Relief Valve System Design

Conventional PR valves and discharge systems should be designed such that built-up back pressure does not exceed 10% of set pressure (both measured in psig), to avoid chattering problems. In the case where a pressure relief valve system is sized for fire conditions, with 21 % overpressure, built-up back pressure up to 21 % of set pressure is permissible. However, the lower rates resulting from other contingencies still must meet the 10% limitation. 

Most hydraulic systems use a positive displacement pump to generate energy within the system. Unless the pressure is controlled, these pumps will generate excessive pressure that can cause catastrophic failure of system component. A relief valve is always installed downstream of the hydraulic pump to prevent excessive pressure and to provide a positive relief should a problem develop within the system. The relief valve is designed to open at a preset system pressure. When the valve opens, it diverts flow to the receiver tank or reservoir. 

The reaction vessel is provided with a pressure relief venting system which includes a small spring-loaded relief valve the design also permits the lifting of the entire cover if necessary. 

Not only must PSI be maintained up-to-date, but it must also be available to employees who work with or on the covered equipment. Many companies use electronic media Only one copy has to be maintained, and all employees who have access to the organization s computer system should have access to the PSI. In some cases, a real-time electronic P ID is available in which employees can access a particular piece of equipment on the P ID and, from there, can access the details of that equipment, such as the MSDS, vessel thickness, the pump curve data, pressure relief valve sizing, design basis, etc. The regulation does not require electronic information hence hard copies maintained in the control rooms or the supervisor s office are considered acceptable. Irrespective of the format, it still must be maintained up-to-date. ... 

The design of relief valve systems includes the criteria of local stresses at the header-to-relief valve inlet piping junction and the stresses in the relief valve inlet piping and header. 

In the LTOP mode, each SCS relief valve is designed to protect the reactor vessel given a single failure in addition to the failure that i iitiated the pressure transient. The event initiating the pressure transient is considered to result from either an operator error or equipment malfunction. The SCS relief valve system is independent of a loss of offsite power. Each SCS relief valve is a self actuating spring-loaded liquid relief valve which does not require control circuitry. The valve opens when the RCS pressure exceeds its setpoint. 

Relief valves are designed to respond automatically to sudden increases in pressure. A relief valve opens at a predetermined pressure. In a relief valve, a disc is held in place by a spring that will not open until system pressure exceeds its operating limits. Tremendous pressures can be generated in process units. When a system overpressurizes, safety valves respond to allow excess pressure to be vented to the flare header or atmosphere. This prevents damage to equipment and personnel. Relief valves are designed to open slowly, and thus are best for pressurized liquid service. They do not respond well in gas service, where quicker pressure reduction is needed. 

Safety valves are considered to be a process system s last line of defense. They are designed to respond quickly to excess vapor or gas pressure. This type of valve is very similar in design to a relief valve. The three major differences between a relief valve and a safety valve are (1) liquid versus gas service, (2) pressure response time, and (3) size of exhaust port. Relief valves are designed to lift slowly, whereas safety valves tend to pop off. Because the exhaust port is much larger... 

Comment There are a number of designs that employ pneumatic, hydraulic, or electrical systems to actuate relief valves. Some designs attach directly to the spring-loaded rehef valves and others may use a bah valve combined with a motor-driven operator, such as the one shown in Fig. 5.194. 

Safety Relief Valves Conventional safety relier valves (Fig. 26-14) are used in systems where built-up backpressures typically do not exceed 10 percent of the set pressure. The spring setting or the valve is reduced by the amount of superimposed backpressure expecied. Higher built-up backpressures can result in a complete loss of continuous valve capacity. The designer must examine the effects of other relieving devices connected to a common header on the performance of each valve. Some mechanical considerations of conventional relief valves are presented in the ASME code however, the manufacturer should be consulted for specific details. 

Rupture Disks A rupture disk is a device designed to function by the bursting of a pressure-retaining disk (Fig. 26-15). This assembly consists of a thin, circular membrane usually made of metal, plastic, or graphite that is firmly clamped in a disk holder. When the process reaches the bursting pressure of the disk, the disk ruptures and releases the pressure. Rupture disks can be installed alone or in combination with other types of devices. Once blown, rupture disks do not reseat thus, the entire contents of the upstream process equipment will be vented. Rupture disks are commonly used in series (upstream) with a relief valve to prevent corrosive fluids from contacting the metal parts of the valve. In addition, this combination is a reclosing system. 

Ah regulator, relief valve, and relay settings must be doeumented by the vendor. The expander-eompressor lube system must be test-run at design differential pressure with the reservoir vented to atmosphere. 

If casing limitations are fixed by user-supplied relief valves, this information should be conveyed to keep the vendor from rating the compressors on other data. Evaluations can be more of a problem if the same design basis isn t universal with all vendors. Startup and shutdown consideration influence various components, shaft end seals, seal system pressures, and even thrust bearings in some instances. The use of an alternate startup gas, or the desire to operate a gas compressor on air to aid in plant piping dryout should be covered. 

Design of Closed Systems for Pressure Relief Valves... 

Conventional Flare System - The majority of pressure relief valve discharges which must be routed to a closed system are manifolded into a conventional blowdown drum and flare system. The blowdown drum serves to separate liquid and vapor so that the vapor portion can be safely flared, and the separated liquid is pumped to appropriate disposal facilities. The blowdown drum may be of the condensible or noncondensible type, according to the characteristics of the streams entering the system. Selection criteria, as well as the design basis for each type of blowdown drum, are detailed later in this volume. The design of flares, including seal drums and other means of flashback protection, is described later. 

Some method of pressure relief is required on all pressure vessels and for other proeess equipment where inereasing pressure might rupture the vessel. Mueh of the piping used in modern ehemieal operations also requires overpressure proteetion. Safety relief valves or rupture dises are employed for pressure relief. In many eases, either a rupture dise or a safety relief valve ean be used. Safety relief valves are usually used for proeess proteetion and rupture dises are used for vessel proteetion. The safety relief valve or rupture dise must be designed to operate at a known pressure and prevent the pressure within the system from inereasing. Therefore, it is important to eon-sider the flowrate the valve ean handle. 

S. Evaluate the acid relief neutralization system in HE alkylation units to ensure its adequacy tor neutralizing design basis relief valve discharges and unit ventings... 

The ASME code requires every pressure vessel that can be blocked in to have a relief valve to alleviate pressure build up due to thermal expan sion of trapped gases or liquids. In addition, the American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice (API RP) 14C, Analysis, Design, Installation and Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems on Offshore Production Platforms, recommends that relief valves be installed at vari ous locations in the production system and API RP 520, Design and Installation of Pressure Relieving Systems in Refineries, recommends various conditions for sizing relief valves. 

In summary, the back-pressure for relief valves should be limited to the following values unless the valve is compensated. We do not recommend using a relief valve with higher back-pressure than shown below without consulting a person knowledgeable in relief valve sizing and relief system design. 

Many operators use a simpler system, using V for pressure vessel, T" for tank, P for pump, C for compressor, and E for heat exchanger, in which case the relief valve would be designated ... 

Relief valves are often seen to be undersized for the required relieving rate, due either to poor initial design or changes in the process conditions which occurred during design. The most common system problem is that the relief valve was adequately sized for blocked discharge but not sized for the flowrate that could occur as a result of a failure in the open position of an upstream control valve (i.e., gas blowby). See Chapter 13. 

A visible cloud of vapor, 1 m deep, spread for 150 m and was ignited by a car that had stopped on a nearby road 25 minutes after the leak started. The road had been closed by the police, but the driver approached from a side road. The fire flashed back to the sphere, which was surrounded by flames. There was no explosion. The sphere was fitted with water sprays. But the system was designed to deliver only haif the quantity of water normally reeommended (0.2 U.S. gal/ft- min. or 8 L/m min.), and the supply was inadequate. When the fire brigade started to use its hoses, the supply to the spheres ran dry. The firemen seemed to have used most of the available w ater for cooling neighboring spheres to stop the fire from spreading, in the belief that the relief valve would pro-teet the vessel on fire. 

The view is therefore growing that we should try to design plants so that they are safe even if there is a fault in the software. This can be done by adding on independent safety systems, such as relief valves and hardwired trips and interlocks, or by designing inherently safer plants that remove the hazards instead of controlling them (see Chapter 21). 

Many accidents, particularly on batch plants, have been due to runaway reactions, that is, reactions that get out of control. The reaction becomes so rapid that the cooling system cannot prevent a rapid rise in temperature, and/or the relief valve or rupture disc cannot prevent a rapid rise in pressure, and the reactor ruptures. Examples are described in the chapter on human error (Sections 3.2.1 e and 3.2.8), although the incidents were really due to poor design, which left traps into which someone ultimately fell. 

The system is a storage tank designed to hold a flammable liquid under a low positive nitrogen pressure (see Figure 5.1). This pressure is controlled by PICA-1. A relief valve is fitted which operates if overpressurization occurs. Liquid is fed to the tank from a tank truck, and is subsequently supplied to the process by the pump P-1. 

---