Safety cases regulations

Lees, P.P., and Ang, M.L. (1989) Safety Cases Within the Control of Industrial Major (CIMAH) Regulations 1984, Butterworth, London. 

L 30 A guide to Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992... 

A guide to the Installation, Verification and Miscellaneous Aspects of Amendments by the Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc) Regulations 1996 to the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992... 

In the United Kingdom, the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974) and regulations made under it require occupiers to provide a safe plant and system of work and adequate instruction, training, and supervision. In the European community, occupiers of major hazard sites are required to produce a safety case, which describes how hazards have been assessed and are kept under control. Many other countries have similar legislation, though standards of enforcement vary. 

The preparation of safety cases under the CIMAH regulations is covered by Lees and Ang (1989). The company is required to report any major incident to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). 

The regulatory environment is changing in Victoria with introduction from March 2000 of the Major Hazard Facilities Regulations, based on the Seveso II Directives. These are expected to flow on to the other states considered in this chapter. The key requirement of these regulations is the preparation of a Safety Case, which must demonstrate, among other requirements, that the risk from the new plant has been reduced to as low as is reasonably practicable - ALARP . The plants will incorporate a number of design features intended to reduce the risk from the facilities and demonstrate compliance with this criterion. 

The concept of a safety case comes from the requirements of the European Union/European Community (EU/EC) Seveso Directive (82/501/EC) and, in particular, regulations that the United Kingdom and other member states used to implement that directive. United Kingdom regulations (Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards [CIMAH], 1984 replaced by Control of Major Accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances [COMAH] in 1999) require that major hazardous facilities produce a safety report or safety case.64 The requirement for a safety case is initiated by a list of chemicals and a class of flammables. Like the hazard analysis approach (Section 8.1.2), experts identify the reactive hazards of the process if analysis shows that the proposed process is safe, it may be excluded from additional regulatory requirements. 

Health and Safety Executive (HSE), A Guide to the Offshore Installations (Safety Case Regulations 1992. HMSO, London, U.K., 1992. 

Hamilton, S.F., Sunding, D.L. and Zilberman, D. (2003) Public goods and the value of product quality regulations the case of food safety. Journal of Public Economics 87 (3-4), 799-817. 

Any risk-benefit analysis should be clearly set out in the safety case with the appropriate justification, rationale and supporting evidence. The complexity of the arguments involved warrant close cooperation between manufacturers, users and regulators. In most cases the inclusion of potential benefits in the safety case is simply not required in HIT CRM and, if anything, introduces subjective noise into an otherwise objective methodology. 

When used to accurately summarise risk, communicate controls and contribute to a safety culture, the safety case is an invaluable tool in assuring a HIT system. However, the value of the safety case can quickly be eroded should it be seen as an administrative exercise or a simple means to an end to satisfy management, a regulator or contractual requirement. All too often the potential hazards associated with a system are only thought about when development of the safety case begins. This... 

Environmental risks are normally controlled by rules and regulations rather than an analysis of risk. They are also assessed and controlled through the use of Environmental Impact Assessments, which are rather like Safety Cases (Chapter 2) in that they require the facility management to account for environmental values in their decisions and to justify those decisions in light of detailed environmental studies and public comments on the potential environmental impacts (Holder, 2004). 

A formal plan is written according to a format and outline provided by the regulator. In some cases, for example, the EPA s RMP, the plan is filed but no action is taken by the agency. In other cases, e.g., safety cases in the United Kingdom, the plan is not only filed, but it is also approved by the agency (the Health, Safety and Environment (HSE)). 

At the heart of the safety case approach lies an understanding that is the operator of a facility—not the regulator—who decides how to ensure safe operations. This nonprescriptive approach to the management of safety is similar to the manner in which most PSM programs are prepared and administered. The operator of the facility, known as the duty holder, develops a safety system that is pertinent to that particular facility. The duty holder s performance is then assessed against his or her own standard. 

The safety case need not contain detailed procedures, calculations, drawings, or plans, but should contain sufficient information to allow the regulator to assess whether the systems and conclusions presented in the safety case are reasonable. General documentary evidence that supports the conclusions reached in the safety case should be referenced, and the regulator given access to the relevant documentation where necessary. 

The stories we tell should have a resolution. In the case of major events such as Piper Alpha or Deepwater Horizon, the resolution could be new ways of managing safety (Safety Cases) or the introduction of new regulations (SEMS). Even less dramatic stories should always provide guidance to better behaviors or improved management systems. 

Safety of the Windscale Vitrification Plant is demonstrated by a safety case, which is required by the UK Regulators to justify continued operation, key items of safety equipment, and key operating procedures identified within the Safety Case. 

Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/3117). For more discussion on the UK regulations, see Chapter 6 in this volume and Paterson, J. (2011) Health and safety at work offshore , in G. Gordon, ]. Paterson and E. Ujenmez (eds.) Oil and Gas Law-Current Practice and Emerging Trends. Second Edition. Dundee University Dundee pp. 1-13 (hereinafter, Paterson, Health and Safety at Work Offshore [2011]). 

Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the workforce involvement is qnite an important aspect of the health and safely regime. However, unlike in Norway, the regulator is not a direct party to dialogues between the workforce and the employers insofar as health and safety of offshore work is concerned. The dialogue is between the employees and the operators, and usually takes place in preparation of the safety cases and, since 2006, in the periodic reviews of, or in the revisions of, the safety cases. ... 

Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/3117) Schedule 2, para. 3 amending the Offshore Installations (Safety Representatives and Safety Committees) Regulations 1989 (SI 1989/971). 

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