Proliferation chemical Weapons, nuclear

One of the primary concerns that precipitated the creation of the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) and Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) was that destitute individuals in the nuclear weapons research and production complex would feel compelled to sell their knowledge to obtain funds to enable their families to survive." Similar concerns contributed to the creation of programs to support individuals involved in research and production of biological and chemical weapons. Since the assessment in this report runs counter to commonly held impressions of the Russian economy, the evidence behind our conclusions is laid out in some detail. 

Another way to think about the supply of proliferation-critical knowledge in the former Soviet Union is to examine the types of individuals that are in the complexes and the knowledge they possess that would be useful to states or terrorist groups seeking to acquire nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or the know-how to develop their own weapons. 

Diversions from state-approved activities may provide significant opportunities for proliferation that equal or exceed the danger posed by illicit acquisition from the FSU. Extensive government-sponsored cooperation between FSU states, especially Russia, and regional states such as Iran, India, Libya, and Syria provides channels for officially approved and illicit transfer of critical weapons knowledge. Furthermore, secondary proliferation from China, Pakistan, and North Korea is another significant channel for the transfer of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons expertise. 

Unlike both the NPT and the BWC, the CWC establishes an implementing secretariat. The international agency for monitoring nuclear weapons non-proliferation obligations is the IAEA. Its counterpart for chemical weapons is the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The OPCW is required ... 

DOD has identified Libya, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, India, China, North Korea, and Russia as countries of concern with respect to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons capability. See Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2001. Proliferation Threat and Response, 3rd ed., Washington, D.C., January. Available online at . 

The accelerating proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in other countries around the world is probably of gravest concern. The more countries that possess such weapons— even if acquired for deterrent purposes—the greater the likelihood that such weapons will be used.1(p2)... 

Before the demise of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons was considered in the context of superpower relations. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the subsequent events have had many consequences. Regional conflicts, once constrained, are now increasingly likely to result in the use of weapons of mass destruction. Opportunities to acquire key technologies and components have expanded through the dual stimuli of underutilized technical expertise and difficult economic circumstances. Simultaneously, development and availability of applicable technologies have expanded. 

Concern about the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery has reached exceptional levels. On November 14, 1994, the President of the United States found that ...the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons ( weapons of mass destruction ) and of the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. He declared a national emergency to deal with the threat. This executive order (12938) was extended on November 8, 1995 November 12, 1996 and again on November 12, 1997. 

The use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war has illustrated the most serious weakness of the current regime the absence of full universality. It has always been the intention of States Parties to the CWC to aim at universality. Indeed, even treaty provisions (among others those on export controls) serve that purpose. Syria has now become a State Party to the CWC—even though, arguably, only as a result of coercive diplomacy. The remaining non-parties should indeed join the regime. But, unfortunately, in some cases the nexus to the nuclear weapons issue remains a problem. Whether the current efforts to clarify the substance of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will eventually contribute to the CWC s universality is an open question. 

The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons involves a spread in the possession of weapons or of the capability to produce them. Like nuclear proliferation, this phenomenon can have a vertical as well as a horizontal dimension - that is, it can involve the development, refinement, or accretion of weapons by the great powers as well as the spread of capabilities to countries outside the orbits of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. It can also imply qualitative as much as quantitative developments, since the use of new agents or combinations of agents or new delivery systems could affect the tactical utility of chemical weapons or their effectiveness as a deterrent. 

The proliferation of chemical weapons has aroused concern, largely because they are often bracketed with nuclear and biological weapons and described as weapons of mass destruction. While these are all area weapons, their destructive effects vary enormously on any target area. They also vary among chemical weapons themselves, with mass... 

The United States Will Lead tim CNirge to Esetend Inctefintteiy the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, to Enact a Comprehensive Nuci r T Ban and to ELIMINATE CHEMICAL WEAPONS ... 

Decides that none of the obligations set forth in this resolution shall be interpreted so as to conflict with or alter the rights and obligations of State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or alter the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ... 

Research by chemists and chemical engineers will be needed for the development of new analytical techniques to detect nuclear proliferation threats and treaty violations. This will require establishing the characteristic signatures of both production and testing of weapons. Detection of these signatures will depend on chemical spectroscopy techniques, and advances in remote sensing. 

Bolton s opinion was bolstered in June 2005 by Senator Richard Lu-gar s survey of 85 non-proliferation and national security analysts from the United States and other nations. It was designed in part to characterize the risks related to the terrorist use of CBRN. The survey revealed that experts believe the probability of an attack somewhere in the world with a CBRN weapon was 50% over the next five years and 70% over the next ten. An attack with a radiological weapon was seen as the most probable with the likelihood of an attack with a nuclear or biological weapon considered about half as plausible [37]. The average probability of a nuclear attack in the next ten years was nearly 30%, with experts almost evenly divided between terrorist acquisitions of a working nuclear weapon versus self-construction [37]. The average risk estimate over ten years for major chemical and biological attacks was 20%. Senator Lu-gar concluded The bottom line is this for the foreseeable future, the United States and other nations will face an existential threat from the intersection of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. ... 

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