Shuttle mission STS

MEMS-based hydrogen sensors have been used in NASA shuttle missions STS-95 and STS-96. Hydrogen sensors were also a part of an "Integrated Vehicle Health Monitoring HEDS Technology Demonstration" series conducted at the NASA Kennedy Space Center. 

Atomic-Oxygen Effects Measurements for Shuttle Missions STS-8 and 41-G, NASA Technical Memorauidum 100459, Ed. J. T. Visentine (NASA, Houston, TX, 1988). 

J. C. Gregory eind P. N. Peters, The Reeiction of 5 eV Oxygen Atoms with Polymeric and Carbon Surfaces in Earth Orbit , Atomic-Oxygen Effects Measurements for Shuttle Missions STS-8 and il-G, NASA Technicail Memorandum 100459, Vol. 2, EM. J. Visentine (NASA, Houston, TX, 1988) pp. 4.1-4.5. 

McCauley, L., in Space Shuttle Mission STS-43 Press Kit, NASA Kennedy Space Center, July 19, 1991. 

Historically, there are two space experiments which employed a vane type PMD. The Fluid Acquisition Resupply Experiment-II (FARE-II) tested a vane type LAD using a simulant fluid onboard of the Shuttle mission STS-57 as its primary PMD (Dominick and Tegart, 1994 Dominick et al., 2011). The secondary PMD resembled that of a sponge. The purpose of the experiment was to establish vane performance limits in terms of maximum achievable expulsion efficiencies under adverse acceleration levels. A snapshot of the FARE-II experiment is shown in Eigure 2.10 (Dominick et al., 2011). This was a very successful mission which generated useful low-g data. 

A vane type PMD was also used for the vented tank resupply experiment (VTRE) onboard the Shuttle mission STS-77 (Chato and Martin, 2006). Twelve outer and twelve inner vanes were mounted inside a small-scale see-through tank to conduct outflow tests using Refrigerant-113. A vane type PMD was also planned to be used in the Skylab mission (Tegart, 1979). 

Fig. 3. Scanning electron micrograph of a Kapton polyimide surface that was exposed to the low Earth orbital ram environment for 40 hours on the STS-46 space shuttle mission. The smooth portion of the Kapton surface was covered during exposure and therefore shows no erosion. The rougher portion of the surface shows the topography and extent of erosion (6 /rm deep) resulting from the exposure.

Figure 4.6. Crew members of NASA Space Shuttle orbiter Challenger, Mission STS-51-L.

This book is dedicated to the crew of the Space Shuttle Columbia (STS-107), Commander Rick Husband, Pilot William McCool, and Mission Specialists Dr. David Brown, Dr. Lauren Clark, Dr. Kalpana Chawla, Michael Anderson and Ilan Ramon for their strength, courage, and great sacrifice in advancing scientific knowledge for us all. Thank you. 

Chapter 6 of the CAIB report, titled Decision Making at NASA, focuses on the decisions that led to the STS-107 accident. Section 6.1 reveals that the shedding of foam from the external tank - the physical cause of the Columbia accident - had a long history. It illustrates how foam debris losses that violated design requirements came to be defined by NASA management as an acceptable aspect of shuttle missions - a maintenance turnaround problem rather than a safety of flight concern. Table Al, adapted from figure 6.1-7 of the CAIB report, provides the histoiy of foam debris losses up to the Columbia disaster. 

July Two in-flight anomalies during shuttle Columbia STS-93 mission. Failure rate increases. 

Any suggestion that NASA would not be able to meet the core complete dates that O Keefe had chosen was brushed aside. The insistence on a fixed launch schedule was worrisome, particularly to the ISS Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force (CAIB, 2003 vol. 1, 117). It observed that, by November 2002, 16 space shuttle missions would be dedicated to station assembly and crew rotation. As the station had grown, so had the complexity of the missions required to complete it. With the ISS half-complete, the shuttle program and ISS were irreversibly linked. Any problems with or perturbations to the planned schedule of one program reverberated with the other. For the shuttle program this meant that the conduct of all missions, even nonstandard missions like STS-107, would have an impact on the Node 2 launch date. 

Because of its high energy density (Table 7.5), the NaS battery has also been proposed for outer-space applicahons, as these cells can be made space-hardened. In fact, in November 1997 a test sodium sulfur cell was flown on the STS-87 Space Shuttle mission to demonstrate its operation in space. The experimental battery had a mass energy density of 150 W hkg (threefold the energy density of a nickel hydrogen battery and about eightfold that of a conventional lead-acid battery) and, when operated at 350 °C, performed sahsfactorily over a 10-day period whilst in orbit... 

In our laboratory, we have recently conducted gelation studies of silica nanopardcles in microgravity during the STS-95 space shuttle mission (28). Stable silica nanoparticle dispersions may be form either by polymerization of silicic acids in an aqueous system or through hydrolysis and condensation of silicon alkoxides (the sol-gel or Stober route). Comparison of small-angle x-ray scattering (SAXS) measurements of Ludox, a commercial aqueous silicate with acid- and base-catalyzed alkoxides shows that only aqueous silicate sols are uniform, whereas alkoxides generate fractal particles. As Brinker and Scherer point out (29), these results illustrate that sols derived from aqueous silicates are... 

In Fig. 10 the results of the STS-95 space shuttle mission are presented obtained under the... 

The space shuttle Discovery lifts off on mission STS-26. Combustion reactions in the solid-fuel rocket engines provide the thrust to lift the shuttle off the launch pad. In this chapter, we learn to write and use balanced chemical equations for a wide variety of chemical reactions, including combustion reactions. 

Flight Activities. The PGU s were designed to require minimal in-flight attendance. Shuttle crew time, however, was requested to read and record PGC temperatures and to check flight equipment 2 to 3 times daily. On the STS-3 mission, the temperature data were routinely voiced down and used... 

February 1, 2002, Flying over Texas and Louisiana. Before dawn that morning, NASA space shuttle Columbia began its descent from orbit around the Earth following the 15-day mission of STS-107. As the shuttle approached Texas, it began to disintegrate. Before long the communications went silent and debris scattered across two states. NASA put a broad search effort into place to collect the debris. 

NASA launched the space shuttle Columbia on its STS-107 mission on Januaiy 16, 2003. On Febmaiy 1, 2003, as it descended to Earth after completing a 16-day scientific research mission, Columbia broke apart over northeastern Texas. All seven astronauts aboard were killed. They were commander Rick Husband pilot William McCool mission specialists Michael P. Anderson, David M. Brown, Kalpana Chawla, and Laurel Clark and payload specialist Ilan Ramon, an Israeli (Smith, 2003). 

The space shuttle Columbia lifts off from launch pad 39-A at the Kennedy Space Center, Florida at 9.39am January 16 to begin the STS-107 mission. 

The Febmaiy 2004 deadline for the Core Complete phase of the International Space Station (ISS) contributed to the Columbia accident in many ways - it pressured the already stressful space shuttle program, affected the ways information was gathered and interpreted, competed with engineers concerns for safety, and affected other decision-making priorities (CAIB, 2003 ch. 6 chapter 7 this volume). However, the Columbia STS-107 mission was also the first flight in two years that was not actually serving the ISS. In order to understand this apparent disconnect one needs to examine the larger historical context. 

The troubled STS-93 mission forced the Clinton administration to change course and pump new money and employees into the shuttle program - only to see the Bush administration then propose sharp cutbacks in spending on safety upgrades. In Januaiy 2001, the Bush administration came to the White House. In the years after that troubled Columbia mission, fears about shuttle safety continued to build. The ice is getting thinner, Michael J. McCuUey, chief operating officer of the shuttle s main outside contractor. United Space Alliance, warned Congress in September 2001. 

While risk was an explicit, albeit ambiguous, part of the vocabulary of safety within NASA s space shuttle program, the Mission Management Team, concerned with guaranteeing safety of the shuttle vehicle and crew, did not explicitly consider risk or uncertainty. In particular, an examination of the written transcripts of the STS-107 MMT meetings reveals that, while safety of flight was considered a critical issue for its consideration, no direct acknowledgments of risks and uncertainties were contemplated. 

As what the Board calls an informal chain of command began to shape STS-107 s outcome, location in the structure empowered some to speak and silenced others. For example, a Thermal Protection System tile expert, who was a member of the Debris Assessment Team but had an office in the more prestigious Shuttle Program, used his personal network to shape the Mission Management Team view and snuff out dissent. 

---