Safety related business processes

This chapter has presented an overview of some key safety-related business processes that are important in the safe operation of hazardous plant. Hazardous plant requires robust processes that are implemented thoroughly and conscientiously, and which learn from mistakes - including mistakes elsewhere. 

If management wants to rednce incidents (injuries, illnesses, loss-producing events, and/or other related costs), everyone must place as much emphasis on safety issues as they place on other core management issues, such as production, sales, and quality control. To be most effective, safety must be balanced with and integrated in other core business processes. 

Business risks relating to process safety should be assessed and reviewed regularly using an appropriate business risk analysis methodology ... 

There are some signs that the issue is resolving itself. Companies that have conducted the business process analysis in detail have found more value in it than they expected. It may be that the same process of learning about an appropriate level of detail is taking place in relation to safety management systems as took place with safety cases (see also Visser 1998 for a further discussion of detailed risk analysis and management systems). 

In order to define the detailed mechanism of CAPE-SAFE it is essential to define the business model of all related functions like design, operation, and maintenance. A team has been established between Tokyo Institute of Technology, Kyushu University, and Okayama University to carry out this task. The result is a complete set of business activity models, which cover the design phase while considering safety and operation factors, under the name of safety operational design . The developed business models are used as a reference in this book to define the design business processes that requires interaction with safety environment i.e. CAPE-SAFE. 

The Hydrocarbon Processing Industry (HPI), has traditionally been reluctant to invest capital where an immediate direct return on the investment to the company is not obvious, as would any business enterprise. Additionally financial fire losses in the petroleum and related industries were relatively small up to about the 1950 s. This was due to the small size of facilities and the relatively low value of oil and gas to the volume of production. Until 1950, a fire or explosion loss of more than 5 million U. S. Dollars had not occurred in the refining industry in the USA. Also in this period, the capital intensive offshore oil exploration and production industry were only just beginning. The use of gas was also limited early in the century. Consequentially its value was also very low. Typically production gas was immediately flared or the well was capped and considered as an uneconomical reservoir. Since gas development was limited, large vapor explosions were relatively rare and catastrophic destruction from petroleum incidents was essentially unheard of. The outlays for petroleum industry safety features were traditionally the absolute minimum required by governmental regulations. The development of loss prevention philosophies and practices were therefore not effectively developed within the industry. 

Setting of KPIs helps the operators to be proactive in taking corrective action to avert problems. Good indicators also help track the impact of business decisions on process safety/integrity related risks. A common set of indicators should be used within the organization in order to allow comparison across various assets at different locations. 

Safety professionals shonld be aware that the company or organization wonld be reqnired to make reasonable accommodations for any/all known physical or mental limitations of the qnalihed individnal with a disability, unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodations wonld impose an undue hardship on the business, or that the particnlar disability directly affects the safety and health of that individnal or others. Safety professionals should also be aware that included under this section is the prohibition against the use of qualihcation standards, employment tests, and other selection criteria that can be used to screen out individuals with disabilities, unless the employer can demonstrate that the procedure is directly related to the job funetion. In addition to the modifications to facilities, work schedules, equipment, and training programs, the company or organization is required to initiate an informal interactive (communication) process with the qualified individual to promote voluntary disclosure of his or her specific limitations and restrictions to enable the employer to make appropriate accommodations that will compensate for the limitation. ... 

For the customer, a reason to improve the risk management was related to the significance of safety issues. From the interviews, it was noted that there might be very high demands for safety and security policies in certain business areas, i.e. in process industry. A customer had, for instance, their own safety and security practices and demands for those suppliers which operate within the customer s real estate. Safety and security issues were improved in co-operation with the customer, and the customer had sometimes offered safety and security training for the company s personnel. Safety and security actions and demands were also monitored strictly by the customer. 

Although many safety issues have gained recognition in the shared workplaces and many tools and methods have been developed (especially for contractors in con-stmction sites), there are still many HSEQ and security threats related to supplier s management in global business environment. The whole supply chain needs to be considered and a comprehensive safety culture in shared workplace needs to be established. If company seeks to perform higher than average in the terms of HSEQ, they must ensure of corporate social responsibility and sustainable processes. HSEQ AP can be one method to support that purpose. 

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