Terrorist organizations

With the focus on biological threats shifting from nations to terrorist organizations, the type of potential agents that might be employed has... 

As discussed above, several states that support terrorism have some CBRN capabilities, so the technical constraint alone is not limiting. Rather, the potential backlash against any state that provides a terrorist organization with CBRN has been a sufficient deterrent to this point. However groups such as al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and the Tamil Tigers have shown significant interest in one or more types of unconventional weapons. 

There are a number of reasons for the absence of CBRN attacks including the technical and material challenges. In addition, while al Qaeda is set to destroy the West, few other groups have the motivation to kill large numbers of people. Other factors include terrorists prefer the certainty of conventional weapons to the uncertainty of CBRN the weapons can be hazardous to the terrorists themselves the response to a CBRN terrorist attack may result in further degradation of terrorist capabilities and finally political support of the terrorist organization s base may be turned away by the use of unconventional tactics. 

Bush Doctrine—The policy that holds responsible nations that harbor or support terrorist organizations and says that such countries are considered hostile to the United States. From President Bush s speech, A country that harbors terrorists will either deliver the terrorists or share in their fate.. . . People have to choose sides. They are either with the terrorists, or they re with us. ... 

The Secretary of State has broad powers to designate domestic groups as terrorist organizations. ... 

These figures reflect the situation prior to 1988. As a consequence of terrorist organizations on both sides acquiring large arms consignments, since March 1988 the IRA and related groups frequently use the 7.62 x 39 mm caliber AKM type rifle with Yugoslavian nny 82 ammunition whereas the... 

Spent fuel represents in the same time a valuable resource, a major radioactive hazard for nearby populations and a possible threat if stolen by terrorist organizations. 

Second bottleneck lies in the transportation capacity fuel elements that have been unloaded stay for many years in pools or in containers stored in the open air by want of transportation capacity. Those de facto intermediate storage lack the safety environment that would have been asked for if they had been conceived from the beginning as storage facilities they also lack correct physical protection and -though spent fuel from submarine is not the easiest way to a nuclear weapon - could thus attract the attention of terrorist organizations. 

We cannot be eonfident that an attack combining the sophistication and ruthlessness of 9/11 with the use of nuclear weapons will not happen. As far as we know, however, no terrorist group has the competence to build nuclear weapons and an element of scepticism is warranted about the capacity of non-state actors to manufacture nuclear weapons undetected by the intelligence agencies of the technologically advanced countries. Nor is there any evidence so far to suggest that nuclear weapons have been transferred to terrorist organizations. Bioterrorism... 

The terrorist CW threat differs fundamentally from the military CW threats of the past. Essentially, it is driven by accessibility of the material. On the one hand, there has to be concern about the security of existing CW stockpiles. But it is equally important to ensure that terrorist organizations cannot get access to relevant precursor materials or toxic industrial chemicals to produce their own make-shift chemical weapons. A related concern is the presence of toxic industrial chemicals in manufacturing, storage and transport, and the danger of deliberate releases of these chemicals by attacks with conventional explosives. 

Such fearsome pronouncements aside, it is an open question as to whether or not a terrorist organization, even one as sophisticated as al-Qaeda, could pull off a substantial chemical or biological attack, especially one that would kill or injure more than the 2,800 who died on 9/11 (Thcker, 2000). 

Arsenicals are considered a threat, not so much from large nation states but fi om smaller, less developed nations and/or by terrorist organizations. The relative ease of production coupled with their effectiveness against an unprotected population make organic arsenicals a continued threat in the 21st century. This chapter describes the human health aspects of arsine, organic arsenicals, and inorganic arsenic, and the current status of development of suitable therapeutic measures. 

Now there is growing realization of the possibility of the use of radiological weapons (dirty bombs) by terrorist organizations. With such weapons, radioactive material could be dispersed in populated areas. Such acts could lead to a variety of problematic health and environmental consequences. The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement has recently published a valuable reference entitled Management of Terrorist Events Involving... 

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