Independent Technical Authority

Another informal comparison was made in the ITA (Independent Technical Authority) analysis described in section 8.6. An informal review of the risks identified by using STPA showed that they included all the risks identified by the informal NASA risk analysis process using the traditional method common to such analyses. The additional risks identified by STPA appeared on the surface to be as important as those identified by the NASA analysis. As noted, there is no way to determine whether the less formal NASA process identified additional risks and discarded them for some reason or simply missed them. 

The new construction and in-service Platform Program Managers are responsible for the cost, schedule, and quality of the ships under their control. To ensure that safety is not traded off under cost and schedule pressures, the Program Managers can only select from a set of acceptable design options. The Independent Technical Authority has the responsibility to approve those acceptable options. 

The Independent Technical Authority (ITA) is responsible for establishing and assuring adherence to technical standards and policy. More specifically, they ... 

Leveson, Nant, Nicolas Dulac, Betty Barrett, John Carroll, Joel Cutcher-Gershenfield, and Stephen HJedenthal. 2005. Risk Analysis of NASA Independent Technical Authority. ESD Technical Report Series. Engineering Systems Division. Cambridge, MA MIT. 

Another external driver for change has been the CAIB report. NASA formed the so-called Diaz Team to look at issues stemming from the CAB report that were applicable to broad spectra of activities (Diaz Team, 2004), and this team made numerous recommendations. As well, CAB called for creation of an independent technical authority (CAB, 2003) to raise the importance of safety. NASA had already created the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) in response to the Columbia disaster. However, NESC does not have as much independence as CAB urged, so NASA is creating another administrative subsystem to fulfill this need, with the result that NESC appears to add redundant complexity. NESC has achieved some successes that may warrant its preservation, but NASA needs to clarify the distinctive responsibilities of NESC, the office of the Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer, the engineering organizations, and the independent technical authority advocated by CAB. 

NDA preparation requires extensive planning and coordination among authors to ensure consistency and completeness of the dossier. Analytical data are the common thread in all CMC documents and are highly intertwined with other reports in the CMC section. Documents related to biobatches also need to be integrated between the CMC and clinical sections of the NDA. The value of cross-functional review of documents cannot be overemphasized. If possible, review of the complete CMC section by the CMC team or an independent technical reviewer is highly recommended. 

Choice of Solvent. As indicated by Averell and Norris (1), and independently confirmed by the authors, technical benzene is a superior stripping solvent for parathion residues. It is almost completely miscible with technical grade parathion at room temperatures, it is universally available and low in cost, it is readily volatile, it fails to contribute to storage decomposition (6), it is a good solvent for plant oils and waxes, and it is immiscible with water. On the other hand, benzene is highly flammable and its vapors are very toxic to human beings, especially as a chronic toxicant even in small doses. 

The accident investigation report is written using the principles of technical documentation. Items 1-4 are objective and should not include the authors opinions. Items 5-7 appropriately contain the opinions of the authors (investigation team). This technical style allows readers to develop their own independent conclusions and recommendations. As a result of these criteria, the accident investigation report is a learning tool, which is the major purpose of the investigation. 

William R. Rhyne received a B.S. in nuclear engineering from the University of Tennessee and M.S. and D.Sc. degrees in nuclear engineering from the University of Virginia. Dr. Rhyne is currently an independent consultant and earlier cofounded H R Technical Associates, Inc., where he remains a member of the board of directors. He has extensive experience in risk and safety analyses associated with nuclear and chemical processes and with the transport of hazardous nuclear materials and chemicals. From 1984 to 1987, he was the project manager and principal investigator for a probabilistic accident analysis of transporting obsolete chemical munitions. Dr. Rhyne has authored or coauthored numerous publications and reports in nuclear and chemical safety and risk analysis areas and is author of the book Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Analysis Quantitative Approaches for Truck and Train. He is a former member of the NRC Transportation Research Board Hazardous Materials Committee, the Society for Risk Assessment, the American Nuclear... 

This report has been reviewed by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council s Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the authors and the NRC in making the published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The contents of the review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their participation in the review of this report ... 

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