisionmaking process of ACIP, the entity that recommends vaccines for use by the public. ACIP currently lacks expertise in cost-effectiveness analysis and hnance, is unable to consider price in its decisions, and makes... [Pg.111]

Theoretical research on the economics of infectious diseases describes an important limitation of subsidies to stimulate demand for vaccines. The private benefit from being vaccinated partly reflects the prevalence of the disease. To the extent that the price faced by the consumer falls, increases in the quantity of vaccinations demanded are likely, followed by... [Pg.114]

An alternative approach focuses on consumer welfare. The product price is set to maximize expected consumer surplus, the difference between benefit and price. To maximize this difference, price must be lower than the mean benefit. However, by lowering price, manufacturers spend less on R D. Thus, there is a reduced probability that the new vaccine will become available. McGuire (2003, p. 214) derived an expression for the optimal division of surplus between consumers and producers at the price that maximizes consumer net benefit ... [Pg.116]

McGuire s analysis is static. Thus, it does not allow for the possibility that paying a higher price for a vaccine may accelerate product development. If paying a higher price would accelerate innovation and there are important opportunity costs to society from waiting for an effective vaccine, the price should be higher than it otherwise would be. [Pg.117]

Should Existing Vaccines Covered by the Mandate/Subsidy Be Priced by a Different Algorithm than Future Vaccines ... [Pg.118]

Substantially less is known about the cost of R D for particular vaccines and for improvements to existing vaccines. To a lesser extent, there is also insufficient information in the public domain about the marginal cost of producing vaccines, especially reflecting actual and optimal safety precautions in the production process. We also know too little about consumer demand for vaccines, including the role of price and nonprice factors. There are insufficient data on coverage of vaccines by private health insurance currently. For this reason, it is not possible to precisely predict market responses to any specific proposal. [Pg.124]


See other pages where Vaccines price is mentioned: [Pg.18]    [Pg.128]    [Pg.130]    [Pg.131]    [Pg.132]    [Pg.132]    [Pg.135]    [Pg.149]    [Pg.340]    [Pg.560]    [Pg.713]    [Pg.713]    [Pg.18]    [Pg.128]    [Pg.130]    [Pg.131]    [Pg.132]    [Pg.132]    [Pg.135]    [Pg.149]    [Pg.340]    [Pg.560]    [Pg.713]    [Pg.713]    [Pg.362]    [Pg.320]    [Pg.196]    [Pg.873]    [Pg.426]    [Pg.470]    [Pg.82]    [Pg.104]    [Pg.108]    [Pg.109]    [Pg.112]    [Pg.113]    [Pg.114]    [Pg.114]    [Pg.116]    [Pg.117]    [Pg.118]    [Pg.118]    [Pg.122]   
See also in sourсe #XX -- [ Pg.25 , Pg.507 ]




SEARCH



© 2024 chempedia.info