Chemical Weapons Convention accession

Recommendation 3-4b. If the development and testing of the machines for accessing agent in the modified baseline process would delay disposal operations past the Chemical Weapons Convention deadline, the Army should consider installing another technology at Pueblo. 

The Political Declaration was a 23-paragraph document intended to be accessible to those without an in-depth understanding of the Convention or chemical weapons. See Political Declaration of the First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, RC-1/3, 9 May 2003 (available on the OPCW website ). 

For the development of new chemical weapons (CWs), a number of criteria are necessary a research base including scientists and equipment, access to information, chemical and arms industries, and of course financial support. It is noteworthy that the development of CWs is possible not only for states but also for terrorists. It is necessary to stress that the intention of this chapter is not to describe new CWs or chemical warfare agents (CWAs) but to comment on a number of trends in toxicology with the aim that these chemicals may be proposed for inclusion in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) verification mechanisms. However, the text of the CWC is comprehensive and covers practically all chemicals that may be misused as CWs. 

B. H. Rosenberg, Riot Control Agents and the Chemical Weapons Convention, paper submitted to the Open Forum on Challenges to the Chemical Weapons Ban, The Peace Palace, The Hague, 1 May 2003, available at http //www.fas.org/bwc/papers/rca.pdf, last accessed 28 November 2003. 

Krutzsch W, Myjer E, Trapp R (2014) Issues raised by the accession of Syria to the Chemical Weapons Convention. In Krutzsch W, Myjer E, Trapp R (eds) The Chemical Weapons Convention—a commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p 689 Krutzsch W, Trapp R (2014) Article II definitions and criteria In Krutzsch W, Myjer E, Trapp R (eds) The Chemical Weapons Convention—a commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p 73 Kurzidem T (1998) Challenge inspections and investigations of alleged use. In Bothe M, Ronzitti N, Rosas A (eds) The new Chemical Weapons Convention— implementation and prospects. Kluwer, The Hague, p 249... 

U-S. Chemical Weapons Convention Schedule 1 see http lluninv.cwc.%ovl (accessed October 28, 2009). 

The verification provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention are not nearly as extensive as those employed by UNSCOM. The CWC inspectors will lack the access rights, the freedom of movement, and the surveillance opportunities enjoyed by UNSCOM. They will have to implement two systems of verification, involving routine and challenge inspections. Under the routine system, inspectors will be required to validate the declarations of participating states to the OPCW on topics specified in the treaty. This will include initial information on the size and composition of existing stockpiles, storage facilities, and any production facilities the actual destruction of those stockpiles and production facilities (or the conversion of the latter for purposes not prohibited under the Convention) the non-diversion of chemicals made in civilian facilities for military purposes and the operation of the single, small-scale facility pennitted to each state party for the production of Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical, protective and other purposes. 

This compilation was made based upon the notifications issued by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his capacity as Depositary of the Chemical Weapons Convention as of July 2014. Unless otherwise indicated, the declarations were made on ratification, acceptance, accession or succession. 

Recognising the contribution that every new ratification of and accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter the Convention ) makes to the fostering of international peace and security and of global stability ... 

Vesicant agents (sulfur mustards, nitrogen mustards, and lewisites) and nerve agents (tabun, sarin, soman, and VX, among others) are included in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 1 of chemicals for the application of verification measures (http //www. opcw.org, accessed February 21, 2014). This schedule features chemicals that have little or no use in the industry and have been developed, produced, stockpiled, or used as CWs. 

The terrorist CW threat differs fundamentally from the military CW threats of the past. Essentially, it is driven by accessibility of the material. On the one hand, there has to be concern about the security of existing CW stockpiles. But it is equally important to ensure that terrorist organizations cannot get access to relevant precursor materials or toxic industrial chemicals to produce their own make-shift chemical weapons. A related concern is the presence of toxic industrial chemicals in manufacturing, storage and transport, and the danger of deliberate releases of these chemicals by attacks with conventional explosives. 

One of the reasons for this was, of course, the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001. The effort to establish a global legal framework against terrorism and to enact counter-terrorism laws in many countries had a positive spin-off for the implementing legislation required under the Convention too. At the same time, the OPCW realized that its own (national as well as international) implementation process contributed to the counter-terrorism efforts, because it made toxic and precursor chemicals (and, of course, chemical weapons themselves) less accessible. ... 

Moreover, the accession to the Convention by Libya at the beginning of 2004 was particularly noteworthy. Libya announced the renunciation of all weapons of mass destruction on 18 December 2003 and its government deposited its instrument of accession to the Convention with the United Nations on 6 January 2004 30 days later, on 5 February 2004, the Convention entered into force for Libya. Wasting no time, the OPCW dispatched a team of inspectors to Tripoli during February to render technical support. A comprehensive implementation of the chemical weapons ban in Libya, the first of such efforts in that region, has thus begun. 

As stated previously, most countries have the capability to develop chemical weapons. Those with a well-developed military infrastructure could readily adapt existing munitions for chemical warfare. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq delivered mustard and tabun with artillery shells, aerial bombs, missiles, and rockets. Virtually any country or subnational group with significant resources has sufficient capability to attain the minimum capability that would be needed to meet terrorist aims. Any nation with substantial foreign military sales or indigenous capability in conventional weapons will have (or have ready access to) both the design know-how and components required to implement at least a moderate capability. 

The Convention requires States Parties possessing chemical weapons to destroy their stocks within a period of ten years, with the possibility to apply for extensions, and ensnres that all possessor States destroy their stockpiles at approximately the same rate, subject to verification. " Due to technical, environmental and financial problems, the time limits originally envisaged for the destruction of chemical weapons nnder the CWC have not been fully met, but overall destruction has been rather successful —and the OPCW has proved enormous flexibility in the context of Syria s accession to the Convention. ... 

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. Available at http //www.opcw.org/html/db/cwc/ eng/cwc frameset.html. Accessed April 17, 2008... 

In terms of implementation of the Convention, there is also a need to find the right balance between prohibitions related to chemical weapons, and free access to chemicals and to chemical equipment and technology. 

It is cmcial that the OPCW be able to adapt to the changing reahties so that the verification and implementation regimes of the Convention can continue to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons and the materials for making them, and in a manner that does not impede legitimate developments in the chemical industry. Non-State actors must not be allowed to gain access to toxic chemicals or to the means for producing them. 

Authorises the Director-General, on behalf of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, to deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations as Depositary for the 1986 Vienna Convention the instrument of accession of the OPCW to the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and Intemational Organisations or between Intemational Organisations. 

Article IV concerns chemical weapons in existence at the time of the Convention s entry into force. Within 30 days, the location, quantity and detailed inventory of chemical weapons already held are to be declared, together with a general plan for the destruction of those weapons. Immediately following the declaration, states must provide access to their chemical weapons for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of the declaration through on-site inspection . There is provision for further measures involving on-site inspection and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments to ensure that chemical weapons are not removed, except to a destruction facility. 

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