Risk and Probability

Although seldom recognized or acknowledged, safety and health professionals do have a major impact on the lives of their employees as well as their families and communities. The day-to-day activities performed by the safety and health professional reduce the risks and probabilities of injury and illness which not only impacts the injured employee but also many others in the cascading and intertwined relationships inside and outside of the workplace. Through the constant and creative activities of the safety and health professional, the risks within the operations are minimized or eliminated providing positive benefits not only to company or organization but also to employees within the workplace. 

There is a clear distinction between hazard, risk, and probability. Hazard is usually defined as a condition with the potential for causing an undesirable consequence (Fell, 1994b). The description of landslide hazard should include the location, volume (or area), classification, and velocity of potential landslides and any resulting detached material, and the probability of their occurrence within a given period of time. 

Numerical Measures of Risk Without risk and the reward for successfully accepting risk, there would be no business activity. In estimating the probabilities of attaining various levels of net present value (NPV) and discounted-cash-flow rate of return (DCFRR), there was a spread in the possible values of (NPV) and (DCFRR). A number of methods have been suggested for assessing risks and rewards to be expected from projects. 

The same questions may then be asked for different values of the probabilities p and po. The answers to these questions can give an indication of the importance to the company of P at various levels of risk and are used to plot the utility curve in Fig. 9-25. Positive values are the amounts of money that the company would accept in order to forgo participation. Negative values are the amounts the company woiild pay in order to avoid participation. Only when the utihty value and the expected value (i.e., the straight line in Fig. 9-25) are the same can net present value (NPV) and discounted-cash-flow rate of return (DCFRR) be justified as investment criteria. 

Insurance is protec tion against risk. Commercial insurance companies minimize their own risks by covering a large number of individuals against a given risk and also by offering coverage on a wide variety of different types of risk. It is frequently quite difficult to assess the probability of success of a particular research and development project. It is much easier for an insurance company to assess its probabih-ties from its casualty tables. 

We can demonstrate the notions of risk and risk assessment using Figure 1.18. For a given probability of failure occurrence and severity of consequence, it is possible to map the general relationship of risk and what this means in terms of the action required to eliminate the risk. 

Hazard analysis (HAZAN) is a quantitative way of assessing the likelihood of failure. Other names associated with this technique are risk analysis, quantitative risk assessment (QRA), and probability risk assessment (PRA). Keltz [44] expressed the view that HAZAN is a selective technique while HAZOP can be readily applied to new design and major modification. Some limitations of HAZOP are its inability to detect every weakness in design such as in plant layout, or miss hazards due to leaks on lines that pass through or close to a unit but cany material that is not used on that unit. In any case, hazards should... 

At this point, following the chapters, the objectives have been defined, the effect of government regulations and standards are known, accidents have been identified and analyzed by various methods to determine the probability of an accident, and the accident consequences have been calculated. These parts must be assembled to present the risk and the analysis of the risk according to its various contributors. 

It would be going too far to say that no one should ever enter a cloud of flammable vapor to isolate a leak. There have been occasions when, by taking a risk for a minute, a man has isolated a leak that would otherwise have spread a long way and probably ignited, perhaps exploded. However, we should try to avoid putting people in such situations by providing remotely operated emergency isolation valves to isolate likely sources of leak. 

The book contains, in alphabetical order, failure rates, event rates and probabilities, and descriptive information which has been collected since 1970 in the course of doing risk and reliability assessments. Twenty appendices contain results of surveys on bursting discs, pipes, valves, relief valves, pump failures and information on human error, international fire losses, and blast effects. 

In this study detailed fault trees with probability and failure rate calculations were generated for the events (1) Fatality due to Explosion, Fire, Toxic Release or Asphyxiation at the Process Development Unit (PDU) Coal Gasification Process and (2) Loss of Availability of the PDU. The fault trees for the PDU were synthesized by Design Sciences, Inc., and then subjected to multiple reviews by Combustion Engineering. The steps involved in hazard identification and evaluation, fault tree generation, probability assessment, and design alteration are presented in the main body of this report. The fault trees, cut sets, failure rate data and unavailability calculations are included as attachments to this report. Although both safety and reliability trees have been constructed for the PDU, the verification and analysis of these trees were not completed as a result of the curtailment of the demonstration plant project. Certain items not completed for the PDU risk and reliability assessment are listed. 

Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis(CPQRA) The numerical evaluation of both incident consequences and probabilities or frequencies and their combination into an overall measure of risk. 

Chapter 14 Introduction to Hazard Risk Assessiiiciit Chapter 15 Evcnt/Haaird Identification Chapter 16 Accident Causes and Probability Chapter 17 Accident Consequences and Evaluation Chapter 18 Hazard Risk Analysis... 

Once tlie system components and their failure modes have been identified, tlie acceptability of risks taken as a result of such failures must be determined. Tlie risk assessment process yields more comprehensive and better results when reliable statistical and probability data are available. In tlie absence of such data, tlie results are a strong function of tlie engineering judgment of tlie design team. The important issue is tliat both tlie severity and probability (frequency) of the accident must be taken into account. 

Risk characterization estimates tlie healtli risk associated with tlie process under investigation. The result of tliis cliaracterization is a number tliat represents tlie probability of adverse healtli effects from tliat process or from a substance released in tliat process. Tlie major types of risk include Individual Risk, Maximum Individual Risk (MIR), Population Risk (PR), Societal Risk, and Risk Indices. 

Risk is defined as tlie product of two factors (1) tlie probability of an undesirable event and (2) tlie measured consequences of the undesirable event. Measured consequences may be stated in terms of financial loss, injuries, deatlis, or Ollier variables. Failure represents an inability to perform some required function. Reliability is the probability that a system or one of its components will perform its intended function mider certain conditions for a specified period. Tlie reliability of a system and its probability of failure are complementary in tlie sense tliat the sum of these two probabilities is unity. This cluipler considers basic concepts and llieorenis of probability tliat find application in tlie estimation of risk and reliability. 

Figure 21.1.3 depicts tlie risk to society in tenns of the annual probability of N or more deaths as a result of tlie occurrence of incident I or incident 11. Note tliat tlie scales in Fig. 21.1.3 are logaritlunic. Tlie plotted probabilities are obtained by summing tlie probabilities of the events resulting in N or more deatlis for N = 0, 3, 6, 13. Table 21.3.1 lists these events and probabilities. 

High heat-transfer rates and sufficient cooling via internal, two-phase flow and circulation are consequently necessary to ensure that modem boilers operate below their particular critical heat-flux (CHF) conditions. This minimizes poor thermal efficiency performance, risks of thermal metal fatigue, and probable tube failures from excessive temperatures. 

NOTE These are all very generous recommendations and probably represent the maximum values that can be maintained in modem boilers without risk of carryover. 

Risk, i.e. the probability that injury of a certain severity will occur under certain conditions, safety, i.e. the measures, procedures and conditions which will minimize the risk, and loss prevention, i.e. the systematic approach to preventing accidents and their consequences to people, equipment and environment. 

Risk analysis. The risk of accidents can be assessed in terms of two factors severity and probability of the accident. Severity is high if consequences of the accident to employees, the public, the environment, and the plant are significant. Severity is related to the amount and properties of hazardous (toxic, flammable, explosive) substances that can escape to the surroundings during the accident, and to the energy that is released during the accident. Probability is associated with the likelihood of the occurrence of unwanted chains of events and the time of development of undesired events starting from the disturbance. If the time... 

From the calculated building damage versus response relationship and the empirical probability of serious injury or fatality versus damage relationship discussed above, the relationship between explosion overpressure (or other effects) and probability of serious injury or fatality may be constructed in a manner that accounts for the detailed structural characteristics of plant buildings. The steps involved are similar to risk screening (Chapter 4), with the addition of detailed quantitative structural evaluation of plant buildings and detailed quantitative frequency assessment as described in the next section. 

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