Weapons proliferation

The issue of nuclear weapons proliferation can be met, we believe, by strengthening the IntemationalAtomic Energy Agency both scientifically and by providing it with means of enforcement. 

OPEN-ENDED PROBLEMS Nuclear weapons proliferation... 

The first of the open-ended problems to be considered is nuclear weapons proliferation, in the context of its relation to commercial nuclear power. There is a connection, because a country with an active nuclear power program has a head start, in terms of equipment and technically trained people, should it decide to embark upon a weapons program. This has been a live issue in the case of han.5... 

However, future challenges faced by nuclear power also relate to operating security concerns, nuclear weapons proliferation issues and final waste management, which are reflected in a mixed public acceptance. These are crucial areas to be addressed and developed, if nuclear power should expand its share in electricity and hydrogen generation in the future. 

Nuclear Weapons Proliferation , Physics Today (April 1978), 42-51 30) SP. Marsh, LASL... 

In tlie PUREX process, the spent fuel and blanket materials are dissolved in nitric acid to form nitrates of plutonium and uranium. These are separated chemically from the other fission products, including the highly radioactive actinides, and then the two nitrates are separated into tv/o streams of partially purified plutonium and uranium. Additional processing will yield whatever purity of the two elements is desired. The process yields purified plutonium, purified uranium, and high-level wastes. See also Radioactive Wastes in the entry1 on Nuclear Power Technology. Because of the yield of purified plutonium, the PUREX process is most undesirable from a nuclear weapons proliferation standpoint,... 

By 2040-2050, natural gas reserves will be in very short supply, and the production of coal will quite likely be approaching peak production levels.19. While nuclear power plants are a source of large scale electricity generation, there exist major concerns regarding uranium supply (without breeder reactors), safety, waste disposal, and nuclear weapon proliferation. Therefore, it is prudent to explore the economic feasibility of other fuel sources such as PV electrolytic H2 for centralized, electricity generating plants. 

The RAND Corporation assembled an interdisciplinary research team to conduct this analysis. In addition to regional experts, the team included those with expertise in economics, business, political science, weapons proliferation, and terrorism. Additionally, some outside experts with unique knowledge briefed the RAND research team. 

Acquiring this information will not be easy for political, logistical, and cultural reasons, but a better understanding of the problem will help U.S. programs established to address the threat of NBC weapons proliferation to focus limited resources where they can be most effective. 

Barletta, Michael, After 9/11 Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation, Monterey, Calif Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Occasional Paper No. 8, May 2002. 

This documented briefing offers a structured assessment of the threat of NBC weapons proliferation and examines each of its key components. It examines the countries and individuals that seek to illicitly acquire expertise and sensitive knowledge as well as the institutions and types of individuals who have them. Despite fears that such diversion might occur, the empirical record of documented incidents is comparatively small. Nevertheless, the diversion of even a small number of people or a limited amount of critical information can create a significant security concern for the international community. 

The extended radiation time for the domestic fuel increases the quantity of fission products and the higher actinides. Pure plutonium product poses nuclear weapons proliferation risk and is the primary reason reprocessing is not practiced in the United States. The modified PUREX process has been practiced on an industrial scale in Europe and supports the production of mixed uranium-plutonium fuel. Blended UO2 and PUO2 powder is compacted and sinter to form the mixed oxide (MOX) fuel pellets much like the enriched UO2 fuel. Natural and depleted uranium can be used to prepare MOX fuel and is the demonstrated option to recover fuel values from spent fuel. 

On balance, a breeder-fission based energy system would appear to be sufficiently robust to provide an energy source for the replacement of fossil fuels. The attendant problems of weapons proliferation and fission product disposal are significant barriers to its use. 

MeV = 10 eV = 8.07 x 10 cm = 9.65 xlO kJ mol ). Of the 2.5 neutrons produced per fission event, one is required to maintain the nuclear reaction, 0.5 neutrons are lost to absorption and one is available to leave the core and be used experimentally. Since occurs naturally at only 0.7% abundance, the use of enriched (>90% U) uranium is required. This has lead to concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation and there is a drive to use lower levels of enrichment in research reactors. 

Burck, G. M. and Flowerree, C. C., International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation, Greenwood Press, New York, 1991. 

Avner Cohen, an expert on unconventional weapons proliferation, has catalogued reported uses of bioterrorism weapons by Jewish forces during the 1948 War of Independence in Palestine. Connectedly, the Israeli historian Uri Milstein alleged that in many conquered Arab villages, the water supply was poisoned to prevent the inhabitants from coming back. Milstein states that one of the largest of such covert operations caused the typhoid outbreak in Acre in May 1948 [121]. Within... 

The proliferation of nuclear weapons rightly remains a major global concern. While there may be geopolitical merit in European countries leading by example (for instance, by unilaterally removing highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium from their civil nuclear activities), it is important to note that all EU countries are robust in their measures to prevent proliferation. Furthermore, any European member state decision to expand nuclear power would not raise the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation in any direct way. CESSA expresses no opinion on proliferation, safety and nuclear fuel cycles issues outside the EU. 

Concerning Ceau escu s conception of the nuclear fuel cycle it is worth noting reports that prior to 1990 Romania did undertake some, at the time undeclared, research into plutonium separation, producing minute quantities of this nuclear weapons proliferation sensitive material. Romania, however, never developed a nuclear weapon and it is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (FAS, 2008). 

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