Necessity defense

The basic question is whether a medical necessity defense is applicable to the federal Controlled Substances Act. Put another way, do patients who believe (or whose doctors believe) that marijuana is necessary for their treatment have the right to receive the drug even though it is illegal under federal law ... 

The Supreme Court s opinion, delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, seems to start by being dubious about the use of any necessity defense that is not actually allowed by the law in question. (The Controlled Substances Act allows use of marijuana only in federally authorized research projects and has no provision for medical necessity.) The Court noted that the creation of e.xceptions to legislation is properly a function of the legislature, not of the courts. 

The cooperative had also argued that even if the necessity defense is not allowed, the Controlled Substances Act exceeds the power of Congress under the constitution s Commerce Clause, and that enforcing this law against medical marijuana patients would deprive them of the right to due process and infringe on liberties guaranteed by the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. However, because these constitutional issues were not raised earlier in the appeals process, the Court declined to consider them. 

This ruling suggests that the necessity defense is unlikely to be permitted in federal court, even when bolstered by a local community s or even state s decision to support medical marijuana use. However, substantive constitutional challenges to federal drug regulations may be more successful. See the case of Raich v. Ashcroft, discussed later. In that case the question is whether the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce properly extends to local, noncommercial medical use of marijuana. 

This decision probably seems to have had more of a political impact than a legal one. It has energized medical marijuana advocates as well as supporters of jury nullification—the idea that jurors should be able to decide whether a law is being fairly applied in a particular situation. Barring the acknowledgement of a medical necessity defense, the well-established principle that federal laws take precedence when in conflict with state laws means that the medical marijuana dispute would have to be ultimately resolved on the national level. 

In a defeat for medical marijuana advocates, the U.S. Supreme Court rules that the federal Controlled Substances Act precludes a medical necessity defense on the part of the Oakland, California, Cannabis Buyers Club. February Officials at the popular drug education program DARE admit that some of the techniques they have been using may be ineffective. They begin a process of reviewing research and revising the curriculum. 

Doyle, Charles. Marijuana for Medical Purposes The Supreme Courtis Decision in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Cooperative and Related Legal Issues. Washington, D.C. Congressional Research Service, 2002. Summarizes the Supreme Court s latest medical marijuana decision, which refused to recognize a medical necessity defense for cultivating or distributing marijuana. The existence of state laws sanctioning medical marijuana have no federal effect. Related constimtional issues that may still come before the Court are summarized. 

As an initial matter, we note that it is an open question whether federal courts ever have authority to recognize a necessity defense not provided by statute. A necessity defense traditionally covered the situation where physical forces beyond the actor s control rendered illegal conduct the lesser of two evils. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980). Even at common law, the defense of necessity was somewhat controversial. See, e.g., Queen v. Dudley ir Stephens, 14 Q. B. 273 (1884). And under our constitutional system, in which federal crimes are defined by statute rather than by common law, see United States y. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812), it is especially so. As we have stated Whether, as a policy matter, an exemption should be created is a question for legislative judgment, not judicial inference. United States. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 559 (1979). Nonetheless, we recognize that this Court has discussed the possibility of a necessity defense without altogether rejecting it. See, e.g., Bailey, supra, at 415. 

Finally, the Cooperative contends that we should construe the Controlled Substances Act to include a medical necessity defense in order to avoid what it considers to be difficult constitutional questions. In particular, the Cooperative asserts that, shorn of a medical necessity defense, the statute exceeds Congress Commerce Clause powers, violates the substantive due process rights of patients, and offends the fundamental liberties of the people under the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. As the Cooperative acknowledges, however, the canon of constitutional avoidance has no application in the absence of statutory ambiguity. Because we have no doubt that the Controlled Substances Act cannot bear a medical necessity defense to distributions of marijuana, we do not find guidance in this avoidance principle. Nor do we consider the underlying constitutional issues today. Because the Court of Appeals did not address these claims, we decline to do so in the first instance. 

A Title VII action is considered equitable in nature, and the primary objective is to stop or eigoin the unlawful discrimination practices. Potential remedies can include injunctive relief, back pay, attorney fees, punitive damages, and other relief Class actions are permitted under Title VII if the rules of civil procedure are met. Although safety professionals will seldom be involved in a Title VII court action, there are a number of possible defenses, including, but not limited to, business necessity defense, statistical data, and bona fide occupational qualifications. 

F.2d 1172 CA4 1982). Those opinions established the three-step business necessity inquiry whether there is a substantial health risk to the fetus whether transmission of the hazard to the fetus occurs only through women and whether there is a less discriminatory alternative equally capable of preventing the health hazard to the fetus. 886 F.2d, at 885. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits that the components of the business necessity defense the courts of appeals and the EEOC have utilized in fetal-protection cases balance the interests of the employer, the anployee and the unborn child in a manner consistent with Title VII. Id., at 886. The court further noted that, under Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989), the burden of persuasion r ained on the plaintiff in challenging a business necessity defense, and—unlike the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits—it thus imposed the burden on the plaintiffs for all three steps. 886 F.2d, at 887-893. Cf. Hayes, 726 F.2d, at 1549, and Wright, 697 F.2d, at 1187. 

Applying this business necessity defense, the Court of Appeals ruled that Johnson Controls should prevail. Specifically, the court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact about the substantial health-risk factor because the parties agreed that there was a substantial risk to a fetus from lead exposure. 886 F.2d, at 888-889. The Court of Appeals also concluded that, unlike the evidence of risk to the fetus from the mother s exposure, the evidence of risk from the father s exposure, which petitioners presented, is, at best, speculative and unconvincing. Id., at 889. Finally, the court found that petitioners had waived the issue of less discriminatory alternatives by not adequately presenting it. It said that, in any event, petitioners had not produced evidence of less discriminatory alternatives in the District Court. Id., at 890-893. 

Having concluded that the business necessity defense was the appropriate framework and that Johnson Controls satisfied 195 that standard, the court proceeded to discuss the BFOQ defense and concluded that Johnson Controls met that test, too. Id., at 893-894. The en banc majority ruled that industrial safety is part of the essence of respondent s business, and that the fetal-protection policy is reasonably necessary to further that concern. Quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 2729-2730, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977), the majority emphasized that, in view of the goal of protecting the unborn, more is at stake than simply an individual woman s decision to weigh and accept the risks of employment. 886 F.2d, at 898. 

We concluded above that Johnson Controls policy is not neutral because it does not apply to the reproductive capacity of the company s male employees in the same way as it applies to that of the females. Moreover, the absence of a malevolent motive does 1204 not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect. Whether an employment practice involves disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination. In Martin Marietta, supra, the motives underlying the employers express exclusion of women did not alter the intentionally discriminatory character of the policy. Nor did the arguably benign motives lead to consideration of a business necessity defense. The question 200 in that case was whether the discrimination in question could be justified under 703(e) as a BFOQ. The beneficence of an employer s purpose does not undermine the conclusion that an explicit gender-based policy is sex discrimination under 703(a) and thus may be defended only as a BFOQ. 

Combining Tort and Contract Advantages. Two methods were available to allow plaintiffs an easier road to recovery. Courts either stripped the tort action of the necessity for estabUshing fault, or interpreted the UCC in such a way that privity was not necessary and the other Code defenses were not appHcable to cases involving personal injury or property damage. Either way a manufacturer would be open to dkect suit without the... 

Emerging infectious pathogens, increasing antimicrobial resistance, recognition of the long-term impact of diarrheal diseases and the appearance of diseases that decrease the host defense have heightened the necessity to develop new and more specific treatments and further... 

The majority fully accepts the defense contention that the utilization of slave labor (except as to five defendants) was the result of compulsory production quotas and other governmental regulations. This asserted defense of "necessity" is held to have been sustained because of the reign of terror within the Reich and because of possible dire consequences to the defendants had they pursued any other policy. 

Far from establishing that the defendants acted under "necessity" or "coercion," I conclude that Farben frequently sought the forced workers. In fact, the production quotas of Farben were largely fixed by Farben itself. I cannot agree with the assertion that these defendants had no other choice. In reality, the defense is an afterthought, the validity of which is belied by Farben s entire course of action. 

In health, aggression is appropriate, as dictated by biological necessity (self-defense) or sanctioned by society (warfare). Aggression does not always result in injury. In sharp contrast, violence, an aggression subtype, is deliberate, unwarranted, avoidable, and leads to physical injury (Filley et ah, 2001). 

The United States petitioned for certiorari to review the Court of Appeals decision that medical necessity is a legally cognizable defense to violations of the Controlled Substances Act. Because the decision raises significant questions as to the ability of the United States to enforce the Nation s drug laws, we granted certiorari. 531 U.S. 1010 (2000). 

The Cooperative contends, however, that notwithstanding the apparently absolute language of 841(a), the statute is subject to additional, implied exceptions, one of which is medical necessity. According to the Cooperative, because necessity was a defense at common law, medical necessity should be read into the Controlled Substances Act. We disagree. 

We need not decide, however, whether necessity can ever be a defense when the federal statute does not expressly provide for it. In this case, to resolve the question presented, we need only recognize that a medical necessity exception for marijuana is at odds with the terms of the Controlled Substances Act. The statute, to be sure, does not explicitly abrogate the defense. But its provisions leave no doubt that the defense is unavailable. 

Under any conception of legal necessity, one principle is clear The defense cannot succeed when the legislature itself has made a determination of values. 1 W. La lave A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law 5.4, p. 629 (1986). In the case of the Controlled Substances Act, the statute reflects a determination that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception (outside the confines of a Government-approved research project). Whereas some other drugs can be dispensed and prescribed for medical use, see 21 U.S.C. 829 the same is not true for marijuana. Indeed, for purposes of the Controlled Substances Act, marijuana has no currently accepted medical use at all. 811. 

For these reasons, we hold that medical necessity is not a defense to manufacturing and distributing marijuana. The Court of Appeals erred when it held that medical necessity is a legally cognizable defense. 190 F.3d, at 1114. It further erred when it instructed the District Court on remand to consider the criteria for a medical necessity exemption, and, should it modify the injunction, to set forth those criteria in the modification order. Id., at 1115. 

In light of these circumstances we cannot agree with the view expressed in the American verdict in the Nuremberg SouthEast Trial,133 that the civilized nations had increasingly espoused the principle that higher orders could not be claimed as defense against criminal acts. This court s opinion has already failed due to the military necessities of post-war times. Its implementation would have undermined all military authority. And this is why the latest (7th, 1952) edition of the well-known Manual by Oppenheim-Lauterpacht contains the following section 134... 

Under the certificate of necessity program, construction, reconstruction, erection, installation, or acquistion of facilities necessary in whole or in part in the interest of national defense during this emergency period was allowed accelerated tax amortization on that portion of the amount applying to defense purposes. During the Korean action period some 1400 applications for certificates of necessity were processed by the Chemical Division. These certificates represented investments running over S3 billion. 

The Chemical and Rubber Division is still carrying on certain activities called for by the Defense Production Act. One of these relates to certificates of necessity and loan applications. This program calls for extensive use of chemical statistics, as noted above. 

National Production Authority, Defense Production Record, weekly. May 3, 1951-Jan. 1, 1953. Summarizes activities of Defense Production Administration and related federal agencies. Includes certificates of necessity issued by D.P.A. for rapid amortization of new chemical facilities. 

---