Safety interlock system

By attempting to maintain process conditions at or near their design values, the process controls so attempt to prevent abnormal conditions from developing within the process. Although process controls can be viewed as a protective layer, this is really a by-product and not the primaiy func tion. Where the objective of a function is specifically to reduce risk, the implementation is normally not within the process controls. Instead, the implementation is within a separate system specifically provided to reduce risk. This system is generally referred to as the safety interlock system. 

Where hazardous conditions can develop within a process, a protective system of some type must be provided. Sometimes these are in the form of process hardware such as pressure rehef devices. However, sometimes logic must be provided for the specific purpose of taking the process to a state where the hazardous condition cannot exist. The term safety interlock. system is normally used to designate such logic. 

The purpose of the logic within the safety interlock system is veiy different from the logic within the process controls. Fortunately, the logic within the safety interlock system is normally much simpler than the logic within the process controls. This simplicity means that a hardwired implementation of the safety interlock system is usually an option. Should a programmable implementation be chosen, this simplicity means that latent defects in the software are less likely to be present. Most safety systems only have to do simple things, but they must do them very, very well. 

The difference in the nature of process controls and safety interlock systems leads to the conclusion that these two should be physically separated (see Fig. 8-89). That is, safety interlocks should not be piggy-backed onto a process-control system. Instead, the safety interlocks should be provided by equipment, either hard-wired or programmable, that is dedicated to the safety functions. As the process controls become more complex, faults are more likely. Separation means that faults within the process controls have no consequences in the safety interlock system. 

Modifications to the process controls are more frequent than modifications to the safety interlock system. Therefore, physically separating the safety interlock system from the process controls provides the following benefits ... 

The possibility of a change to the process controls leading to an unintentional change to the safety interlock system is eliminated. 

Although the traditional point of reference for safety interlock systems is a hard-wired implementation, a programmed implementation is an alternative. The potential for latent defects in software implementation is a definite concern. Another concern is that solid-state components are not guaranteed to fail to the safe state. The former is addressed by extensive testing the latter is addressed by manufacturer-supplied and/or user-supplied diagnostics that are routinely executed by the processor within the safety interlock system. Although issues must be addressed in programmable implementations, the hard-wired implementations are not perfect either. 

Implementation of process interlocks within process control systems is perfectly acceptable. Furthermore, it is also permissible (and probably advisable) that responsible operations personnel be authorized to bypass or ignore a process. Safety interlocks must be implemented within the separate safety interlock system. Bypassing or ignoring safety interlocks by operations personnel is simply not permitted. When this is necessary for ac tions such as verifying that the interlock continues to be func tional, such situations must be infrequent and incorporated into the design of the interlock. 

Basic Process Control System (BPCS) and Safety Interlock System (SIS)... 

There are few chemical plants that are so forgiving that a control system or a safety interlock system is not required. Process engineers provide controls to assure product yield and quality and maintain safe operating conditions. This type of control system is a BPCS. The BPCS acts to alarm and moderate a high or low operating condition specified by the normal operating limits within the never exceed critical limits. The SIS is provided to shut down or otherwise place the process in a safe state if the BPCS fails to maintain safe operating conditions. A BPCS should not be used as the sole source of a process safety shutdown. 

Introduction The chemical processing industry relies on many types of instrumented systems, e.g., the basic process control systems (BPCSs) and safety instrumented system (SIS). The BPCS controls the process on a continuous basis to maintain it within prescribed control limits. Operators supervise the process and, when necessary, take action on the process through the BPCS or other independent operator interface. The SIS detects the existence of unacceptable process conditions and takes action on the process to bring it to a safe state. In the past, these systems have also been called emergency shutdown systems, safety interlock systems, and safety critical systems. 

A control system designed to automatically change the operating conditions such that the COP is no longer outside the Never-Exceed-Limit (N-E-L). The system may shutdown the operation or it may change conditions such that operation continues in a different mode. The Safety Interlock System must be independent from the normal control system to avoid "common mode" failure where one failure defeats both the normal control system and the Safety Interlock System. 

Safety Interlock systems should preferentially be set below the N-E-L. 

If a Safety Interlock System exists, describe what is to happen when shutdown is triggered for example, reactor feed MV closes, reactor vent MV opens, etc.)... 

Safety interlocks. These are designed to protect the public, the plant personnel, and possibly the plant equipment from process hazards. These are implemented within the safety interlock system. 

The process hazards analysis is conducted by an experienced, multidisciplinary team that examines the process design, plant equipment, operating procedures, and so on, using techniques such as hazard and operability studies (HAZOP), failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), and others. The process hazards analysis recommends appropriate measures to reduce the risk, including (but not limited to) the safety interlocks to be implemented in the safety interlock system. 

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