Understanding and Interpreting Safety

Investigators working theory of safety structures how they interpret incidents, understand risks and manage improvement. This working theory is typically left implicit and unarticulated. It is not neatly documented or carefully defined, but is revealed through investigators daily practice and in the way they analyse and communicate about safety incidents and risks. This practical theory of safety provides an interpretive framework, or interpretive schema, within which investigators 

A key idea used by investigators to understand this protection, and one ubiquitous in the field of safety management, is that of organisational safety defences. Such defences are understood by investigators as taking the form of practical, social and technical activities that are intended to catch and correct failures. These defences are not seen as passive things, but as active practices that are carried out by personnel in interaction 

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And, sometimes it takes a little effort to find the information. This chapter helps students begin to understand how to find and interpret safety information. The World Wide Web has made this finding fairly easy but it takes some knowledge to do the interpreting correctly This chapter is one of three chapters covering the first principle of safety recognizing hazards. 

The Savannah River Site (SRS) reactor operation has traditionally been controlled by the instructions in detailed operating procedures. In 1975, safety requirements were established in the Technical Specifications and more specific controls were established in the Technical Standards to identify overall plant safety requirements, which were previously determined by supervisors. The supervisor was responsible for understanding and interpreting the technical bases supporting these documents, which were described in other safety documents such as technical reports and technical manuals. It was determined that this process was deficient in human factors considerations, that it lacked an integrated approach, and that the validity of some of the technical bases were not well established and documented. 

Using clear procedures to ensure wearing of appropriate safety equipment (avoid gray areas of interpretation). Avoid having complex criteria for determining the recommended personnel protective equipment (simple is easier to understand and to follow). 

The DOE and private industry have learned many lessons from years of experienee in site remediation. This book will refer to seleeted lessons learned from the DOE, the Army Corps of Engineers, private industry, and personal experienee. After reading this book the reader should have a better understanding of how to interpret the hazardous waste requirements to make sure eomplianee is maintained at a high level for eaeh site-speeifie aetivity. Over and above eomplianee, the authors eneourage the development of health and safety programs to help build a sound and workable safety eulture that ean be utilized aeross all boundaries. 

As we proceed with discussing the various system properties and measurement methods that can be used to investigate water and solids mobility, it is important to keep in mind the influence the complexity of food systems, such as in the ice cream example just discussed, can have on our ability to measure, interpret, understand, and predict food quality, stability, and safety. 

The requirements of 21 CFR Part 11 apply well beyond the laboratory environment, but do stand as supplemental to and interpretative of the GLP in automated laboratory environments. Comphance requires an understanding of the key elements of the Part 11 document, and the formulation of a strategy that assures safety, regulatory acceptance, and cost-effective management. 

New rules and interpretations change, cases make precedents, but the concepts that Tom has explicitly put before you are key to your understanding and survivability in the unique environment in safety, legal, and making a difference. 

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