Safety evaluation, philosophies

It has become necessary to question the use of in vivo safety evaluation studies in animals because of the pressure from society to reduce the use of live animals in medical research. Consequently, there has been an increase in the exploration and use of various in vitro systems in toxicity testing. The current philosophy is embodied in the concept of the three R s replacement, reduction, and refinement. Thus if possible, live animals should be replaced with alternatives. If this is not possible, then measures should be adopted to reduce the numbers used. Finally, research workers should also refine the methods used to ensure greater animal welfare and reduction in distress and improve the quality of the data derived, if possible. 

Recently, a new fuel can design was adopted that mandated a new criticality safety evaluation. The safety philosophy used was to assume that the cans had filled with water while in pool storage. Hie original worst-case accident scenario involved dilution of the gadolinium soluble poison from 4.3 to 2.6 g/S by water in the cans during fuel dissolution in a stagnant dissolver, along with dissolution of uranium to the saturation level of 610 g U/S. A quick look at... 

DDESB policies, philosophy, and safety criteria are reflected in published chemical ammunition standards which were published in the Federal Register (41 FR 20686) and in DoD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards (1 ). These standards are used to review the site plans, safety submissions, and in conducting worldwide safety surveys of activities that store or handle DoD chemical ammunition. The surveys, however, are not conducted just to evaluate compliance with chemical ammunition and explosives safety standards. The surveys are a means whereby the DDESB Secretariat can keep informed on the military departments safety posture, determine the need for new standards or change to existing ones, and detect hazardous conditions. 

As shown in Figure 19.1, the offshore oil and gas business is especially dependent on contractors— ranging from very large companies all the way to small organizations and individuals. The agency responsible for offshore safety in the United States is the BSEE. This agency has paid particular attention to the management of contractors. Their philosophy is that the responsibility for what takes place offshore lies with the operator and that the operator therefore has to make sure that the contractors work safely and in conformance with the rules. It is up to the operator to ensure that the contractor knows what to do and that all contract workers are properly trained and evaluated. 

Feedback from the evaluation survey was useful for providing insights into the perception of the purpose of OHS MS in the workplace As a general statement most of the OHS system is focused on being a defensive document. .. rather than trying to continually improve safety. For me there are two main components to safe operation the safety you can build into the process. .. and the safe behaviours we bring to the operation. .. the ideal system would be a balance of both of these philosophies. ... 

The basic process control requirements can be established only after an operating philosophy has been developed. The process variables to be controlled must be established. The desired location of measuring elements, control valves, and controllers must be determined. The safety aspects and operational information must be evaluated. 

As the nuclear ftiel recycle industry grows, the probability of a criticality accident will tend to grow proportionately unless current criticality safety control is improved. (Accident Probability < Probability per Plant times Number of Plants.) Optimum control of criticality safety requires an overview of the entire system. The relationships between the criticality safety philosophy, the criticality data, the use of the data, and various human Victors must be considered. Application of the foult tree analysis (FTA) methodology will permit identification of the important control foctors and their relationships, indication of what is required to reduce the accident probability per plant, and systematic evaluation of our current criticality safety position. FTA is not new but the application to criticality safety presented in this... 

In its general form, the basic framework accordingly shall include analysis of cause frequency and consequence, justification of control measure, and final evaluation, as shown in Fig. 11/4.1.5-1. The entire procedure is greatly influenced by a number of factors such as people, viewing the system, appropriate selection of analysis process control measure, updating, and maintenance as shown. The operator s safety philosophy plays vital role in modifying the stmcture of risk analysis. If the intent is to... 

Thus, IRIS has adopted the internal CRDMs as reference (traditional CRDMs remaining as backup) because (1) they eliminate the corrosion problem, (2) they are one more implementation of the safety-by-design IRIS philosophy, and (3) current advancements which have occurred in Japan in regard to the electromagnetic concept, while internally to the IRIS project. Polytechnic of Milan has further advanced the hydraulic drive concept. IRIS is currently evaluating candidate concepts for the internal CRDMs to proceed with the preliminary design of the chosen one. 

A simple answer to this first question is a simple yes. Or at least, I believe that if your company is well managed, the answer should be a simple yes. Maybe your company philosophy does not link performance evaluations with safety performance. This is a mistake. K your aim is to further develop or define your safety culture, there is—or at least there should be—a link between safety performance and performance evaluations. So, the answer to the first question is a definite YES. If safety is not part of your general performance evaluations or reviews, you should seriously consider making some changes. 

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