CBRN

CBrN 506-68-3) see Anagrelide hydrochloride Desloratadine Epinastine hydrochloride Fluoxetine Nalorphine Naloxone Pergolide cyanogen chloride... 

Self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBAs) or air purifying respirators (APRs) should have a National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and Chemical/Biological/Radiological/Nuclear (CBRN) certification. However, during emergency... 

Matousek J. Forms and material sources of CBRN-Terrorism. Symposium on nuclear,... 

The deadly terrorist bombings of July 7, 2005 in London again demonstrated that even sophisticated terrorists capable of planning and executing multiple, coordinated attacks continue to rely on traditional weapons rather than risk the technical and political uncertainty of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons. While terrorists have the motivations and capabilities to conduct large (and small) attacks worldwide, we have not yet witnessed the use of so called weapons of mass destruction (WMD) foreshadowed by the 1995 Sarin attacks in... 

In addition to the organized and loose networks that generally fund their own activities, there are a number of states that sponsor terrorism. This is of particular concern with regards to weapons of mass destruction, because the numerous resources that can be brought to bear in state development of CBRN weapons can in turn be transferred to terrorists. Disincentives do exist to prevent this proliferation. As of October 2004, the United States lists six countries as state sponsors of terrorism Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Of these, five are pursuing WMD to one degree or another. Libya repudiated its WMD program as discussed below. 

Arrests, the loss of sanctuary and the freezing of assets have diminished some threats, but it has spawned others as terrorists adjust to being the focus of the global war on terrorism. What will be the balance Will loss of sanctuary and financial resources prevent terrorists from developing or acquiring CBRN that can be used to mass effect Or will the global war on terrorism embolden terrorists and states to share and use CBRN While terrorists continue to use traditional weapons in innovative ways, a primary concern is terrorist adoption of CBRN weapons in the future. The potential for this is explored next. 

As discussed above, several states that support terrorism have some CBRN capabilities, so the technical constraint alone is not limiting. Rather, the potential backlash against any state that provides a terrorist organization with CBRN has been a sufficient deterrent to this point. However groups such as al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and the Tamil Tigers have shown significant interest in one or more types of unconventional weapons. 

With the spread of information and the desperation for hard currency of some of the state sponsors of terrorism, as well as the changing national security environment, it is possible that terrorists may build or acquire CBRN in the future. 

Bolton s opinion was bolstered in June 2005 by Senator Richard Lu-gar s survey of 85 non-proliferation and national security analysts from the United States and other nations. It was designed in part to characterize the risks related to the terrorist use of CBRN. The survey revealed that experts believe the probability of an attack somewhere in the world with a CBRN weapon was 50% over the next five years and 70% over the next ten. An attack with a radiological weapon was seen as the most probable with the likelihood of an attack with a nuclear or biological weapon considered about half as plausible [37]. The average probability of a nuclear attack in the next ten years was nearly 30%, with experts almost evenly divided between terrorist acquisitions of a working nuclear weapon versus self-construction [37]. The average risk estimate over ten years for major chemical and biological attacks was 20%. Senator Lu-gar concluded The bottom line is this for the foreseeable future, the United States and other nations will face an existential threat from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. ... 

A number of trends discussed above favor the eventual use of CBRN weapons. The willingness to commit mass murder is primary among them. Cross fertilization among terrorist groups increases the likelihood that terrorists will develop and use more sophisticated tactics and weapons as groups share information and resources on materials, methods, and tactics. Splinter groups are seen as more likely to attempt innovation and the spread of technology will put the power to develop ever more sophisticated weapons in the hands of terrorists. 

There are several specific factors that indicate terrorist groups are making progress in the pursuit of CBRN materials and technology. A few highlights include ... 

Al Qaeda in particular continues to pursue unconventional weapons, both leveraging existing commercially available agents and technologies and creating CBRN weapons. According to Rohan Gunaratna, The... 

Despite significant interest in unconventional weapons, there have been few instances of widespread death or incapacitation due to CBRN use by terrorists, and the number of casualties pales in comparison to those killed by more conventional explosives, armed attacks and arson. Since 1968, more than 14,000 people have been killed by bombing, and nearly 6,000 by armed attack, but CBRN attacks have accounted for less than 20 deaths [41]. The two most notorious unconventional attacks in modern history, Aum Shinrikyo s gassing of a Tokyo subway in 1995 and the anthrax attacks in the U.S. in the fall of 2001, killed a total of 17 people. The food poisoning by the Rajneeshees in Oregon in 1984 has also received much attention. While there were no fatalities when the cult poisoned several salad bars with Salmonella, there were more than 700 injuries. 

There are a number of reasons for the absence of CBRN attacks including the technical and material challenges. In addition, while al Qaeda is set to destroy the West, few other groups have the motivation to kill large numbers of people. Other factors include terrorists prefer the certainty of conventional weapons to the uncertainty of CBRN the weapons can be hazardous to the terrorists themselves the response to a CBRN terrorist attack may result in further degradation of terrorist capabilities and finally political support of the terrorist organization s base may be turned away by the use of unconventional tactics. 

While there have been few successful or large-scale CBRN attacks, experts clearly believe that attacks will be more sophisticated and occur more frequently in the future. Because the threat is difficult to predict policy makers have made tremendous investments in response and recovery efforts. One small part of this effort has been an investment in the science, technology and role of sensors. 

Given the successes of the war on terrorism and the caveats listed above, research on sensors should address near term threats such as metals in weapons, explosives and improvised explosive devices (fEDs), and suicide packs, while continuing to address the longer-term threats of CBRN. 

HSPD - 18 Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass Destruction. Establishes policy guidelines to draw upon the considerable potential of the scientific community in the public and private sectors to address medical countermeasure requirements relating to CBRN threats. 

At the beginning of the twenty-first century new threats to human well being have emerged, which stem from terrorist activities. Potential use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear warfare (CBRN) in terrorist events is considered to be very likely, and on a small scale it has already been used in the past. CBRN threat however is not limited to malicious intentions and can be caused by a careless attitude towards the use of technology and equipment, breach of safety rules, or triggered by natural disasters or environmental pollution. 

---