Safety Analysis Conclusions

DOE O 5480.23 Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports For nuclear facilities only (Hazard Category 3 or above), requires preliminary and final hazard categorization and comprehensive hazard/safety analysis to support the conclusion that nuclear facility activities can be conducted without causing unacceptable health or safety impacts to workers, public, or environment. SAR prepared in accordance with DOE-STD-3009 or a BIO prepared in accordance with DOE-STD-3011. Annual updates to either SAR or BIO for those changes that affect the safety basis. Preliminary and final hazard categorization prepared in accordance with DOE-STD-1027. 

Occasionally the carefully derived conclusions we draw from our safety analysis can be unpalatable to our peers, employers or customers and reqnire a course of action which is costly or time consuming. From a personal perspective this can present a conflict when we are also faced with managing our careers, reputation and professional standing. It is human nature that sometimes it is easier to take the path of least resistance and derive conclusions which prove popular with stakeholders rather than challenge estabhshed wisdom. 

As the one who first coined the term behavior-based safety in 1979 some Professional Safety readers may be surprised to learn that agree completely with Mr. Manuele s analysis, conclusions, and recommendations. 

There are the following conclusions coming from the study presented in the paper fast time simulation should be followed by real time simulation or open water trials on physical man manned models to include human factor in navigational safety analysis. Real time simulation is the most powerful tool as it allows examining all influencing factors at reasonable cost. It is also practical to use full mission simulator for the assessment of emergency manoeuvres. 

In Section 2, we provide a brief description of the structure of a general ATC system and the safety analysis techniques related to the system elements focusing on human components. In Section 3, a method is presented for the determination of the set of air traffic complexity parameters to be used for sector capacity estimation. In Section 4 we summarize the results of a neural network based sector capacity estimation model with different sets of complexity factors as input parameters and in Section 5, we give final conclusions. 

A.302. Information should be provided in sufficient detail to support the analysis and conclusions of Chapter A. 16 (Safety Analysis) to demonstrate that the reactor facility can be safely operated at the proposed site. For many low power reactors, which present very limited hazards, the amount of detail provided in this chapter can be substantially reduced. 

As a brief conclusion to this section, let us recall that the global safety objectives are fully transposable to the MSFR reactor. The difficulty lies, among other things, in the identification of severe accidents for this type of reactor. Thus a core melt in the case of solid-fueled reactors is central to present safety studies and has no immediate equivalent in a Uquid-fiieled reactor. A safety analysis for the MSFR must then proceed from the fundamentals of nuclear safety. 

In conclusion, the safety analysis of the architecture allowed us to formalize the safety concepts of the PlPC, which are ... 

WSRC has concluded that the number and type of findings is not indicative of a widespread problem that could adversely affect reactor safety. This conclusion is documented in OPS RRP-900137 (Reference 15). The WSRC analysis of the findings indicates that most material conditions discrepancies are due to inadequate maintenance and poor work practices. These root causes are being addressed on a plant-wide basis under the SER sections on maintenance and housekeeping (13.0 and 10.5, respectively). 

It is important to note that vahdation typicahy only brings a measurement under suspicion. It does not verify that the measurement is incorrect. Safety is paramount. Some vahdation analysis could result in concluding that the measurement is invalid when, in fact, the comparison information is invahd. It is not difficult to extrapolate that actions could result from this erroneous conclusion which would place maintenance and operating personnel in jeopardy. Validation merely raises suspicion it does not confirm errors or measurement. 

Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) is a powerful analysis approach used to help manage risk and improve safety in many industries. When properly performed with appropriate respect for its theoretical and practical limitations, QRA provides a rational basis for evaluating process safety and comparing improvement alternatives. However, QRA is not a panacea that can solve all problems, make decisions for a manager, or substitute for existing safety assurance and loss prevention activities. Even when QRA is preferred, qualitative results, which always form the foundation for QRA, should be used to verify and support any conclusions drawn from QRA. 

It should be obvious from this discussion that the technique of creating a hazard tree is somewhat subjective. Different evaluators will likely classify conditions and sources differently and may carry the analysis lo further levels of sources. However, the conclusions reached concerning building design, maintenance, layout of traffic patterns, lighting, ok., should be the same. The purpose of developing the hazard tree is to l ocus attention and help the evaluator identify all aspects that must be considered in reviewing overall levels of safety. 

In the previous Chapter it was shown that the developed protocol for analysis identified the ineffective control elements causing the precursors prior to accidents. However, due to the lack of detailed accident information the conclusions were limited. To perform the analysis, using the developed 7-stage protocol pro-actively (before any accident occurs), cases have to be selected on which the analysis can be performed and from which reliable and generic conclusions about safety indicators and the performance of current safety management systems can be obtained. The next sub-Section will discuss the selection criteria to select suitable cases. 

The following Chapter will use the results and conclusions from the analysis performed in this Chapter, to derive some final conclusions and recommendations. Moreover, the posed research questions from Chapter 1 will be addressed and some open problems will be stated, to improve the current way in which companies manage safety. 

Examination of such studies may lead to the conclusion that some of the safety factors of Table 1.4 may be optimistic. But long experience in certain areas does suggest to what extent various uncertainties do cancel out, and overall uncertainties often do fall in the range of 10-20% as stated there. Still, in major cases the uncertainty analysis should be made whenever possible. 

These are two of the many principles that have been defined for green chemistry, we mentioned some other principles earlier health, safety, energy efficiency, and so on. Such technology can best be quantitatively analyzed with a thorough thermodynamic analysis in which the concepts we presented in Part II, and which are closely related to energy, its quality and its losses, are most prominent. But let us follow these researchers as they reported their remarkable achievements and conclusions in the Scientific American [62]. 

The summary should present the most important information about the drug product and the conclusions to be drawn from this information. This should be a factual summary of safety and effectiveness data and a neutral analysis of these data. The summary should include the following items ... 

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