Weapons verification plans

Have unimpeded access to all parts of the chemical weapons destruction facilities and the chemical weapons storage facilities located at such facilities, including any munitions, devices, bulk containers, or other containers, therein. The items to be inspected shall be chosen by the inspectors in accordance with the verification plan that has been agreed to by the inspected State Party and approved by the Executive Council ... 

The reliable verification of chemicals related to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC-related chemicals) depends essentially on the collection of good samples and well-planned, effective, and reasonably simple sample preparations suitable to the method of analysis. The collection of good samples is arguably the most critical part of a successful analysis and this is discussed in a separate article (see Chapter 3). For its part, proper preparation of samples requires a thorough understanding of the behavior of the various types of chemicals in different sample matrices, both before and during... 

After a review of the detailed facility information for each destruction facility, the Technical Secretariat, if the need arises, shall enter into consultation with the State Party concerned in order to ensure that its chemical weapons destruction facilities are designed to assure the destruction of chemical weapons, to allow advanced planning on how verification measures may be applied and to ensure that the application of verification measures is consistent with proper facility operation, and that the facility operation allows appropriate verification. 

Not less than 180 days before the destruction of a chemical weapons production facdity starts, a State Party shall provide to the Technical Secretariat the detailed plans for destruction of the facility, including proposed measures for verification of destmction referred to in paragraph 33 (f), with respect to, inter alia. 

The purpose of systematic verification of the destruction of chemical weapons production facdities shall be to confirm that the facility is destroyed in accordance with the obhgations under this Convention and that each item on the declared inventory is destroyed in accordance with the agreed detailed plan for destruction. 

Having considered the information submitted by the Russian Federation on the adjustment of the general plan for the destruction of chemical weapons (EC-45/NAT.4, dated 26 April 2006, and Corr. 1, dated 17 May 2006), which, jointly with EC-XXVII/DG. 1, dated 26 October 2001, fully meets the requirements of Part IV(A), paragraph 25, of the Verification Annex, and constitutes a proposal to set a specific date for completion of the destruction of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation ... 

After the initial notification, the State Party shall document the status of the temporary conversion of the chemical weapons production facility in the plans that it provides pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 29 of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex. 

Akey advance in the submission and handling of declarations in the period since the First Review Conference has been the implementation of the first phase of the VIS. As at December 2007, the modules for document management of all verification-related information and for analysis of Article Vl-related declarations are operational, and work is underway on the module for planning Article Vf inspections. Modules dealing with chemical weapons data are currently being planned. 

In accordance with paragraphs 27 and 56 of Part V of the Verification Annex and the detailed plan for the destruction, inspectors shall have the right to confirm that the chemical weapons production facihty has been destroyed. 

The First Review Conference noted that a large part of the OPCW s verification resources have in the past been spent on the verification of chemical weapons destruction operations. The planned increase in chemical weapons destruction in coming years and any resource constraints will require a thorough review of the current verification methodology used for chemical weapons destruction verification, as part of the effort to optimise the verification regime of the Convention. 

Article IV concerns chemical weapons in existence at the time of the Convention s entry into force. Within 30 days, the location, quantity and detailed inventory of chemical weapons already held are to be declared, together with a general plan for the destruction of those weapons. Immediately following the declaration, states must provide access to their chemical weapons for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of the declaration through on-site inspection . There is provision for further measures involving on-site inspection and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments to ensure that chemical weapons are not removed, except to a destruction facility. 

The project SEMB analysed the threat potential which lEMI (intentional electromagnetic interference) poses to Cl in Austria. The non-classified study analysed freely available literature on respective events, available lEMI weapons and their cost, and the state of the art with respect to technical protective measures. In addition, an appropriate risk analysis method was developed, which was intended to support Cl providers in judging where in the infrastructure to prioritize improvements of protective measures. This paper describes the selection and adaptation of the risk analysis method, explains the effort-saving way of data capturing and shows how the risk assessment results are presented. Finally, some of the results are shown, which were obtained in the verification of the method on the basis of three vehicle convoy scenarios. The conclusions comprise a judgment on the benefit of the method and an outlook on further research planned. 

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