Failure operator

Valve cin vil loo tai [iiloni-il valve failure Operation No Ny pressure to HF cylinder - no HF flow Lo vaporizer, B-l wing Local pressure indication on N2 line None tv ... 

Latent Human Error/Failure (operational level) A latent human error is similar to an active error, but the consequences of the error may only become apparent after a period of time or when combined with other errors or particular operational conditions. 

The primaiy causes of accidents arc mechanical failure, operational failure (human error), miknown or miscclhmcous. process upset, and design error. Figure 14.4.1 is the relative number of accidents that liave occurred in tlie petrochemical field (on a percentage basis), There are lliree steps that normally lead to an accident ... 

Accidents in industry occur for many reasons. A few of which can be attributed to mechanical failure, operational error (human error), and process upset, and design error. In order to understand tlie root cause of an accident, system safety appraaches have been put to use. 

Premature disk failure Operator error Pump motor failure Reaction inliibitor system failure Coolant system failure Outlet piping obstruction Motor alann failure Pressure sensor failure... 

L. Theodore, J. Reynolds, F. Taylor, and S. Errico, "Electrostatic Precipitator Bus Section Failure Operation and Maintenance," paper No. 84-96.10, presented at die 77di Aimual Meeting of Air Pollution Control Association, San Francisco, 1984. 

Equations (8.32) and (8.33) describe what we call the normal or no failure operation of the system of interest. The problem of failure detection is concerned with the detection of abrupt changes in a system, as modeled in Eqs. (8.32) and (8.33). Changes in (8.33) will be referred to as sensor failures. The main task of failure detection and compensation design is to modify the normal mode configuration to add the capability of detecting abrupt changes and compensating for them. In order to do that, we need to formulate what is called the failure model system ... 

During the process operation, water was introduced into the blender, probably as a result of a mechanical failure. Operators noticed the production of heat and the release of foul-smelling gas. During an emergency operation to offload the blender of its reacting contents, the material ignited and a deflagration occurred. The most likely cause of this incident was the inadvertent introduction of water into water-reactive materials (USEPA-OSHA, 1997). 

The alert mechanic informed the operations supervisors of the failures. Operations shut down the furnace. Maintenance mechanics replaced the bolts with the properly-specified high-strength stud bolts prior to any serious releases. 

Theodore, L., Reynolds, J., Taylor, R, Filippi, A., and Errico, S., Electrostatic Precipitator Bus Section Failure Operation and Maintenance, Proceedings of the Fifth USEPA Symposium on the Transfer and Utilization of Particulate Control Technology, Kansas City, 1984. 

Fusion power generators are inherently safe. The magnetic confinement of the plasma must be carefully controlled and balanced to sustain the nuclear reaction. Any disturbance of the operating conditions will result in termination of the reaction. No combination of system failure, operator error, natural disaster or sabotage can cause the fusion reaction to run away. A nuclear explosion, melt down or similar catastrophic accident is not possible. A violent event, one of sufficient magnitude to disrupt the total reactor, could cause a chemical or electrical fire similar to any industrial fire. 

In the United States, commercial nuclear power plant operators are required to monitor and report any detectable quantities of radioactive materials released to the environment (NRC 1996). Table 6-1 summarizes releases of radiostrontium isotopes with half-lives >8 hours to the atmosphere and water for 1993 from PWR and BWR nuclear power plants. Nearly all of the radioactive material reported as released in effluents are from planned releases from normal plant operation or anticipated operational occurrences. The latter includes unplanned releases of radioactive materials from miscellaneous actions such as equipment failure, operator error, or procedure error, and are not of such consequence as to be considered an accident (NRC 1993b). 

If one of the solenoid valves has the mechanical failure, TCU will not find the failure. At this time, the failure operation of transmission will be determined according to the solenoid valve with failure. The characteristic of different solenoid valve failure is listed in Table 6.1.2. 

Technologies were reviewed to determine if a common process failure (e.g., explosion, corrosion, mechanical failure, operator error, incorrect feeds, service failme, etc.) under normal operating conditions could lead to serious worker, community, or environmental damage. The following factors were considered ... 

CP-14 Contaminatlo n Event (Rooms 107, 110, 111, 112)-SCB manipulator boot/ penetration confinement failure (Zone D- SCB manipulator boot/ penetration fatigue/failure operator error external forces applied to SCBs (natural phenomena/ external event) Mechanical properties of boot penetration ventilation (AP) control prevents leaks by inward flow operator procedure, training II Audible SCB (AP) monitor Ventilation flow (AP) shielding Procedure, training -Workers D -Collocated workers D -Public D -Environment D 3 3 3 3 manipulator boot/ penetration integrity -Regular boot replacement for manipulator maintenance... 

Mechanical interlock (prevents removal of cover with cask lid captured) Cover raised with captured cask lid Mechanical Failure Operator applies excessive force Visual observation, RAM Alarm Access control, evacuation Potential for high radiation in room 111. 

Uninterruptible power supply (UPS). We adopted the design criterion that the criticMity alarm system should, during power failure, operate from a UPS dedicated to the alarm system. 

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