Site vulnerability analysis

Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, Inc. (SOCMA), Manual on Chemical Site Security Vulnerability Analysis Methodology and Model, 2002. 

Step 3 Decide Which Approach to Vulnerability Analysis to Use. Security vulnerability analysis (SVA) is the activity of identifying how potential terrorists can breach security at your site in order to impact an asset and cause a terrorist event. In this context, asset can mean a piece of equipment, a store of product, a key building, a computer system, a person, or anything else of importance to your company or organization. Security is vulnerable when three factors coexist (a) an... 

Among the natural phenomena capable to determine serious hazards to industrial plants, earthquakes should be taken into account especially because they are capjable to generate multiple sources of releasing of dangerous substances and domino effects within the same plant, determining the complete destruction of the site. The analysis of p>ast accidents induced by earthquakes has shown the high vulnerability of some typical industrial compxjnents and the severity of the consequences. 

On the other hand, the information and analysis results provides the security element with a portion of an overall plant vulnerability analysis that can be used to develop a site security plan. That plan should provide actions to be taken prior to, during, and after any sort of attack. ... 

I met with DHS S T representatives several times early in the study process to discuss the statement of task, data availability, and the departments objectives in commissioning this study. Based on these discussions and from discussions with DHS representatives at the committee s first meeting, it was agreed that this study should complement and not attempt to duplicate other ongoing activities such as the DHS Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) and Environmental Protection Agency s (EPA s) Off-Site Consequence Analysis. Thus, the committee did not attempt to assess the effectiveness of current protective measures although called for in the statement of task this was a part of the DHS RAMCAP effort, which DHS representatives made clear should not be duplicated. As the statement of task indicates, the focus of this review is on the vulnerabilities of the supply chain as a whole rather than the vulnerability of individual chemical plants. 

In choosing between these methods to assess deformations in a lateral spread, the first question must be why is lateral spreading a concern The usual engineering approach for a fill will be to densify that fill so that spreading is not an issue. If a decision is made to leave a vulnerable stratum unimproved, possibly because of the scale of the works, then likely deformations can be estimated using Hamada (1999) as straightforward supplement to the site response analysis. If that is regarded as insufficiently reliable for a particular project, then specialist advice will be needed and almost certainly detailed numerical analysis. 

Several catastrophic fire incidents in the petroleum industry have been the result of the facility firewater pumps being directly affected by the initial effects of the incident. The cause of these impacts has been mainly due to the siting of the fire pumps in vulnerable locations without adequate protection measures from the probable incident and the unavailability or provision of other backup water sources. A single point failure analysis of firewater distribution systems is an effective analysis that can be performed to identify where design deficiencies may exist. For all high risk locations, fire water supplies should be available from several remotely located sources that are totally independent of each and utility systems which are required for support. 

This book is not intended to be the singular reference for transporlahon vulnerability assessment, but rather provide the background for a transporlahon professional supporting such an analysis. Therefore, the SVA references presented above will provide more detail, with the understanding that most were developed from the perspective of chemical security for fixed chemical sites. The excephons are the TSA tools and API/NPRA SVA methodology, which addresses both fixed-facility and hansportation risks. Regardless, the specific security issues detailed in this chapter can be incorporated into any vulnerability assessment methodology selected. It is foreseeable that current fixed-facility methods will be expanded to include transportation issues, as well as new TSVA approaches developed. 

A Site specific evaluation of design ground motion parameters for a seismically vulnerable site located 12 km from Ahmedabad (Gujarat) was carried out involving both seismic hazard analysis and ground response analysis. The seismic hazard... 

The second step of the analysis returns the status of the surface in terms of type and location oftargets (via on-site inspections). In particular, each type of target (i.e. people, buildings and commercial activities) must be a) quantified in terms of vulnerability b) related to the other types of targets c) prioritised in terms of relative importance (e.g. persons vs. buildings). Table 2 reports the synthesis of the quantification process and results. 

In April 2007, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standard (CFATS). The DHS is to identify, assess, and ensnre effective security at high-risk chemical facilities. Included in this standard is the requirement for facilities handling chemicals above a threshold amount, to submit an SVA for DHS review and approval along with a Site Security Plan (SSP). An SVA evaluates risk from deliberate acts that could result in major incidents. It is performed in a systematic and methodical manner to analyze potential threats and evaluates these threats against plant vulnerabilities. From this analysis, it determines possible consequences and whether safeguards to prevent or mitigate their occurrence are recommended. See also Terrorism. 

An SVA may include an entire campus or specific facilities on a campus and it involves a series of comprehensive investigations and an integrated analysis. The purpose of an SVA is to catalog potential security risks to a laboratory, determine the magnitude of the risks, and assess the adequacy of systems that are in place. An SVA helps in determining the security planning needs of a facility. An SVA should include an asset evaluation, threat assessment, site survey and analysis, and physical vulnerability survey. 

The site survey and analysis should include a vehicular traffic plan that highlights areas for material deliveries, truck routes, parking, and building entries and exits. The site analysis should address traffic patterns of vehicles and pedestrians over 24-hour periods on normal workdays and weekends, physical protection and security features, building uses, and which persons are allowed access. Such a comprehensive review is necessary to permit an accurate survey of physical vulnerability and to put into place operational procedures for detection, delay, and assessment systems to protect physical assets and to protect operations on the campus or in a facility that could be interrupted or sabotaged. 

In discussions during the early portions of the study process that resulted in this report, DHS representatives made clear that they commissioned the report to complement their own RAMCAP exercise. Where RAM CAP is focused on a site-by-site analysis, this study attempts to take a systems-level view of the chemical infrastructure and the supply chain of which it is a part. Where RAMCAP is heavily focused on analyzing security measures within the chemical industry, this study is meant primarily to guide science and technology (S T) investments by DHS that would reduce vulnerabilities associated with the chemical infrastructure. The full statement of task for this study is provided in Appendix B. How the statement of task was interpreted in light of discussions with DHS and based on available data is explained in the discussion that follows. 

Following a facility s submission of the security vulnerability assessment and its analysis by the DHS, the DHS will either confirm that a facility is high risk or inform a facility that the DHS no longer considers the facility to be high risk or subject to further regulation under CFATS. For facilities confirmed to be high risk, the DHS will communicate the final facility tier determination, and the facilities must develop and implement site security plans that satisfy the risk-based performance standards enumerated in 6 CFR 27.230. 

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